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An analysis of the 1987-88 Persian Gulf crisis is
pursued by examining the relationship between the stated
political objectives and the military means (role of force)
used in attempting to attain those goals. The purpose of
this study is twofold: First, to evaluate the "strategic"
process that led to U.S. involvement in the Gulf and
determine how effective that process was in achieving the
stated political goals. And second, to evaluate allied
cooperation and NATO's effort to address Persian Gulf
security issues and its subsequent impact on the U.S.
reflagging policy. The study does not evaluate tactics but
rather focuses on the strategic perspective of U.S. Persian
Gulf policy in terms of the relationship between ends and
means, objectives and resources, and capabilities and
intentions
.
U.S. policy is found to be strategically deficient as
the military tactic of protecting Kuwaiti ships was not
placed in a comprehensive strategic context. The confusion
over the proper definition of the objective allowed the
available options to remain limited to two unattractive
alternatives: reflag and protect Kuwaiti ships or abandon
the public commitment to Kuwait and suffer the loss of
credibility in the Arab world. Moreover, the strategic
course of action chosen to achieve the stated political
objectives depended on Iraqi war aims and Iranian restraint
vi

to succeed. Similarly, by framing the initial protection of
shipping plan in unilateral terms and then pursuing
diplomatic efforts to enlarge the commitment into a
multilateral operation by securing allied assistance the
United States forced a showdown with its allies over who had
the greater share of responsibility in protecting Western
oil supplies.
The study concludes that U.S. policy violated one of
the cardinal rules of matching political objectives with
military realities: avoid multiple objectives with competing
priorities. Finally, the study proposes a set of
alternative strategies and recommendations based on a
regional and collective security approach that emphasizes
low-intensity-conflict while confining the military





As a naval officer with a good deal of operational
experience, I have had the unique opportunity to observe the
use of military power as a means in seeking political
objectives from operational theatres as diverse as the North
Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Northern and
Western Pacific Ocean. In a sense, this study began when I
found myself on the implementing end of policy, albiet on
the tactical level, in late February of 1979 when the Carter
administration decided to dispatch the USS Constellation
(CV-64) to the Gulf of Aden in response to the invasion of
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) by the Soviet-backed Marxist
regime of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
The decision to support North Yemen in its dispute with
South Yemen had both global and regional implications for
the rapidly deteriorating "twin pillars" policy adopted by
the Nixon administration nine years earlier: with the
Iranian revolution at fever pitch (the Shah had recently
fled the country) and the Soviet penchant for meddling in
the Horn of Africa apparently reaching new heights, the
Carter administration deemed it essential to send a strong
signal of American resolve not to allow the remaining pillar
of that policy -- Saudi Arabia -- to fall.
Two years later I again found myself on the
implementing end of policy this time onboard the USS
Independence (CV-62) then on station in the North Arabian
viii

Sea in response to the continuing Iran hostage crisis. In
January of 1981, with the Independence still on station, the
hostages were released. A few months later, the
Independence was diverted to the eastern Mediterranean in
response to the placement of Syrian SA-6 surface-to-air
missiles in the Bekka Valley. This seemingly subtle move
signalled the beginning of an ever increasing American
presence in Lebanon which would culminate in the terrorist
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983 and the
subsequent removal of all U.S. forces from Lebanon the
following year.
In late May of 1981, while on the same deployment and
in a move that seemed calculated to demonstrate further the
political-military flexibility of an aircraft carrier, I
found myself involved in what was to be the beginning of a
series of highly coordinated, Reagan administration directed
freedom of navigation exercises conducted in and around the
disputed waters and airspace of the Gulf of Sidra. This, of
course, was merely a mild precursor to the series of more
violent military confrontations between the United States
and Libya prevalent throughout the decade of the 1980' s.
When one considers the odds of being involved in the
political use of seapower on four separate occasions in less
than three years, I was not surprised when in February of
1988 I found myself back in the North Arabian Sea, this time
IX

onboard the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in support of the U.S.
ref lagging operation in the Persian Gulf.
As a student of international relations, I found that
the theoretical literature on the role force plays in
achieving political objectives was diverse and quite
comprehensive. But I also found the literature somewhat
lacking in critical analyses of specific crises from the
operational perspective of that often elusive point at which
theory meets practice. This is not to say that the
literature is bereft of analyses of crisis situations in
which theory is applied to practice; indeed, there have been
many seminal studies conducted using this framework. Rather
that the vast majority of these analyses have been conducted
from the outside looking in. Very few studies have been
conducted from the implementation end looking back up at the
policy end. For example, an indepth review of the available
primary and secondary sources such as government reports
,
books and periodicals written in the wake of the 1987-88
Persian Gulf crisis reveal a plethora of information on the
mechanics of the crisis but very little effort has been
devoted to a systematic analysis and evaluation of the
"strategic" process that led to U.S. and allied involvement
in the Gulf nor a determination of how effective that
process was in achieving the stated political objectives.
Likewise, a review of recent U.S. and international Ph.D.
abstracts and titles reveal that none have focused

specifically on the issue of political objectives and
military means (to include allied cooperation) during the
1987-88 crisis nor have any of the major studies been
conducted from the operational perspective. Thus it is
hoped that this study will build upon and make a contribution
to the existing crisis management and alliance cohesion
literature by examining, from the operational perspective,
the theoretical and practical factors pertaining to the U.S.
and allied involvement in this unique crisis.
To a great extent, I based this study on my practical
experience with the seemingly inherent difficulty and
problems associated with transforming policy into action.
Additionally, my studies in both the theoretical and
practical aspects of crisis management, alliance cohesion,
strategy and policy, international security studies,
political theory and specific courses on the diplomatic
history, politics and culture of Southwest Asia at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the U.S. Naval War
College created the analytical framework within which I
chose to evaluate this crisis.
The overwhelming portion of the research for this study
involved primary open-source information contained in a host
of U.S. Government documents all pertaining to U.S. policy
in the Persian Gulf. These included carefully prepared and
detailed reports from the Departments of State, Defense,
Energy, and the Navy as well as Congressional staff reports.
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Additionally, extensive use was made of sworn testimony
taken before numerous Congressional hearings convened
between 1987 and 1989 on U.S. Persian Gulf policy as it
pertained to the ref lagging of the Kuwaiti tankers.
Specific information relating to allied cooperation in
the Gulf was found in international government reports and
communiques from the Assembly of the Western European Union,
the various committee's of the North Atlantic Assembly, the
Defense Planning Committee and North Atlantic Council of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European parliamentary
hearings as well as documents and reports from specific
agencies of the five European nations involved in the Gulf.
While secondary sources, such as think-tank policy
papers and books, newspaper and periodical analyses, and
conceptual model studies were used extensively, I have, for
the most part, stayed as close as possible to official
policy statements as the basis for my analysis. The reader
should be aware, however, that the analysis and conclusions
presented in this study are done so without the benefit of
access to classified information. In a sense, what
precludes this study from being complete is an analysis of
the classified command histories of those naval units that
took part in the reflagging operation as well as internal
State and Defense Department and National Security Council
(NSC) memorandums and agreements with those regional and
allied states that cooperated with the United States. The
xii

continuing security interests of those nations will prohibit
early declassification of these documents. Such an
omission, however necessary and understandable, hampers the
researcher's ability to uncover the true political objective
vis-a-vis the publically stated one, thereby raising the
possibility of basing one's line of reasoning on the wrong
premise
.
An additional limitation was the need to examine
original sources published in French, German, Italian,
Flemish and Dutch. However, many of these original sources
were available in translation through the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) and the U.S. Information Service
(U.S.I.S.). I also gained access to the translation
services contained in the State Department's unclassified
European wireless files during visits to NATO headguarters
and U.S. embassies in several European capitals. Neither of
these limitations, however, should adversely affect the
conclusions and findings of this study.
An undertaking of this magnitude cannot be completed
successfully without the help and dedicated support of
others. Acknowledgements are therefore in order: I remain
particularly grateful to Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, the
current Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the former
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and
Operations (OP-06) and his Executive Assistant Captain
Spencer Johnson, USN, for their faith and confidence in my
xiii

ability to successfully complete the two-year Fletcher
program. They went out on the proverbial limb on my behalf
and I trust I have not let them down. In short, without the
"second year," I could not have written this dissertation.
I also am personally indebted to Rear Admiral Tony
Less, USN, the current Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06B) and the
former Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME) for
taking time from his busy schedule to discuss with me the
operational aspects of implementing the reflagging policy.
In my opinion, he remains the consummate naval warrior and
master of that often elusive point at which theory meets
practice -- or as he no doubt would prefer — that point at
which the rubber meets the road.
I remain equally grateful to the staffs of the National
Policy and Command Organization Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OP-602) and the Department of National Security
Affairs (CODE 56BN) and the Civilian Institutions Programs
Office (CODE 031) at the Naval Post Graduate School for
their dedicated support throughout my stay at Fletcher. I
am particularly indebted to Captains Ray Figueras and Robert
Dilks, USN, and Thomas C. Bruneau for their insightful
advice on selecting the best method to navigate one's way
through bureaucratic mine fields. Their management of the
Navy's post-masters program in international relations -- a
vital source for the Navy's future strategists -- was
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nothing short of superb. I remain fortunate to have taken
part in the program.
The staffs of the U.S. Defense Attache and Political
Military Affairs Offices in the U.S. embassies in London,
Brussels, The Hague, Paris, Bonn and Rome were most helpful
in providing written unclassified background information on
the European contributions to the Gulf operation. In
particular, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Yarbro, USA, in
Brussels, Mr. Donald E. Braum in The Hague, Mr. John Berry
in Paris, Mr. James Herd in London, Ms. Silvia Eiry in
Rome and Mr. Colin Cameron of the Western European Union
were extremely helpful in pointing a seemingly disoriented
Ph.D. student in the right direction. Likewise, Mr. Martin
McCusker, Director of the Defense and Security Committee at
the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels, was kind enough to
let me use their small but highly specialized library for
the European portion of my research. I am particularly
indebted to Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN, the Director of
the Defense Operations Division at the U.S. Mission at NATO
headquarters for taking time from his busy schedule to host
me on my two visits to his office. His suggestions on the
available and appropriate information sources and avenues of
approach to the research problem proved invaluable to the
successful completion of this project.
I remain deeply grateful to Professors Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., John P. Roche and Richard H. Shultz, Jr.,
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who ably directed me throughout the course of this study.
Their trust and confidence in my ability to conduct
independent research and writing as well as their
recognition of the unigue time constraints associated with a
naval aviation career streamlined what could have been a
much more complicated and lengthy process. I alone,
however, remain responsible for errors of fact, opinion, and
omission as well as for the findings presented in this
study. The administrative, technical, professional and
moral support provided by the faculty and staff of
Fletcher's International Security Studies Program Department
and the Registrar's Office far exceeded normal expectations.
They have given new meaning to the concept of taking care of
your own. Indeed, while the Charles River gang may receive
more fanfare and at times seem somewhat aloof, the Mystic
River gang made me feel right at home.
I also am indebted to Professor Andrew Hess, the
Director of Fletcher's Southwest Asia Program, his friend
William A. Kirby, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in
the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and
Ambassador William Rugh , currently the Director of the
Office of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Information
Agency, for their support and encouragement. Their many
hours of enlightening and insightful classroom, lecture and
after hours discussions pertaining to Southwest Asia and
Islamic civilization provided me with a refreshing and
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balanced perspective to an often perplexing, elusive, and
volatile subject.
Anyone even remotely familiar with the mechanics of
piecing together a dissertation or a manuscript of any sort
appreciates the immense and painstaking effort that goes
into ensuring the prescribed format and style are adhered
to. Ellen McDonald and Paula Cammarata of the Fletcher
School's Edwin Ginn Library staff were particularly helpful
in this regard. They introduced me to the intracacies of
Kate Turabian and patiently and professionally fielded my
seemingly endless questions on style and format. Likewise,
I also am indebted to William V. Luti and Donna King who,
despite my shortcomings in grammar and syntax, read the
entire manuscript (several times) and offered constructive
suggestions in both areas. Once again, however, I alone am
responsible for any contortions of the English language.
Finally, Mrs. Carol Levesque worked faithfully and
diligently in the word processing stage of this project
despite her busy schedule and my penchant for red ink.
I am also indebted to my parents, siblings and daughter
for their unyielding support and encouragement throughout
the course of this two-and-a-half year project. In
particular, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my parents
for providing a continuing series of palatable explanations
for my eight-year-old daughter on why and how her father
could spend so much time in the library reading a seemingly
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abnormal amount of "grown-up" books when he could have been
home reading something as delightful and heartwarming as The
Wolf Story to her at bedtime. They give new meaning to the
age-old addage that nothing makes a child as smart as having
grandparents
.
As a final note, I would like to point out that the
inspiration for pursuing this study grew out of my personal
participation in both the Earnest Will convoy and Praying
Mantis combat operations conducted from January through June
of 1988 in the Persian Gulf. My motivation is simply to
participate in and contribute to the continuing effort to
close the ever-narrowing gap between civilian and military
thinking on the role force plays in seeking political
objectives in this era of "violent peace." Matthew B.
Ridgeway's simple yet eloquent expression that the "soldier
is the statesman's junior partner" drives to the heart of
the matter and provides further inspiration for this study.
Finally, the contents of this study reflect my own
personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the U.S.






LIST OF TABLES xxi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xxii













Threats to U.S. Interests 30
III. THE CRISIS 36
Background 36
Reflagging 42




IV. ENDS VERSUS MEANS: THE CONCEPTS 65
The Objective 65
The Issues 67
The Role of Force 75
Framework for Sizing Naval Forces . . 88
V. ENDS VERSUS MEANS: AN ANALYSIS 91
Background 91
Sizing the Force 105
The True Political Objective 107






Summary of Findings 146
Lessons Learned 153
VI. ENDS VERSUS MEANS: ALLIANCE COHESION
THEORY 158
Purpose 158

















Noncooperative Behavior Analysis . . . 215
The External Threat 215
The Alliance Security Dilemma . . . 222
Collective Action 231
Domestic Politics 236
Cooperative Behavior Analysis .... 243
The External Threat 244
The Alliance Security Dilemma . . . 251
Collective Action 257
Domestic Politics 260
Summary of Findings 265
VIII. CONCLUSION 273
Regional Strategies: Problems and
Perceptions 273
Alternative Strategies 288







1. Combat Forces Potentially Available to
CENTCOM 21
2. Dependency on Persian Gulf Oil .... 28
3. Attacks on Ships in the Gulf by
Belligerent, 1981-88 31
4. Attacks on Ships in the Gulf by
Belligerent, 1987 40
5. 1987 Iranian Attacks on Kuwaiti and
Saudi Trade 44
6. Readiness Conditions of U.S. Naval
Combatants 51
7. Persian Gulf Map: Ship Attacks and
Exclusion Zones 58
8. Attacks on Ships in the Gulf by Type
Weapon Used 61
9. Six Major Tests for the Use of U.S.
Combat Forces 68
10. U.S. Navy Convoys, July 1987 -
December 1988 93
11. Framework for Sizing Naval Forces . . . 108
12. Country Performance in Selected Burden-
Sharing Areas 232
13. NATO/WEU Governing and Opposition
Parties (1987) 240




























Allied Command Europe Mobile Force
Arabian-American Oil Company
Airborne Warning and Control System





Commander Joint Task Force Middle East
Chief of Naval Operations
Commander Middle East Force
Carrier (Fixed Wing) Battle Group




Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Guided Missile Fast Frigate































Gas Oil Separation Platform
Identification Friend or Foe
Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Joint Chiefs of Staff







North Atlantic Council (NATO)




Operations and Maintenance Navy
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
Rapid Deployment Force




Sea Lines of Communication
xxi 11

SOF Special Operations Force
SOG Special Operations Groups
SSM Surf ace-to-Surf ace Missiles
STVD Soviet Southern Theatre of Military
Operations
TVD Soviet Theatre of Military Operations
UAE United Arab Emirates
USCINCLANT U.S. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
USCINCPAC U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific
USIA U.S. Information Agency
USIS U.S. Information Service
ULCC Ultra Large Crude Carrier
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier
WEU Western European Union




A. U.S. Senate Resolution 207 Relating to
a Resolution of the Conflict Between
Iran and Iraq 306
B. U.S. Congress Joint Resolution 295 to
call for the removal of the United
States Armed Forces from the Persian
Gulf 308
C. U.S. Congress House Resolution 194 Urging
the President to Seek a Meeting of the
United Nations Security Council for the
Purpose of Protecting Nonbelligerent
Shipping in the Persian Gulf 310
D. United Nations Resolution 598 of
20 July, 1987 312
E. North Atlantic Assembly Resolution 189
on the Persian Gulf 315
F. North Atlantic Assembly Recommendation 87
on NATO and Public Opinion 317
G. Information Letter Dated 31st August, 1987
From Mr. H. van den Broek, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands to
Mr. Charles Goerens , President of the
Assembly of Western European Union on
the Situation in the Gulf 321
H. WEU Press Guidelines for the
Presidency 325
I. Information Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary General of WEU, on the
Activities of the Intergovernmental





. . . At the outset of a war its character
and scope should be determined on the basis of
the political probabilities. The closer these
political probabilities drive war toward the
absolute, the more the belligerent states are
involved and drawn in to its vortex, the
clearer appear the connections between its
separate actions, and the more imperative the
need not to take the first step without
considering the last.
von Clausewitz, On War, 1831
The Problem
On 14 April, 1988, the U.S.S . Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-
58) was hit and severely damaged by a mine while operating
2
55 miles northeast of Qatar. The mine was a 385 pound
device that exploded on the port side of the keel adjacent
to the engine room as the ship was maneuvering to avoid
other mines spotted by lookouts. The explosion ripped a 30
by 23 foot hole in the ship below the waterline, destroyed a
15 foot section of the keel, pushed the main shaft back
1
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (edited and translated
by Michael Howard and Peter Paret with introductory essays
by Peter Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie and a
commentary by Bernard Brodie). {Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), p. 584.
2
Pat Towell, "New Gulf Incident Rekindles an Old
Debate," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report , 23 April
1988, p. 1058

approximately 18 inches, knocked the reduction gear housing
3
off its mounting, and seriously injured ten young sailors.
To keep the ship's stern from breaking off, the crew welded
steel plates and strung cables across the damaged area in
what has been described as a classic text-book case of
damage control. The crews heroic efforts saved the ship and
4
avoided further injuries and potential loss of life.
Four days later, the U.S. Navy, in combined air and
surface attacks, engaged the Iranian Navy in a day-long
battle in the southern Persian Gulf. Immediately after the
fog of battle had lifted and the results of the navy's
superb combat performance became clear, a host of questions
surfaced as to the relationship between our stated political
objectives and the military means (role of force) used in
attempting to achieve those objectives. This debate
reflected the age-old attempt to rationalize the political
context within which military force is applied. It has long
been recognized that the use of force is not an end in
itself but a means by which states pursue political
objectives. In recent years, a lack of consensus has
emerged on how force is to be applied within this political
3
Rear Admiral George N. Gee, USN, "Statement," U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of
Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989 , Hearings





context. (No doubt as a result of the continuing
manifestation of the Vietnam War syndrome.) This lack of
consensus is dramatically illustrated by the long-standing
institutional differences between intra-governmental
agencies in the political-military decision-making arena in
Washington, D.C. A recent study concluded that a
dysfunction exists between civilian and military thinking on
5
the use of force as an instrument of national policy.
Civilian planners prefer to work from a set of options that
maximize flexibility and reduces the risk of failure. They
tend to view the instruments of war as a means to send
diplomatic signals. Conversely, military planners prefer to
deal with concrete objectives and view the purpose of force
to prevail rather than send subtle diplomatic signals. To
the military planner, the use of force is designed to
increase an adversary's perception that the foreign policy
of the United States is backed by a potent military force
The study was conducted by the U.S. Naval War College
Strategic Studies Group which had been tasked by then Chief-
of -Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, to analyze
the peacetime use of naval forces and to develop a
"proactive" means of employing these forces to avoid crises.
The CNO felt that naval forces were being used as a "force
of convenience" rather than as a part of an overall
strategy. For more information see: Marshall Bremment,
"Civilian-Military Relations in the Context of National
Security Policymaking," Naval War College Review , Winter
1988, p. 27.

structure with the political will and resolve to use those
6
means when vital national interests are at stake.
Purpose
The Persian Gulf crisis of July 1987 through December
1988 reminds us once again of the essential need to estab-
lish a sound balance between political objectives and
military means. The elemental concept that a clear sense of
purpose must form the basis of all plans of action has been
the cornerstone of strategic thought for over 2,500 years.
Throughout the centuries, strategists have made it
abundantly clear that the relationship between military and
political objectives is central to the decision to resort to
force in the conduct of international relations. Therefore,
the purpose of this study is twofold: First, to examine the
relationship between the stated political objectives of the
U.S. Persian Gulf policy and the military means (role of
force) used in attempting to attain those goals. And
second, to formulate causal statements and hypotheses
pertaining to the sources (both theoretical and practical)
of allied cooperative and noncooperative behavior and then




Harry G. Summers Jr., "Employing Force to Advance
Policy," U.S. News and World Report , 7 April 1986, p. 27

To accomplish the first task, the study will address the
following research questions posed on both the strategic and
tactical level: Strategically, what issues are truly vital
national interests? Are the threats to U.S. interests in
the region substantial? Can it be proven that a disruption
of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would be an
economic disaster for the West? (1973 proved painful but
not unbearable). Would Soviet intervention in Iran really
trigger a U.S. response, given public and congressional
antipathy toward Iran? Would the politically sophisticated
ruling families of the Gulf oil shiekdoms really allow
Soviet political and military agents to establish a beach-
head in the region? Is the U.S. -Soviet competition in the
region a zero-sum game? What is the relationship between
Kuwaiti tanker protection and U.S. strategic objectives? On
the tactical level, what are we trying to accomplish? What
is the military objective? Who are we trying to influence
or coerce? How are we trying to influence or coerce them?
How much and what type of force do we employ? How do we
define success? When is the crisis over? When can forces
be withdrawn? And how do we modify the strategy if
conditions change? Admittedly, the scope of these research
questions, at first glance, appears quite extensive.
However, both the research process and the answers are
intended to serve as a foundation upon which to focus the
analytical effort on the specific issue of political ends

and military means in the Persian Gulf.
Moreover, this study seeks to evaluate the "strategic"
process that led to U.S. involvement in the Gulf and
determine how effective that process was in achieving the
stated political goals. The approach to this task is taken
from the perspective of classical policy and strategy
formulation: the process by which "ends are related to




Additionally, this study includes several basic
assumptions: First, that the publicly stated objectives of
the policy are in fact the real ones upon which the strategy
is based. Second, that the complexity of international
relations often makes it difficult to establish a
relationship between cause and effect in both theory and
practice. Third, that the analysis, where possible, avoids
ex post facto judgments and attempts to evaluate the
strategy according to the goals set by the policymakers.
And finally, that the grouping of dysfunctional thinking on
the role of force into civilian and military categories is a
generalization made only for analytical purposes. This is a
7
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment
,
A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. viii

complex issue that transcends and often crosses military,
8
civilian, and intra-governmental agency lines.
The second portion of the analysis focuses on allied
cooperation and NATO's efforts to address Persian Gulf
security issues as they pertained to the U.S. decision to
reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers. The following research
questions form the basis for this portion of the political-
military analysis: How can we understand the initial
American failure to elicit European support for the
ref lagging operation? Moreover, how can we explain the
gradual shift of position by the Europeans to one of (tacit)
support for U.S. policy under the auspices of the Western
European Union (WEU) ? In short, why did a political
agreement and its subsequent transformation into an
operational agreement emerge? The answers to these
questions can be found by an analysis of the four hypotheses
explaining alliance cooperation and then applying them to
the case study.
8
Perhaps the most celebrated case of this dysfunction
was reflected in a series of extraordinary speeches made by
former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger throughout 1984 in the
aftermath of several bloody terrorist attacks on U.S.
citizens overseas. The issues focused on the appropriate
use of military force to counter overseas threats. In an
ironic reversal of roles, Shultz maintained that the use of
force is an important factor in diplomatic endeavors and
should be used as a specific tool to fight terrorism while
Weinberger admonished policymakers on the limits of military
force and the need for extreme caution and care in
employing it. Shultz 's views were expressed in public
speeches at Yeshiva University in New York on 9 December, at

The first section of this analysis outlines the
evolution of NATO policy toward Southwest Asia and
identifies examples of both cooperative and noncooperative
behavior. The second section establishes four central
hypotheses that seek to explain intra-alliance behavior.
These hypotheses are derived from both systemic and domestic
models of international politics:
The external threat hypothesis suggests that
alliance cohesion rises and falls with the external
threats to collective security. The alliance
security dilemma hypothesis proposes that cohesion
is a function of the coercive potential of the alliance
leader and its ability to exact cooperative behavior
from its weaker partners. The collective action
hypothesis suggests that alliance behavior is
fundamentally a public goods problem. The domestic
politics hypothesis asserts that alliance behavior
is determined primarily by political and economic
factors at the domestic level.
The third section tests these hypotheses against the
reflagging case study to determine which one (or
combinations thereof) best explains the behavior that
eventually led to allied cooperation in the Persian Gulf.
In the final section, some general conclusions are drawn
regarding the sources of alliance cohesion and the
forecasting capability of these alliance cooperation
propositions. Admittedly, the theoretical scope of this
portion of the study is limited, primarily due to the
the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York on 25 October, and to
the Trilateral Commission in Washington on 3 April.
Weinberger outlined his philosophy in a speech to the
National Press Club on 28 November. For more information
see: "Shultz vs. Weinberger - When to use U.S. Power," U.S.
News and World Report , 24 December, 1984, pp. 20-21.

concentration on one case study. However, the purpose of
this portion of the study is simply to attempt to formulate
and then validate a series of causal statements pertaining
to the sources of cooperative and noncooperative behavior
within the confines of the Persian Gulf case study.
Organization
The study is organized on a topical and compartmented
basis. In the second chapter, the historical evolution of
U.S. policy and involvement in the Persian Gulf is traced.
Particular emphasis is placed on the rise of U.S. diplomatic
activity in the Middle East coinciding with a corresponding
decrease in British influence in the region and the effect
U.S. regional doctrines had on shaping U.S. policy. An
examination of this historical evolution reveals a clear
pattern in U.S. policy (and perception of interests) that
transcends any presidential administration or political
party. Within this context, U.S. strategic, political, and
economic interests in the Gulf region are defined and the
threats to those interests examined.
The third chapter deals with the actual mechanics of
the Persian Gulf crisis. Specific elements of the crisis
are examined including the ref lagging proposal, the
protection of shipping mission, the military arrangements,
and the implementation of the plan. Additionally, a step-
by-step appraisal of the escalation process is made in order

to lay the technical foundation for the political-military
analysis contained in Chapter Five.
Chapter Four outlines the conceptual framework and
reviews the literature upon which the analysis in Chapter
Five is based. This section addresses the concept of the
objective, frames the issues, explores the role force plays
in obtaining political objectives, and identifies the
analytical model chosen to organize and evaluate the
relationship between the political objectives and military
means in the Persian Gulf. Chapter Five is a detailed
analysis of the relationship between ends and means in the
Gulf based on the analytical models outlined in the previous
chapter
.
Chapter Six outlines the conceptual framework and
reviews the literature upon which the alliance cohesion
analysis in Chapter Seven is based. This section identifies
examples of both cooperative and noncooperative behavior and
establishes the four central hypotheses that seek to explain
intra-alliance behavior. These hypotheses are derived from
both systemic and domestic models of international politics.
Chapter Seven tests these hypotheses against the
reflagging case study to determine which one (or combination
thereof) best explains the behavior that led to allied
cooperation in the Persian Gulf and its impact on U.S.
policy. Also, some general conclusions are drawn regarding
the sources of alliance cohesion and the forecasting
10

capability of the alliance cooperation propositions.
The final chapter proposes a set of alternative
strategies and recommendations to solve the Gulf security
dilemma through a regional and collective approach which
emphasizes low-intensity-conflict while confining the
military objective to the more narrow issue of freedom of
navigation in international waterways. This section rests
upon the spirit of Clausewitz's insightful dictum that one
cannot "condemn a method without being able to suggest a
9
better alternative."
In summary, the prevailing theme of this study is that
a balanced, clear, and well-articulated strategy for
achieving political objectives remains the essential
ingredient for attainment of that often elusive foreign
policy "victory." Perhaps former Secretary of the Navy
James H. Webb, Jr., summed it up best when he solemnly
pointed out that a well-defined and properly articulated
strategy assumes a moral obligation: "If we cannot tell our
people what our objectives are around the world and clearly
indicate to them why these objectives are important to our
nation, we cannot expect them to invest the lives of their
10
sons and daughters in the national interest."
9
Von Clausewitz, p. 161.
10
James H. Webb, Jr., "National Strategy, The Navy,





U.S. PERSIAN GULF POLICY
. . . It is a narrow policy to suppose that
this country or that is to be marked out as
the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of
England. We have no eternal allies, and we
have no perpetual enemies. Our interests
are eternal and perpetual, and those interests
it is our duty to follow.
Lord Palmerston, 1848
Historical Background
The historical evolution of U.S. policy in the Persian
Gulf region has its roots deeply embedded in the 150 year
domination of the region by the British. Not only did the
United States assume "the mantle of leadership and much of
its strategic infrastructure from the British but also its
way of thinking about its interests and how to pursue
2
them." The two major interests of the United States --
preventing the expansion of Soviet influence and ensuring
access to oil — can be seen as an extension of "The Great
Game" as played by the British throughout the nineteenth
1
Philip Guedalla, Palmerston (New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1927), p. 301.
2
Gary Sick, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, The
Evolution of U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf , Hearing
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 14 July 1988), p. 37;




century and as a reflection of British projection of its
lines of communications and markets east of Suez. As a
result of this historical evolution, "there is a line of
continuity in U.S. policy and its perception of national
interests in the Persian Gulf region that transcends any
3
administration or political philosophy."
U.S. military as well as business interests in the
Persian Gulf date from the pre-World War II years and the
establishment of the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO)
in Saudi Arabia in the 1930' s. During the war, the region
became one of the major lend-lease supply routes to the
Soviet Union through which tremendous amounts of military
equipment and related supplies found their way into the Red
Army. With the ouster of Reza Shah (due to his German
leanings) and the replacement by his son on the peacock
throne, the British and Soviets effectively divided Iran
into spheres of influence for the duration of the war. U.S.
presence in the Gulf during these years witnessed the
largest sustained deployment of U.S. military forces —
40,000 troops of the U.S. Middle East Command — in history
4
to the region.
Close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United
States during the course of the war led to the building
3
Ibid






of an airfield at Dahrain and the establishment of an
American naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The naval
presence was formalized in 1949 with the establishment of
the U.S. Middle East Force (USMIDEASTFOR) homeported at the
British naval base at Jufair, Bahrain. This presence,
coupled with additional American and U.N. diplomatic
pressure and some astute Iranian diplomatic maneuvering, was
an important motivating factor in forcing the Soviet Union
to withdraw its occupation forces from northern Iran at the
5
end of World War II. Even at this early stage, U.S.
Persian Gulf policy reflected the growing concern over the
containment of Soviet expansionism and spread of
international communism around the world. This concern was
enunciated in the Truman Doctrine and manifested itself in
the pursuit of regional collective security arrangements
such as the Baghdad Pact (forerunner to the Central Treaty
Organization-CENTO) and in the conclusion of bilateral
6
agreements with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
5
Jeffrey Schloesser, "U.S. Policy in the Persian
Gulf," Department of State Bulletin , October 1987, p. 39
6
Emile A. Nakhleh, The Persian Gulf and American




In 1957, President Eisenhower, in an attempt to fill
the void left by the British and French withdrawal in the
wake of the 1956 Suez crisis, formulated a policy of
economic and military assistance for those Middle Eastern
nations attempting to protect themselves against
"international communism." In a special message on the
situation in the Middle East delivered in person before a
joint session of Congress, on January 5, 1957, Eisenhower
proposed that the United States, through the joint action
of the President and Congress, grant:
. . . such assistance and cooperation to
include the employment of the armed forces
of the United States to secure and protect
the territorial integrity and political
independence of such nations requesting such
aid against overt armed aggression from any
nation controlled by international communism.
Later that same year, the Eisenhower Doctrine was
expanded in scope to include support for regimes under
internal political subversion as a result of the
administration's "publicly expressed intolerance" of Arab
neutralism in a region believed crucial to the success of
8
U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. The Eisenhower
7
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Dwight David Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington: National
Archives and Records Service, GPO, 1958, pp. 12-13.
8
Jed C. Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, The





Doctrine received its first test, in terms of application of
funds, in support of King Hussein's struggle with left-wing
radicals in Jordan; and a second test, in terms of direct
military intervention, came in the successful 1958 attempt
to stabilize the Civil War in Lebanon.
This rise in U.S. diplomatic activity in the Middle
East coincided with a corresponding decrease in British
influence in the region. Due to economic and budgetary
crises at home, Britain recognized the need to substantially
reduce its overseas military commitments. By the early
1960's, the United States feared continued British
withdrawal from the region would require an increased
American presence to fill the political-military void. With
the announcement in 1968 that British forces would be
withdrawn from the area "east of Suez" by 1971, that fear
became a reality. The Vietnam War had caused severe strains
in both the economy and foreign policy of the United States
and raised serious questions about the utility of future
9
American intervention around the globe. These questions,
coupled with the British withdrawal from the Middle East,
forced a strategic reassessment of U.S. global policy that
culminated in the formulation of the Nixon Doctrine. In the
First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign
Policy for the 1970's of 18 February, 1970, the Nixon
9
Ibid
. , pp. 87-88.
16

administration clearly articulated the direction that
U.S. foreign policy would take during the next decade by
stating the central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine previously
announced on Guam:
The United States will participate in
the defense and development of allies and
friends, but America cannot — and will
not — conceive all the plans, design
all the programs , execute all the
decisions and undertake all the defenses
of the free nations of the world. We will
help where it makes a real difference and
is considered in our interest. 10
This strategy for regional security had direct
application in the Persian Gulf where the two superpowers
were becoming more involved in the affairs of the region.
To secure U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf, the
strategy was to establish strong regional allies through
massive programs of economic and military assistance to both
Iran and Saudi Arabia in the hope they could develop viable
military forces to serve as the Gulf states' protectors and
11
as a deterrent to Soviet intervention. This "Twin
Pillars" policy survived numerous strains throughout the
1970' s, including the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Arab oil
embargo, only to ultimately fail with the fall of Iran in
1979.
10
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States. Richard Milhous Nixon, 1970 (Washington: National





A series of essentially simultaneous crises during the
last year of the Carter Administration — the fall of Iran,
the Iran-Iraq War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
— forced yet another strategic reassessment of U.S. policy
in the Persian Gulf. In his 23 January, 1980 State of the
Union Address, President Carter declared that:
An attempt by outside force to gain control
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the
United States of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force. 12
While the Carter Doctrine has been regarded as an
important step in Persian Gulf regional security, it should
be noted that "the strategic effect of declarations made
only after a crisis — rather than prior to them — is
limited. The test will come if and when the Soviet Union
chooses to probe the limits of the Doctrine's
13
application." To prepare for that test, and to put teeth
into the Doctrine, the Carter administration established the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) headquartered at MacDill Air
Force Base in Tampa, Florida. As the new command, formally
referred to as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF) , took shape it became readily apparent that a
12
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
,
Jimmy Carter, 1980-81 (Washington: National Archives and





whole host of logistical and force structure problems would
have to be dealt with before any bite would be put into the
14
new doctrine.
The Reagan Administration, recognizing that current
funding was inadequate to meet the threat, focused
additional attention on the problem by upgrading the RDJTF
and in 1983 by creating a new geographic unified command
with the RDJTF commander becoming the commander of the new
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) (see Table 1). Recognizing
the range of threats facing the friendly states of the
region, the Reagan Administration shifted emphasis of its
policy to reflect the need to develop a force projection
capability as a deterrent to any outside pressure directed
15
against the states of the region. Additionally, the
Reagan Administration made two policy decisions in the early
1980* s that underscored this "concept of regional
deterrence" — the sale and deployment of Airborne Warning
14
Ibid . . p. 117. For a detailed discussion of the
requirements and capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force
from conception through the mid-1980 's see: Kenneth Waltz,
"A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," International
Security 5, Spring, 1981; Jeffrey Record, The Rapid
Deployment Force , (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, 1981); Thomas L. McNaughter, Arms and Oil
:
U.S. Military Strategy in the Persian Gulf , (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1985) ; Jeffrey Record, "The Rapid
Deployment Force: U.S. Power Projection and the Persian
Gulf," in Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., and Geoffrey
Kemp, eds., Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions,





and Control Aircraft (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia and a five-year
military aid package for Pakistan — all of which
contributed to the administration's "two-prong policy of
increased security assistance for key Western-oriented
states in the region and the deployment of U.S. military
hardware to project the U.S. intention of underwriting the
16
security of regional surrogates." The administration also
recognized that any "attempt to protect states in the
region can be successful only if pursued without the
17
traditional instruments of Great Power diplomacy."
U. S . Interests
A review of recent official policy statements clearly
indicate an intra-departmental consensus on U.S. strategic,
18
political and economic interests in the Gulf region. In a








Official State Department policy statements on the
Persian Gulf can be located in the following Department of
State Bulletins : February 1980, Special Section (President
Carter's State of the Union Address, 23 January, 1980) P. A.;
March 1987, p. 19 (Secretary Shultz's statement, 27
January); April 1987, p. 52 (President Reagan's statements
of 23 January and 25 February); August 1987, p. 78 (Under-
secretary for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost's
statement, 16 June) ; Department of State Special Report No.
166, July 1987 on "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf" by










1 Airborne Division 7 Tactical Fighter Wings b





3 Carrier Battle Groups
Marine Corps Surface Action Group
5 Maritime Patrol Air
1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Squadrons
Forces a
A Marine Amphibious Force typically consists of a
reinforced Marine division, a force service support
group, and a Marine aircraft wing (containing roughly
twice as many tactical fighter,/attack aircraft as an
Air Force tactical wing, as we 11 as a helicopter unit)
Includes support forces . Does not include 3 1/2
tactical fighter wings available as attrition
fillers
.
cThese bombers would be accompanied by reconnaissance,
command and control, and tanker aircraft.
SOURCE: FY 19 88 DOD Annual Report to Congress
(Washington, D.C.: GPO 1988)
21

State of the Union Address of January 23, 1980 through
recent White House and State and Defense Department Reports,
the U.S. position reflects a concise and seemingly well-
thought-out policy that combines diplomatic, political, and
military means to safeguard these fundamental interests.
However, what is not as clear, is to what degree these
interests are defined (survival, vital, major, or
peripheral) and how best to defend against the many levels
of threats presently facing the United States in the
19
region.
Regional Affairs Office of Near East and South Asian
Affairs and U.S. Department of State Current Policy Document
No. 390 on "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," May 1982,
statement by Nicholas A. Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near East and South Asian Affairs. See also: U.S.
Dept. of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (Washington:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, 1989, 1990).
19
In a paper presented to the Ninth National Security
Affairs Conference, October 8-9, 1982, cosponsored by the
National Defense University and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, Donald E.
Nuechterlein defined four levels or intensities of interests
as follows:
. . . survival interests, when the existence of a
country is in jeopardy as the result of an overt
military attack, or threat of attack if an enemy's
demands are rejected; vital interests, when
serious harm likely will result unless strong measures,
including the use of conventional military force, are
employed to counter an antagonist's provocative action;
major interests, when a country's political,
economic and social well-being may be adversely
affected by external events or trends; peripheral
interests, when a nation's well-being is not adversely
affected by events and trends abroad, although harm





U.S. strategic interests center around the position
that the region is of vital economic importance to the Free
World. With the Strait of Hormuz remaining the major
chokepoint for oil moving from the Gulf oil fields, any
attempt to block the Strait to international shipping would
pose a grave danger to the economic well-being of the Free
World. Keeping the region free of domination by a power
hostile to the United States, the Western allies, and
regional friends, is deemed essential to maintain the
20
uninterrupted flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.
Due to the West's dependency on oil, the region is of
great strategic importance to the Soviet Union.
Additionally, and for a variety of political, economic and
security concerns, the Soviets have historically attempted
to expand their borders and influence into the Gulf
21
region. In recent years, this expansion has been
highlighted by their nine year occupation of Afghanistan and
the establishment of a Southern Theatre of Military
Operations (STVD) command structure in opposition to the




General George B. Crist, USMC , "Statement," U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Status of the
United States Central Command , Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Govt. Print Off., 22 February 1988), p. 13. Hereafter
referred to as Crist Statement.
23

command of General of the Army Mikail Zaytsev, the STVD High
Command of Forces is currently considered to be roughly
comparable, in terms of force expansion, readiness, and
modernization, to the other Soviet TVD's in Central Europe
22
and the Far East. While the removal of all Soviet combat
forces from Afghanistan has reduced the Soviet Union's
ability to project power into the Gulf region, the Soviets
still have 26 active divisions (25 ground and one airborne)
,
fifteen fighter and fighter-bomber regiments, over 700
tactical aircraft, plus the four divisions that have been
withdrawn from Afghanistan all available for contingency
23
operations in the Gulf region. Additionally, the Soviets
have recently stepped-up their diplomatic efforts to expand
their influence throughout the region by political means as
evidenced by the establishment of diplomatic relations with
24








Frederick Axelgard, United States Policy in the
Persian Gulf: An Analytical Look Ahead to 1989-1992




Likewise, Iran's expansionism poses a serious threat to
U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf region. Recognizing
the Iranian revolution as an irrefutable "fact of history"
and Iran's size and strategic location in the region vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union, the United States seeks, over time, to
25
normalize relations with Iran. However, as long as Iran
seeks to export its revolutionary ideology to moderate Gulf
states and continues its support for international
terrorism, U.S. interests in the region will remain at risk
and normalization of relations will not be possible. In
short, "the effects of either Soviet or Iranian hegemony in





In defining U.S. economic interests in the region, U.S.
policymakers point to the Middle East oil crises of 1973
and 1978-79 as examples of the potential economic disaster
facing the West in the event of even a minor disruption of
the Gulf oil supply. The inability of the economy to adjust
to the sudden and large increase in the price of oil during
these crises, wrecked havoc with the world economy and led
25
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report to the Congress on
Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf (Washington: 15






to sharp and painful increases in inflation and unemployment
and several years of recession for the Western industrial
27
powers as well as for the Third World. Many government
policy statements quote a recent statement by former
President Reagan to illustrate their point:
. . . I think everyone . . . can remember the woeful
impact of the Middle East oil crisis of a few years
ago — the endless, demoralizing gas lines, the
shortages, the rationing, the escalating energy
prices and double-digit inflation, and the enormous 28dislocation that shook our economy to its foundation.
The Gulf states supply over 25% of all the oil available on
today's world market. Japan depends on oil shipped through
the Strait of Hormuz for 60% of its consumption, Western
Europe depends on the Strait for 11% and the United States
for 5%. According to the American Petroleum Institute, 6 to
7 million barrels of oil per day pass through the Strait of
29
Hormuz. Approximately 25% of Western Europe's oil
consumption and 50% of Japan's originates in the Persian
Gulf region (see Table 2) . According to a recent Department
of Energy (DOE) Energy Security Study, as consumption






"Supply Vulnerability in Mideast Gulf Full of




consumption rate of 5% is expected to increase significantly
30
over the next five years. DOE analysts predict that the
West's dependence on Gulf oil will continue to rise as 60% to
70% of the world's known oil reserves are located within the
31
borders of the Gulf states.
Other exports, such as natural gas, cotton, coffee, and
phosphates also play a major role on the international
market. While recent reductions in the price and
consumption of oil has caused a local trade deficit, the
trade between the United States and these regional states is
valued at over $6 billion with the United States enjoying a
32
$3.6 billion trade surplus.
Political
According to U.S. policymakers, the security and
stability of the moderate Arab states of the Gulf Region are
critical to the achievement of U.S. strategic and economic
goals. Due to their great wealth and oil reserves, the Gulf
states weild considerable influence both within and outside
30
The Weinberger Report , pp. 5-6.
31
U.S. Dept. of Energy, International Energy Outlook
1989: Projections to 2000 (Washington: 8 March 1989) , p. 5.
32
Crist Statement , p. 11.
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the region. U.S. policy has been to promote regional
security while assisting friendly states in their efforts to
resist Soviet and Iranian expansionism. In the wake of the
Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf States formed the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in an effort to provide for their own
collective self-defense against the fall-out of the war.
This cooperative action was deemed essential by the regional
states given Iran's public pronouncements regarding the
"illegitimacy" of the moderate Arab states as well as Iran's
support for subversion and terrorism directed against the
34
United States and other friendly states. U.S. military
assistance programs provide the means by which these states
can provide for their common defense. Executive branch
agencies contend that congressional blocking of future arms
transfers will have the "unintended effect of increasing the
USSR's and Iran's leverage in the region, particularly as it












Threats to U.S. Interests
Various U.S. government reports define the threats to
U.S. interests in the region in essentially three political
and diplomatic categories: renewed open conflict in the
Iran-Iraq War, Iran's quest for hegemony, and Soviet
36
exploitation of regional insecurities and sensitivities.
While it remains clear that oil prices have not been
drastically affected by the Iran-Iraq War, the renewal of
hostilities between the two belligerents "directly endangers
freedom of navigation for non-belligerents and the access to
37
oil." The Tanker War (initiated by Iraq), involved
attacks by Iraq on ships serving Iranian ports and oil
loading facilities and retaliatory attacks by Iran on a wide
variety of neutral shipping serving both belligerent and
non-belligerent Persian Gulf ports in international waters
(see Table 3)
.
Since September 1986 the United States has maintained that
Iran has deliberately targeted shipping serving Kuwaiti
ports in large measure to intimidate Kuwait from its
logistical and financial support for Iraq, as well as
to enhance its influence over the other GCC states
by threatening similar action. The tanker attacks
were matched by other elements of Iranian-backed
intimidation, including rocket attacks, sabotage, and
36
Ibid





n m (-3 co * Hi H H >
CD ^O H- O H H rt3 CO 3 a o rt QJ 0) H
r+ M CD Jd CD (D 3 .£) a»
fl> | co n pJ H1 oH ' - M CO ;v
co en CD CD >
h+i <T> M H 1-3





D) Qhj HO 3 &> CD
fD Qj 3 H
Hi C <sO s;
n> n &) co CD o
253 CD H h 3w DK I rt
CD rt co CO
(D Hsj H- M 53H H ^o •• 3 VO H3 co rt <_n O U1 CO TJ
Hi Hi CC Hi M CO
* 3*
H H CD CD H3 •O Hi 2
OJ O • « Hi H
rt CD OJ CD to to V£> HiH- Hj M w O fO O to CO S
CD w 3* rt to M3 3 • H-
«• W 3 to hj
CD --> iQ o MM D rt H •0
U) H OJ > M H UD CO3 rt 3 C (T> o CT> CO H
C-| l-h JU lQ- to >2p> h3 c3 H Hi w Hi
>C 3 H w rt O
0J OJ rt H> G COH rt 3 - H -J H Ul U3 f It*
^< H- VO \-> CO CO CO T) M







»• H - rt £» H U) »£> o
>-J £» LO CO 21
>v m co cr en
M ^> 3" CD M
CO H- H Kj
O CTi^J
CD ""d H H H1 CO
CD 0> H- vd h-1 *. <Tl VD M& 3 3 CO H tn en CO H1
H- Qji£) -j C^ f3 H
cQ M M QW U3 3 13 M
- co rt • H M to




cnuqHO (D (U M
^ C 3 3 H1 ^£>
co H O Oj <£> Ui CO <^> CO











uo o Ul to co
co H Kj £* CO to rt
CO U) H to fl»




other forms of violence and subversion . . . The
overall intimidation effort has not changed
Kuwaiti policy or practice, but it did force the
government of Kuwait to seek protection for its
interests, both from the GCC and other outside
powers. 38
Iran's quest for hegemony in the Gulf region, while
having historic overtones, was elevated to new heights by
the Khomeini regime. Highlighted by stepped-up political
rhetoric as well as the acquisition and testing of Chinese
built Silkworm anti-shipping missiles, the Khomeini regime
39
made no secret of its desire to dominate the region. The
vision of an Iraqi defeat and fanatic Iranian revolutionary
armed forces sweeping south through the Arabian Peninsula,
served to galvanize the GCC states in their efforts to
prevent an Iranian victory. Due to its strategic location,
vis-a-vis the Strait of Hormuz , the Khomeini regime long
maintained the view of Iran "as having predominate
responsibility for security in both the Strait of Hormuz and
38
Ibid . , p. 7
.
39
The Silkworm anti-shipping missile is the export
version of the Chinese (Peoples Republic) Hai Ying-2 (HY-2)
coast defense missile system and is a derivative of the
Soviet SS-N-2 STYX anti-ship missile. The HY-2 has three
varients: radar homing, radar homing with a radar altimeter,
and an infra-red homing version. The HY-2G employs an
active radar homing system in the I-Band frequency range
with a relatively large antenna and a radio
altimeter enabling it to achieve a narrow tracking beam-
width and a cruising altitude of 30 meters and a terminal
attack altitude of 15 meters. The HY-2A is an infra-red
version not of the "imaging" type. The war-head weight is
450kg and the missile has an effective range of 20-95km




the Gulf as a whole." The right of other Persian Gulf
states to seek security assistance from outside powers has
been adamantly denied by Iran.
The Soviet Union seeks to establish and then strengthen
its influence with states in the region while eroding U.S.
influence in the Gulf with the ultimate objective of
replacing the United States as the superpower protector of
41
the region. The Soviets have attempted to offer a
security framework to the Gulf states that would guarantee
"the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil without the less
attractive political side effects that would accompany a
42
Western alliance." While the Soviets have not overtly
threatened the flow of oil, they have close ties to those
countries "that sit astride the oil sea lanes of
communication (SLOC's) — the People's Democratic Republic
43
of Yemen (PDRY) , Ethiopia, Libya, and Afghanistan."
deployed near the Strait of Hormuz. By late 1988, Iran was
thought to have acquired the follow-on to the HY-2, the
C801, which is postulated to be employable in both ship-
launched and coastal defense roles. For more information
see: Jane' s Weapons Systems 1988-89 , Jane's Information
Group, Surrey, U.K., p. 160.
40









However, the Soviet position in the region is also
complicated by a series of conflicting interests brought
about by the Iran-Iraq war:
The Soviets seek to maintain their position
as the champion of Iraq and are concerned
about the consequences of an Iranian victory
in the Gulf War. . . . However, the Soviets
also seek to avoid alienating Iran and, if
possible, hope to improve their relationship.
In practice, therefore, the Soviets have
sought to play both sides of the war, staking
out ostensibly constructive positions calling
for the wars end, while thus far deflecting
strong action directed against Iran as the
recalcitrant party towards a settlement.
Based on their experience in Afghanistan, the Soviets
would "not take lightly a decision to invade Iran, a country
with twice the area and three times the population of
45
Afghanistan, and with equally difficult terrain."
Likewise, the damage to recent Soviet political and
diplomatic objectives throughout the world would be severe
and serve as a disincentive to invasion. However, the
potential for Soviet intervention in Iran could dramatically
increase if the recent Soviet internal political and
economic reform initiatives fail resulting in widespread
domestic turmoil. Couple this with Soviet Armenian and
Azerbaijani ethnic tension escalating out of control and a
44
The Weinberger Report , pp. 8-9.
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collapse of central authority in Tehran causing in turn a
request for Soviet assistance from one of the competing
factions, and the probability of Soviet intervention is
significantly enhanced. Without a unified internal
resistance movement and external military assistance, Iran,









Iran under the great leadership of the
Shah is an island of stability in one of
the more troubled areas of the world.
This is a great tribute to you, Your
Majesty, and to your leadership, and to
the respect, admiration and love which
your people give to you. 1
Jimmy Carter
New Year's Eve Toast,
Tehran, December 31, 1977
Background
Within weeks of President Carter's toast to the Shah,
Iran plunged into a year-long series of violent antiregime
demonstrations which culminated in the overthrow of the Shah
and the establishment of a theocratic revolutionary regime
in February of 1979. Such pronouncements illustrate not
only the failure of the United States to recognize
significant shifts in Iranian domestic politics but clearly
demonstrates the volatility of an area of the world steeped
in 3,000 years of Persian cultural and religious traditions
suddenly exposed to superheated rates of economic and
political change.
1
James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of






In the months following the Revolution, Iran moved to
isolate itself from the Great Power struggle in the region
— first from the United States as a result of the 444 day-
hostage crisis of 1979-81 and then from the Soviet Union by
the clergy's ruthless and violent suppression of the
Communist Tudeh Party and the breaking of diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union in 1983. This period of the
"Twin Great Satans" is without precedent in Iranian history
as Iran, from the age of Russian expansion in the eighteenth
century, has always acted to balance the Great Powers
against one another. Iran's move to isolate itself from the
Great Power struggle ironically encouraged Great Power
cooperation in terms of the United States' concern over
access to vital oil supplies and the Soviet Union's concern
over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism as an element of
disorder in Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia. Likewise, Iran's
move toward isolationism coupled with the threat posed by a
spill-over from the Iran-Iraq War caused regional actors to
coalesce against the hegemonic desires of Iran as manifested
in the establishment of the GCC. Other manifestations of
this spill-over from the war of attrition on the Iran-Iraq
border included the Gulf "Tanker War" and the "War of the
Cities" with the former posing a serious threat to neutral
2
interests in the region.
2
Sick Statement , pp. 18-19.
37

Iraq's military strategy shifted in 1984 to an all-out
effort to strangle Iran's economic capacity to wage war by
using its air superiority to attack and destroy Iran's oil
producing facilities and exporting terminals. In an attempt
3
to cripple Iraq's economy, Iran's only choice of a counter-
strategy was to attack the shipping of Iraq's gulf allies by
"indiscriminately laying minefields in international and
neutral waters and by attacking neutral shipping throughout
the Persian Gulf in the best Barbary corsair
4
tradition." However, in the summer of 1986, it became
clear that significant changes were taking place in the
Persian Gulf. Intelligence reports provided evidence the
Iranian's had acquired and were preparing to deploy Chinese-
built Silkworm anti-shipping missiles in the Strait of
5
Hormuz. During this time frame, there was "an equally
significant change in the organization and nature of the
[Iranian] combat forces . . . the introduction of the
3
Early in the war, Iran had destroyed Iraq's
ability to export or import by sea. Consequently, no
shipping — neutral or belligerent — were serving
Iraqi ports. For an analysis of the war strategies of
Iran and Iraq see: David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A
Military Analysis," Foreign Affairs , vol. 66, No. 5,








Revolutionary Guard as a threat to shipping in the Gulf."
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy
. . . emerged as a new, unpredictable
and more daring element during 1987.
Whereas most "regular navy" strikes
have occurred at night off the UAE
Coast, the Revolutionary Guard, using
high speed patrol craft, ventured
further into the Gulf for both day and
night attacks.
?
Persian Gulf shipping attacks by both Iraq and Iran
increased steadily throughout 1987 with over 60% of the
attacks taking place in the last four months of the year
(after the 6 week U.N. sponsored cease-fire was broken in
8
late August) (see Table 4). Interestingly, Iranian oil
exports were 40% higher than the previous year despite Iraqi
9
interdiction efforts.
The first 6 months of 1987 witnessed ships bound for
Kuwaiti ports becoming the primary targets of Iranian
attacks. After the Iranian inspired riots in Mecca in



















































































































































































trade with Saudi Arabia. In September, the Iranians
began firing Silkworm missiles from the occupied Fao
11
Peninsula against ships inside Kuwaiti territorial waters.
Coupled with these attacks were a series of unexplained but
highly suspicious mining incidents which had begun in mid-
May 1987. The detection and subsequent sinking of the
Iranian mine laying ship the Iran Air on 21 September "laid




Some accounts of the riots in Mecca maintain that the
incidents were not inspired by Iran. One account claims
that "the angry masses" actually acted in violation of
Khomeini's specific instructions and rioted in Mecca.
According to the "Khomeyni Message to Hajj Pilgrims, Part
III" contained in FBIS-NESA of 3 August, 1987, Khomeini
urged that "the respected clergy, managers, and officials of
the convoy's and pilgrimage must make every effort to ensure
that the Hajj [pilgrimage] ceremonies will be conducted in a
correct and orderly manner." For more information on the
Iranian side of the story see: R.K. Ramazani, "The Iran-Iraq




On 3 September, 1987, Iran conducted it's first
Silkworm attack against Kuwait. The missile, fired from the
Fao Peninsula, traveled close to 60 miles and impacted
within three kilometers of the huge $5 billion Al Ahmadi
refinery. The missile flew 8 miles further than the
published range suggesting Iran had made modifications to
the Silkworms fuel capacity. On 15 October, the Iranians
fired another Silkworm from the Fao Peninsula and hit a U.S.
owned, Liberian registered tanker at the Ahmadi terminal.
For more information see: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, War in the Persian Gulf : The U.S.
Takes Sides , a Staff Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., November 1987), p. 26. Hereafter referred to as:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Staff Report .
12




In an effort to meet the formidable challenges posed to
U.S. interests in the region by this spillover from the
Iran-Iraq War and Iran's quest for hegemony, the United
States developed a "two-track policy — on the diplomatic
front to end the war and on the strategic front to protect
13
our interests in the interim while the war rages." One
fundamental aspect of U.S. policy was an all-out effort to
end the war. Because of Iraq's willingness to negotiate and
Iran's "intransigence," U.S. efforts focused on ways to
14
step-up the international pressure on Iran. Since 1981,
Iran had rejected all attempts by the international
community to negotiate a comprehensive settlement to the
war. U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war centered on
several U.N. Security Council resolutions and through
efforts like "Operation Staunch" to end the flow of arms to
15
Iran. In order to promote regional stability, the United





. , p. 43.
15
Operation Staunch was a unilateral diplomatic effort
by the Reagan Administration to stop the flow of arms to
Iran. The goal of the operation was to limit Iran's ability
to purchase weapons, ammunition, and other equipment which
could be converted to military use thereby persuading Iran
to end the war. The sources of Iran's military supplies and
equipment were tremendous: Spain, Portugal, Great Britain,
Switzerland, West Germany, Sweden, South Korea, North Korea,
42

sales to key regional allies in the hope of deterring a
spillover from the war and reduce the possibility of using
U.S. forces to prevent such a spillover. Specifically,
because of Iranian intimidation of Kuwait and Kuwaiti
shipping and Soviet efforts to expand its influence in the
region, the United States deemed it necessary to be
"responsive to Kuwaiti requests for protective naval
16
support" (see Table 5)
.
The government of Kuwait raised the issue of "securing
outside assistance" at a GCC. summit meeting in November of
17
1986. The first indication of Kuwait's new approach to
protect its interests came in December of 1986 when the
Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company (KOTO queried the U.S. Coast
Norway, Belgium, Argentina, Japan, China, the Eastern
European countries, and others. The credibility of
Operation Staunch was seriously undermined by the Iran-
Contra Affair which revealed that the United States was
secretly selling arms to Iran. While generally endorsing
Operation Staunch, critics argued that it should have been
enhanced by stronger and bilateral measures. Specifically,
they claim that China should have been singled out (in the
form of retaliation) by withholding the transfer of
technology in response to the selling of Chinese Silkworm
missiles to Iran. For more information see: U.S. Congress,
House, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Policy
Implications of United States Operations in the Persian
Gulf , Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1987), pp.
71-72. Hereafter referred to as: House Committee on Armed
Services Report .
16
Crist Statement , p. 97.
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INCLUDES 3 SHIPS IN TRADE WITH BOTH NATIONS
OF 80 SHIPS IRAN ATTACKED IN 1987, 73 VERE EN ROUTE TO /FROM
KUWAIT AND/OR SAUDI ARABIA
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SOURCE: General George B. Crist, U.S.M.C, "Statement," U.S
Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Status of the
United States Central Command
, Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 22 February 1988).
44

Guard on reflagging requirements. And in January 1987, "the
government of Kuwait formerly queried our embassy about the
use of U.S. flags and whether reflagged Kuwaiti vessels
would receive U.S. Navy protection equal to that provided by
18
other U.S. flagged vessels." Kuwait also informed the
United States of an agreement with the Soviet Union to
provide similar reflagging protection for Kuwaiti tankers or
to charter Soviet ships. Kuwait's original plan of
reflagging six tankers under the U.S. flag and five tankers
under the Soviet flag was revised when the U.S. government,
on March 7th, announced that all eleven Kuwaiti tankers
would be protected under the U.S. flag. Kuwait did however
augment its tanker fleet by chartering three "long-haul"
Soviet flag vessels through a one year commercial charter
19
lease.
Following several more months of discussion and
indecision on the reflagging proposal, the United States
announced in early May that the protection of shipping plan
was about to be implemented. However, on 17 May an Iraqi
fighter aircraft mistakenly attacked the U.S.S. Stark (FFG-
31) with two Exocet air-to-surface missiles killing 37 crew
members and severely damaging the ship. This tragic event
18
Ibid






combined with Congress' position that it had not been
adequately informed of the reflagging plan, forced a delay
in implementing the plan until late July.
Protection of Shipping Mission
After President Reagan formally approved the reflagging
plan on 29 May, 1987, the USCENTCOM was assigned the
challenging mission of protecting U.S. flagged vessels
20
transiting the Persian Gulf. The primary mission of U.S.
forces in the Gulf:
. . . has been and will continue to
be to provide military presence in order
to protect U.S. interests and provide a
rapid response capability in
contingencies. Other missions include
assisting friendly regional states,
protecting U.S. flagged vessels,
maintaining safe passage of U.S. flagged
shipping through the Strait of Hormuz
,
and preserving U.S. and allied access to
vital oil resources in the region. 21
The specific mission of protecting the 11 reflagged Kuwaiti
tankers required additional naval combatants be assigned to
the U.S. Middle East Force and the stationing of a Carrier
Battle Group (CVBG) in the North Arabian Sea to serve as a
deterrent to the threat posed by the introduction of the
Silkworm missile as well as Iranian F-4 Phantom aircraft
positioned in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. A
20
Crist Statement , p. 96.
21
The Weinberger Report , p. 15
46

Battleship Surface Action Group (BBSAG) also joined the CVBG
to augment the contingency forces in the North Arabian Sea.
This initial increase in force structure signaled the
beginning of a protection of shipping plan that was
continually adjusted and fine-tuned (in terms of force
structure, operating procedures, and command and control) as
the threat evolved with the introduction by the Iranians of
22
mine warfare, Silkworm missiles, and small boat attacks.
Military Arrangements
In a report to Congress of 15 June, 1987 regarding U.S.
security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, former Secretary
of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger outlined the military
arrangements which would be implemented to support the
protection of shipping plan. Noting that U.S. warships have
escorted U.S. -flag vessels (4 to 10 ships per month) for the
past four years with no attack on these ships by either
belligerent nor any other neutral vessel while in close
proximity to a U.S. warship, the report shares with Congress
the fundamental elements of U.S. policy, the nature of the
U.S. naval presence, and the evolution of events that have
led to the protection of shipping plan.
The report outlines the belligerent (Iran and Iraq)
order of battle and assesses the threat to U.S. forces and
U.S. flagged shipping as well as the threat to Kuwait and
22
Crist Statement , p. 98.
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other GCC states. The report stresses that Iran is
"reluctant to deliberately and overtly target U.S. forces"
and "the Iranian threat to U.S. forces is primarily based on
potential identification errors or a unilateral decision by
23
a local commander." The most likely Iranian threat is
described as an act of terrorism and other unconventional,
non-attributable forms of attack. The report does not
specifically mention the threat posed to U.S. forces by
Iranian mines.
Since the Iranian government views Kuwait as an "active
ally" of Iraq, the threat to Kuwait's oil facilities,
desalinization plants, and shipping was rated as moderate-
to-high either from raids by the Iranian Air Force or by
24
sabotage. Similar attacks or threats of attack could be







An apparent act of sabotage took place at
Kuwait's Al Ahmadi refinery on 22 May, 1987. The
manager of the refinery told the members of a
Congressional Investigation Committee that a ruptured
pipeline connected to a huge liquid petroleum gas (LPG)
tank had caught fire after the pipe had been tampered
with. According to the manager, "That incident came
within a whisker of a major catastrophe. If we had not
contained the fire, and the LPG tank had exploded this
entire plant, all the neighboring communities to the
north and south would have been vaporized." For





It is considered unlikely that Iran
would seek a direct confrontation with
the United States by directly or overtly
attacking a U.S. flag merchant ship.
This is particularly true if the
merchant ship is escorted by U.S.
warships. A deliberate strike on U.S
forces by Iraq is highly unlikely, and
accidental attacks such as that suffered
by the U.S.S. Stark are far less likely
to occur due to procedures being
developed for interaction between U.S.
and Iraqi forces. 25
The report also outlined U.S. peacetime Rules of
Engagement (ROE) noting they were based on the inherent
right of self-defense. The Persian Gulf Supplemental ROE
were tailored to provide specific guidance for threats from
aircraft, surface ships (including Boghammer gunboats) and
land-based Silkworm anti-shipping missiles. The following
definitions formed the basis of the ROE:
- Hostile intent: The threat of imminent use of force
against friendly forces, for instance, any aircraft or
surface ship that maneuvers into a position where it could
fire a missile, drop a bomb, or use gunfire on a ship is
demonstrating evidence of hostile intent. Also, a radar
lock-on to a ship from any weapons system fire control radar
that can guide missiles or gunfire is demonstrating hostile
intent. This includes lock-on by land-based missile systems
that use radar.
- Hostile act: A hostile act occurs whenever an
aircraft, ship, or land-based weapon system actually
launches a missile, shoots a gun, or drops a bomb toward a
ship.
U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf will respond as
follows:
25
The Weinberger Report , p. 17.
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- Self-defense: U.S. ships or aircraft are authorized
to defend themselves against an air or surface threat
whenever hostile intent or a hostile act occurs.
- U.S. -flagged commercial vessels: U.S. ships or
aircraft may defend U.S. -flagged commercial vessels against
air or surface threats whenever hostile intent or a hostile
act occurs.
The ROE authorized the on-scene commander to declare a
threat hostile and engage that threat with the necessary
force required to defend his unit or U.S. flagged vessels.
Any force beyond that which is required to neutralize the
immediate threat or in response to a specific hostile act
must be approved by the National Command Authority (NCA)
.
Likewise, the combat readiness of U.S. warships operating
inside the Gulf will normally remain at Condition III (see
Table 6) . However, when confronted by an air or surface
contact which behaves in a threatening manner or when
transiting the Strait of Hormuz , ships were required to be
27
at General Quarters stations.
To successfully conduct the protection of shipping
plan, U.S. naval forces were augmented with additional
combatants equipped with surface-to-air missile systems










READINESS CONDITIONS OF U.S. NAVAL COMBATANTS
U.S. Naval vessels have five readiness conditions. These
conditions represent varying states of readiness and are
depicted as follows:
CONDITION I . Condition I, or General Quarters, requires
the manning of all weapons systems, sensors, damage
control, and engineering stations. Engineering systems
are configured for maximum flexibility and survivability
With all hands at General Quarters, the ship is prepared
to fight at its maximum capability.
CONDITION II . Temporary relaxation of Condition I for
rest and meals at battle stations.
CONDITION III . Condition III watches require about one-
third of the crew to man the weapons systems for pro-
longed periods. Condition III must provide the
capability to conduct or repel an urgent attack while
the ship is called to General Quarters.
CONDITION IV . Condition IV watches require an adequate
number of qualified personnel for the safe and efficient
operation of the ship and permit the best economy of
personnel assignment to watches. No weapon batteries
are manned
.
CONDITION V . In port during peacetime, no weapons
manned.
SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Report (Weinberger Report) to





Arabian-based B-3A (AWACS) aircraft were also integrated into
the plan to enhance its effectiveness. The report notes an
operational plan was developed employing a "sphere of
influence" for small groups of vessels under escort by U.S.
warships and further states that "our warships are
adequately armed and are guided by the appropriate rules of
engagement to meet the threat, including that from Silkworm
28
missiles." Escorted merchant ships were to be in direct
communication with and have moderate separation from U.S.
Navy warships. The escorting warships were required to
conduct electronic surveillance while other U.S. Navy ships
remained on patrol elsewhere in the Gulf. These additional
ships were available to assist the escorting ships if
required. While the report assesses the risk from
unconventional attack as low-to-moderate, it stresses the
presence of U.S. Navy warships would serve as a "powerful
29
deterrent to an Iranian attack."
The military arrangements section of the report is
summarized by an assurance to Congress that the United
States was vigorously seeking an end to the Iran-Iraq War
through all diplomatic channels which would ensure the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of each belligerent.
Additionally, the United States welcomed the active support
28
Ibid . , p. 23.
29
Ibid
. , p. 24.
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for the protection of shipping plan from both allies and
regional friends but was prepared to accept the superpower
responsibility of taking the initiative in ensuring the free
transit of shipping and oil:
The bottom line: If we as the leader of the
free world, do not take on the role of
protecting declared vital U.S. and Western
interests, there are others who will try to
insert themselves — gladly. Their objectives
will not be ours. That is the real risk we
cannot afford to take. 3 °
Implementation
The first "Earnest Will" convoy escort mission took
place on 22 July, 1987, and continued uneventfully from the
Gulf of Oman and into the Persian Gulf until the evening of
24 July when the tanker Bridaeton struck a mine off Farsi
Island in the northern Persian Gulf shipping lanes. The
discovery of mine fields in the Al Ahamdi channel off Kuwait
in June and off Oman in August, required an increased
31
emphasis on mine countermeasures . Minesweeping
helicopters were airlifted to the U.S. naval base at Diego
Garcia and loaded onboard an amphibious assault ship, the
U.S.S. Guadalcanal (LPH-7) , bound for the Persian Gulf.
Several "in-theatre" boats were modified for minesweeping
missions but proved ineffective in open water operations.
30
Ibid . , p. 24.
31
Crist Statement , p. 99.
53

By late October, these boats were replaced by Aggressive
class oceangoing minesweepers and in November, U.S.
minesweeping operations were augmented by an allied task
32
force. A combined British, Netherlands, and Belgian task
force patrolled the waters in the vicinity of Abu Musa
Island and the Western Strait of Hormuz . An Italian force
conducted minesweeping operations along the tanker escort
route south of Abu Musa Island while the French Navy
conducted operations off the United Arab Emirates Coast and
33
the Fujairah and Khor Fakkan anchorages.
As the mine threat increased, Iran intensified its
attacks on neutral (and unescorted) shipping with Swedish-
built Boghammer fast-attack boats and reportedly perfected
the art of concentrating their fire on the crew compartments
32
Joachen Hippler, "NATO Goes to the Persian Gulf,"
Middle East Report , Nov. -Dec. 1988, p. 18.
33
Crist Statement , p. 100. The Royal Navy's ARMILLA
Patrol had been in the Persian Gulf since 1980 providing
protection for British merchant shipping. In September of
1987, four additional MCM ships arrived in the Gulf to
augment the ARMILLA patrol . MCM ships from the European
navies coordinated their mine clearing operations under the
auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) (see Chapter
VII) . However, there was very close cooperation between the
British, Dutch, and Belgian MCM forces which culminated in
the formation of an integrated MCM force code-named CALENDAR
(named in memory of the joint Anglo-Dutch-Belgian operation
to clear the Scheldt Estuary of mines in 1944-45) . From
October of 1988 through January of 1989, CALENDAR ships
joined forces with the other WEU navies and conducted
operation CLEANSWEEP to clear a shipping lane 2,000 yards
wide and 300 miles into the Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz.
For more information see: United Kingdom Statement on the




of these ships. U.S. special purpose helicopters, river
patrol boats, and MK III patrol boats were deployed
throughout the Gulf to counter this new and intensifying
threat. Support for these forces was provided by an
amphibious dock landing ship (LSD) and several mobile sea
bases stationed in the northern Persian Gulf. These bases
were to "provide a continuous presence along the transit
route, thereby making new mining operations and small boat
35
attacks against shipping far more difficult."
Additionally, U.S. special operations forces were stationed
in the area to "give the on-scene commander the flexibility
36
to match response to the threat."
Responsibility for command and control of these forces
had been limited to the small staff of the Commander, Middle
East Force (COMMIDEASTFOR) deployed inside the Persian Gulf
and the CVBG in the North Arabian Sea with the chain-of-
37
command "split" between USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT. As the
threat changed and the escort operations intensified, it
became apparent that a new command and control structure,
34
Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , May 1988, p. 31.
35
Crist Statement , p. 97.
36





reflecting this intensification and complexity, was
required
:
For these reasons a single headquarters under
the direction of United States Central
Command - Joint Task Force Middle East -
was established in September to more
efficiently plan, coordinate, and direct
overall joint operations in the Persian Gulf
region. The Commander, Joint Task Force
Middle East controls all the U.S. forces
involved with escort operations. These
forces include the Carrier Battle Group,
Battleship Battle Group, Middle East Forces,
Mine Warfare Forces, Air Force assets, and
Army Forces in the Persian Gulf region. 38
By the end of 1987 these improvements in force structure and
command and control had contributed to the successful
completion of 22 transits involving 60 ships in and out of
the Gulf.
Escalation
In late September of 1987, after a brief hiatus, both
Iraq and Iran resumed the tanker war. Iraq continued to use
missile-armed attack aircraft against ships near Kharg
Island, in the vicinity of Sirri and Lavan Islands and
eventually as far south as Larak Island near the Strait of
Hormuz as a part of its strategy while Iran intensified its
use of mine warfare in waters close to Kuwait, in the








the Gulf of Oman. (see Table 7)
On 21 September, the U.S. Navy captured, then destroyed
an Iranian mine laying ship caught in the act of laying
mines. On 7 October as tensions in the Gulf increased, U.S.
forces sank three Iranian Boghammer gunboats that had fired
on U.S. helicopters. On 16 October, Iran fired a Silkworm
anti-shipping missile from the Fao Peninsula and hit and
damaged the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City inside Kuwaiti
territorial waters. The United States retaliated for the
missile attack on the Sea Isle City three days later by
destroying two Iranian oil platforms in the Rostam oil field
near Bahrain. And on 22 October, Iran again fired Silkworm
missiles from the Fao Peninsula but this time the threat was
40
Kuwait's primary offshore oil facility. As tensions
mounted, the GCC states announced in late-October that an
attack on one would be considered an attack on all and
appropriate collective self-defense measures would be
implemented if such an attack took place.
In an unprecedented development, Soviet warships began
escorting Soviet-flagged vessels leased to Kuwait.








PERSIAN GULF MAP: SHIP ATTACKS AND EXCLUSION ZONES
URCE: U.S. Dept. of State, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf,"
ecial Report No. 166, July 1987, p. 4.
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from Iranian attack as they sustained damage in two separate
41
mining and gunboat attacks. In an attempt to placate both
Iran and Iraq, these incidents were played down and the
Soviet Navy took no retaliatory action against Iran.
The first months of 1988 witnessed a continued rise in
Persian Gulf tensions even though the United States scaled
42
back its naval presence in February to 29 ships. Iranian
strikes in the Gulf tanker war in January and February
indicated a shift in tactics away from larger, hard to
damage crude carriers and toward more vulnerable refined
products such as gas liquids or petrochemical carriers.
According to some analysts, these strikes appeared more
damaging suggesting the use of more effective incendiary
43
weapons. On 6 March, U.S. forces fired on Iranian
gunboats attempting to engage a U.S. Navy supply barge. The
following day, U.S. helicopters came under fire from gunners
on Iranian oil platforms. And on 14 April, the U.S.S.
Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) struck a mine 55 miles northeast
of Qatar having just completed the year's 25th escort
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gas carrier Gas King through the Gulf to Kuwait. While
over one hundred tankers had been damaged by mines,
missiles, and gunfire throughout the long Iran-Iraq War,
this was the first time a U.S. vessel had been hit and
damaged by a mine (see Table 8)
.
The Reagan Administration ordered U.S. military forces in
the region to step-up plans and preparations for a possible
retaliatory strike against Iran for resuming its mine-laying
operations in international waters. Press reports indicated
the retaliatory plan "was a possible limited military attack
coupled with a stern warning from the U.S. government that




Mines recovered from the area by U.S. naval units
clearly indicated an Iranian connection. The serial numbers
matched the production line of the type of mines captured
from the Iranian landing craft Iran Avr in September 1987.
Additionally, the mine's casings remained free of any sea
growth clearly indicating that the mine field had been
recently sown. Acting on this evidence, President Reagan,
44
Molly Moore, "U.S. Warship Damaged by Gulf Blast,"
The Washington Post , April 15, 1988, p. 1.
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in full consultation with the senior leadership of Congress,
ordered U.S. naval forces, in a "measured" response, to
destroy three Iranian gas oil separation platforms (GOSP's)
and one Iranian warship. Accordingly, U.S. ships destroyed
the Sassan and Sirri GOSP's with naval gunfire and explosive
charges after warning the Iranian crew to evacuate the
platforms. After two Iranian F-4 Phantom aircraft that had
approached U.S. naval units in the vicinity of the Sirri
platform were chased off by surface-to-air missiles, the
U.S.S. Wainriqht (CG-28) and the U.S.S. Simpson (FFG-56)
destroyed the Joshan, an Iranian guided missile patrol boat,
with missiles and naval gunfire. After learning that armed
Iranian Boghammer speedboats were attacking United Arab
Emirates owned oil platforms in the Mubarak oil fields and a
U.S. flagged supply tug, the Willie Tide , President Reagan
personally authorized an attack on these boats by U.S.S.
Enterprise (CVN-65) based A-6E Intruder aircraft. At least
one Boghammer was sunk, several severely damaged, and the
remainder fled at high speed back to the Iranian
46
Revolutionary Guard base on Abu Musa Island.
Later that afternoon, an A-6E aircraft, conducting a
low fly-by to obtain a visual identification on a suspected
Iranian warship, was fired on by the British-built SAAM





the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas in reaction to the
U.S. retaliatory strikes. As soon as the on-scene commander
declared the ship hostile, carrier based A-6E and A-7E
aircraft along with the U.S.S. Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) sank
the Sahand in a coordinated missile and laser-guided bomb
attack. Shortly thereafter, a second SAAM class frigate,
the Sabalan, also fired on an A-6E conducting a visual
identification check. The aircraft returned fire with a
single laser-guided bomb effectively crippling the ship.
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci called off the attack
on the Sabalan before additional firepower could be brought
47
to bear. Ironically, while U.S. naval forces were
engaging Iranian forces in the southern Persian Gulf, Iraqi
forces successfully dislodged the Iranian occupation of the
Fao Peninsula near the strategic Shatt-Al-Arab waterway in
the northern Persian Gulf. This incident was the last major
confrontation between Iran and the United States prior to
the 3 July incident in which the U.S.S. Vincennes (CG-49)
mistakenly shot down an Iranian commercial A-300 airbus
47
For a first-hand account of Operation Praying Mantis
as told by the operational commanders on the scene see: Bud
Langston and Don Bringle, "Operation Praying Mantis - The
Air View" and J.B. Perkins, III, "Operation Praying Mantis -









For detailed information on the accidental downing
of Iran Air 655 see: Department of Defense, "Investigation
Report: Formal Investigation into the Downing of Iran Air
Flight 655 on 3 July 1988 and U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Armed Services, Investigation into the Downing
of an Iranian Airliner by the U. S . S . "Vincennes . " Hearing.
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 8 September 1988). See
also: Norman Friedman, "The Vincennes Incident," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings
,
May 1989, pp. 72-79; and, U.S. Dept.
of State
,
Iran Air 655 : Steps to Avert Further Tragedies ,
Current Policy Document No. 1092 (Washington: U.S. Govt.




ENDS VERSUS MEANS: THE CONCEPTS
'Cheshire puss,' she began rather timidly. . .
'would you tell me please, which way I ought to
go from here?
'
'That depends a good deal on where you want to




The combat between U.S. and Iranian forces in the
Persian Gulf on 18 April, 1988, was the largest naval battle
fought since the end of World War II. Immediately after the
fog of battle had lifted and the result of the U.S. Navy's
superb performance became clear, a myriad of questions
surfaced as to the relationship between our stated political
objectives and the military means (role of force) used in
attempting to achieve those objectives. The elemental
concept that a clear sense of purpose must form the basis of
all plans of action has been the cornerstone of strategic
thought for over 2,500 years. The Cheshire Cat
notwithstanding, strategists from Sun Tzu to Carl von
Clausewitz and as recently as Caspar Weinberger have all
made it abundantly clear that the relationship between
1
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland ; as quoted in:
John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices
(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 1.
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military and political objectives is central to the decision
to commit combat forces into a given situation.
Weinberger's six major tests for the use of U.S. combat
forces reflects a continuation of the age old attempt to
rationalize the political context within which military
force is applied (see Table 9) . The establishment of a
clearly defined relationship between political objectives
and military means is central to Weinberger's six tests.
Interestingly, his analysis appears heavily influenced by
many of Clausewitz's dictums regarding this political-
military relationship. For example, Clausewitz's admonition
that "the political object is a goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation
from their purpose," is clearly reflected in Weinberger's
2
third test. This test is also firmly stamped with the
imprint of Clausewitz's dictum regarding war plans:
No one starts a war - or rather, no one
in his senses ought to do so - without
first being clear in his mind what he
intends to achieve by the war and how he
intends to conduct it. The former is its
political purpose; the latter its operational
objective.
3
Likewise, Clausewitz's warning that "the original political
objectives can greatly alter during the course of the war
and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by
2
von Clausewitz, p. 81.
3
Ibid
. , p. 579.
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events and their probable consequences" is strictly adhered
4
to and forms the basis of the fourth test. While no one
is claiming the United States was fighting a war against
Iran in the Persian Gulf, this strategic thought process —
the ability to see relationships between objectives and
capabilities, ends and means, aspirations and interests, and
short-term and long-term priorities — as conceptualized by
these latter-day (albeit dead) strategists, provides
valuable insight for current policymakers as to the proper
application of force in pursuit of political goals. As a
recent study clearly points out:
Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military
forces, our military leaders must insist that
the civilian leadership provide tangible,
obtainable political goals. The political
objective cannot merely be a platitude, but
must be stated in concrete terms. While
such objectives may very well change during the
course of the war, it is essential that we begin
with an understanding of where we intend to go.
The Issues
Critics of the Administration's policy in the Persian
Gulf maintained that the plan to reflag 11 Kuwaiti tankers
was not placed in a comprehensive strategic context. The
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SECDEF'S SIX MAJOR TESTS FOR USE OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat
overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion
is deemed vital to our national interest or that of
our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into
a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and
with the clear intention of winning. If we are
unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary
to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them
at all.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas,
we should have clearly defined political and military
objectives. And we should know precisely how our
forces can accomplish those clearly defined
objectives. And we should have and send the forces
needed to do just that.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the
forces we have committed — their size, composition
and disposition — must be continually reassessed
and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives
invariably change during the course of a conflict.
When they do change, then so must our combat re-
quirements .
5. Before the United States commits combat forces
abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we
will have the support of the American people and
their elected representatives in Congress. This
support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in
making clear the threats we face; the support
cannot be sustained without continuing and close
consultation.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should
be a last resort.
SOURCE: Excerpt from speech of Honorable Caspar W.
Weinberger to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.,
28 November 19 84.
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made in a vacuum, without a clear, coherent and consistent
strategy for protecting vital U.S. interests in the region.
The debate within the decision-making process that led to
the placement of combat forces in the Persian Gulf in the
summer of 1987 failed to answer the vital question of "What
are we trying to accomplish with the use of military force?"
In short, the critics argued that the confusion over the
proper definition of the objective manifested itself in the
administration's allowance of available options to remain
limited to two unattractive alternatives: reflag and protect
Kuwaiti tankers or abandon the U.S.'s (already public)
commitment to Kuwait and suffer loss of credibility in the
6
Arab world.
The strategic objective of containing then ending the
Iran-Iraq War had two ancillary objectives — first, ending
the ground war which Iraq initiated and Iran insisted on
pursuing and secondly, ending the tanker war against
6
For a detailed discussion of the opposing views on
the Reagan Administration's reflagging and Persian Gulf
policy see: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Response to the Weinberger Report Concerning the
Administration ' s Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf ,
Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987); U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Persian Gulf
:
Report to the Majority Leader United States Senate from
Senator John Glenn and Senator John Warner on their Trip to
the Persian Gulf May 27 to June 4, 1987 (Washington: U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 17 June 1987); and U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, War in the Persian Gulf : The
U.S. Takes Sides , A Staff Report (Washington: U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., November 1987).
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shipping in the Gulf for which Iraq was responsible. The
objective of ending the ground war was shared by the United
States, Iraq, the GCC states (including Kuwait), and to some
extent by the Soviet Union. Conversely, the United States
and Iran shared the common objective of ending the tanker
war. Critics argued that U.S. policy must distinguish
7
between these "shared and divergent objectives." When
viewed from this perspective, protection of Kuwaiti tankers
they argue, does not make sense as the strategic interests
of the United States would be enhanced by an end to the
tanker war. In short, by protecting a key Iraqi ally, the
United States is promoting a continuation of the war at sea
and reducing the "downside risks for the principle aggressor
8
(Iraq) in the tanker war to continue its attacks."
Additionally, by protecting Kuwaiti tankers, the United
States squarely confronts Iran "with whom it shares the
objective of keeping the Gulf open for the free flow of
9
oil." Therefore, these critics argue that:
7
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Response to the Weinberger Report Concerning the
Administration ' s Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf ,
Report, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1987); as
contained in 26 I.L.M., September 1987, pp. 1469-1470.
Hereafter referred to as The Nunn Report .
8





The only plausible reason for protecting Kuwaiti
tankers and, thereby, encouraging further
ship attacks by Iraq is the possibility that
these events would influence the Iranians to end
the ground war. But the Administration has
produced no witnesses and no evidence that there
will be any effect on the ground war or that
this is even a purpose of the move. Thus, the
United States proposes to play an expanded
military role which is counter to one objective
(ending the 'tanker war') and which will not be
effective in attaining the second (ending the
ground war) . The United States is about to repeat
the same mistake it made in Lebanon: U.S. military
forces are to be employed in a symbolic mission
without clear and attainable military
objectives.10
In short, Iran's attacks on Gulf shipping is a
retaliatory response which would probably stop if Iraq
ceased its attacks in the Gulf as Iran depends heavily
on its own Gulf shipping to fuel the war effort. The
U.S. naval forces poised against Iran are, "in effect,
11
hostage to Iraqi war policy."
Critics of the administration's policy in the Persian
Gulf also maintained that the protection of shipping plan
placed too much emphasis on protecting interests (access to
oil, security of moderate Arab states, limiting Soviet
influence) which were not being substantially threatened at
the time. Given the huge volume of shipping traffic through








limited number of attacks (less than one percent of Gulf
shipping has been disrupted) it becomes readily "apparent
that the 11 Kuwaiti tankers proposed for reflagging and the
relatively insignificant amount of oil they may carry are
12
not the real issues." The real issues are:
First, the strategic interests of the U.S.
(and the industrialized West) in an area that
holds 50-60 percent of the worlds ' known
petroleum reserves and second, the threat
posed to that interest by the Iran-Iraq War.
The "Tanker War" per se, does not significantly
threaten that interest — few oil tankers have
been sunk and the price of oil has actually
decreased since the tanker war began
(March 1984) . 13
These critics also maintain that Iran exports more oil than
Kuwait and the "U.S. has not expressed concern about the
14
free flow of Iranian oil." They also charge that it is
difficult to justify the protection of shipping plan when
the United States is indirectly protecting the interests of
Iraq who initiated the tanker war and who has carried out
over 70% of the shipping attacks, including many on U.S.
12
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Persian Gulf : Report to the Majority Leader United States
Senate from Senator John Glenn and Senator John Warner on
Their Trip to the Persian Gulf May 27-June 4, 1987
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 17 June 1987), p. 16.









Some have taken the argument a step further by claiming
the overall concept for the defense of the Gulf oil fields
and transit routes borders on "strategic absurdity":
The original determination of "vital interest"
for a commodity of some economic value —
but of marginal strategic criticality — has
established a momentum which places virtually
all options in the hands of the potential
opponent. The U.S. has created an inadequate
force of substantial cost to deploy as a
sacrificial player in the narrow hope of
dissuading an aggressor from seizing a prize he
probably has little need for — and which has
little more than comfort and standard-of-living
value to the West. . . . The planning for
defense of the Persian Gulf is an example of
severe disharmony between national policy and
military strategy. There is simply no rational
way the latter can live up to the former.
Likewise, critics argue that the Administration's
preoccupation with U.S. -Soviet competition in the region as
a zero-sum game detracts from a more balanced and regional
approach to Gulf security. The internal domestic,
political, economic, religious and cultural factors of the
regional states that tend to play against the Soviet Union
are not factored into the strategic equation. Soviet fear
of regional hegemony by a fanatical and fundamentalist Iran
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Azerbaijan is not taken into account when developing
security strategy for the Persian Gulf:
Possibilities for Soviet gains in the region are
severely limited by ingrained Arab suspicions of
Soviet power and purpose. Indeed, the only
potential Soviet advance may lie in its emerging
rapprochement with Iran — a development,
ironically, being encouraged by current U.S.
policy .1
'
While generally supportive of the administration's
military arrangements, some critics maintained that the lack
of landbased air cover, threats against non-military
targets, and lack of burden sharing arrangements with Europe
and Japan would combine to severely inhibit the conduct of
the protection of shipping plan. A foreboding statement
from a Senate Armed Services Committee Report of 29 June,
1987, raised another issue critical to the success of the
plan:
That being the threat, from naval mines.
Mine warfare would be an indirect form of
attack that Iran might favor. U.S. mine
countermeasures capabilities are severely
limited. As a consequence, the United States
must be prepared well in advance to counter
any mine threat .18 (Emphasis added)
In summary, the tactic of protecting Kuwaiti ships,
critics argue, was not placed in a comprehensive strategic
context. The relationship between Kuwaiti tanker protection
17







and U.S. strategic objectives (ending the Iran-Iraq War and
keeping Iran intact as a buffer state against Soviet
hegemony) was not properly factored into the strategic
equation. The primary reason for U.S. involvement in the
region — the objective of limiting Soviet influence -- was
based on the false assumption that the threat of Soviet
hegemony in the Gulf was imminent. By making a public
commitment to Kuwait, inserting forces, then debating the
strategy all without Congressional support, the
administration put itself in the "untenable position of
implementing a military policy which lacked strategic
purpose and which is unlikely, should hostilities erupt, to
receive sustained support from the Congress and the American
19
people." Other policy options should have been developed,
without "directly or abruptly abandoning the commitment to
Kuwait" for a course of action that accounts for the
20
achievement of the overall strategic objective.
The Role of Force
The political context within which military force is
applied has long been a source of controversy often leading
to bitter debate, confusion of policy, a paralysis of
forces, and ultimately an embarrassment or outright failure











It has long been recognized that the use of force is
not an end in itself but a means by which states pursue
political objectives. What has not been clear, particularly
in recent years, is an agreement on how force is to be
applied within this political context. As mentioned
previously, this lack of consensus is dramatically
illustrated by the long-standing institutional differences
between intragovernmental agencies in the political-military
21
decision-making arena in Washington, D.C. A recent study
concluded that a "dysfunction" exists between civilian and
military thinking on the use of force in "this confused,
22
semipolitical , semimilitary era of violent peace."
Civilian planners prefer to work from a series of options
that provide maximum flexibility and a low risk of failure.
They tend to view the instruments of war as a means to send
diplomatic signals to potential adversaries (and friends).
This is accomplished by establishing a military presence,
coercing, or conducting "surgical strikes" to demonstrate
23






James H. Webb Jr., "An Appropriate Use of Force,"
Naval War College Review , Winter 1988, p. 26.
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Summers, U.S. News & World Report , p. 27.
76

Conversely, military planners prefer to deal with
concrete objectives as early as possible to properly plan
and execute military operations. To the military planner,
the purpose of force is to prevail, not to send subtle
diplomatic signals. U.S. military capability is viewed
"less as a scalpel than as a battle-ax" designed and
intended to increase an adversary's perception that the
foreign policy of the United States is backed up by a potent
force structure with the political will and resolve to use
24
those means when vital national interests are at stake.
Add to this lack of consensus on the role of force, a
changing Third World order-of-battle that includes
sophisticated precision-guided weapons and a lack of
sufficient U.S. forces to cover all contingencies, and the
result is quite often less effective than what policymakers
25
had anticipated.
In Force Without War , U.S. Armed Forces as a Political
Instrument . Blechman and Kaplan define the political use of







Physical actions are taken by one or more
components of the uniformed military services
as a part of a deliberate attempt by the national
authorities to influence, or to be prepared to
influence, specific behavior of individuals
in another nation without engaging in a
continuing contest of violence. ^o
The key to this concept lies in the policymakers recognition
that objectives are to be achieved through the effect the
27
force has on the perceptions of the adversary. This
conceptual framework also relates very closely to John
Cable's definition of gunboat diplomacy:
Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat
of limited naval force, otherwise than
as an act of war, in order to secure
advantage, or to avert loss, either in
the furtherance of an international dispute
or else against foreign nationals within
the territory or the jurisdiction of their
own state.2 ^
Both concepts stress the limited and calculated use of
force, short of all-out war, to obtain political objectives
by reinforcing or modifying the behavior of individual
leaders within a target state.
26
Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force
Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 12.
27
Ibid . , p. 13.
28
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979 : Political
Applications of Limited Naval Force (London: The MacMillan
Press, Ltd., 1981), p. 39.
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In their study, Blechman and Kaplan conclude that when
the nature of relations between two countries is hostile,
military force is normally used as an instrument of coercive
diplomacy. In this case, force is used "to deter the target
from an undesired action or from stopping a desired action;
or to compel the target to do or to stop doing
29
something." Likewise, force may also be used to support
a non-antagonist in one of two ways: "to assure a second
target that it will continue to do or not do something; or
30to induce a second target to do or stop doing something."
Regardless of the mode, the authors note that force can be
applied either directly to a specific target or indirectly
to intermediaries. When placed in a naval context, these
terms relate very closely to Cable's definitions of
expressive, catalytic, purposeful, and definitive uses of
force and Edward Luttwak's use of the terms latent and
31
active suasion. It should be noted that these studies
indicate the nature of U.S. objectives appears to be an
important factor in whether or not the use of force for
political ends is successful. The use of military force to
29
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achieve political objectives is most successful when U.S.
32
objectives were complementary with prior U.S. policies.
These same studies show that the use of force in a coercive
role for political purposes can be used to compel an
adversary to change its behavior or to maintain or reinforce
an established behavior. Additionally, the use of force has
been most successful when the U.S. objective is to reinforce




As Blechman and Kaplan point out, the literature of
coercive diplomacy has devoted much less attention to
assurance and inducement than it has to deterrence and
compulsion. The most straightforward and strikingly candid
treatment of coercive diplomacy can be found in Thomas
Schelling's Arms and Influence . In this seminal study,
32
Blechman and Kaplan, p. 525.
33
Ibid
, p. 107. For additional information on the
objectives and goals of force see: Robert J. Art, "The Role
of Military Power in International Relations," in Trout and
Harf , eds
.
, National Security Affairs (New Brunswick, NJ
:
Transaction Books, 1982), pp. 13-53; Glenn H. Snyder, "The
Conditions of Stability," in R.J. Art and K.N. Waltz, eds.,
The Use of Force : Military Power and International Politics
(New York: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 64-74;
Robert E. Osgood, "The Expansion of Force," in The Use of
Force , pp. 75-100; Robert Jervis; "Cooperation Under the
Security Dilemma," World Politics , Vol. 30, No. 2, January
1978, pp. 167-214; and Clause Knorr, The Power of Nations
(New York: Basic Books, 1975), especially chapters 1 and 5.
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Schelling draws a clear distinction between diplomacy and
force: Diplomacy is bargaining -- it seeks outcomes that,
though not ideal for either party, are better for both than
some of the possible alternatives. The key to successful
bargaining (whether it is polite or impolite, constructive
or aggressive, respectful or vicious) is the presence of
some common interest between the antagonist as well as an
awareness of the requirement to make the adversary prefer
34
an outcome favorable to oneself.
Force, on the other hand, provides the means by which a
country may not need to bargain: "Some things a country
wants it can take, and some things it has it can keep, by
35
sheer strength, skill, and ingenuity." Where Schelling
departs from traditional Western military strategy is in the
less military and less heroic aspects of the role force
plays in achieving political objectives:
In addition to seizing and holding, disarming and
confining, penetrating and obstructing, and all
that, military force can be used to hurt . In
addition to taking and protecting things of value it
can destroy value. In addition to weakening
an enemy militarily it can cause an enemy plain
suffering. ^6
34
Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," in R.J. Art
and K.N. Waltz, eds
.
, The Use of Force: Military Power and
International Politics (New York: University Press of America,







, p . 4 .
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To exploit this capacity for hurting and inflicting
damage, Schelling contends that one needs to know precisely
what an adversary values and what frightens him. Just as
important, the adversary must be made to clearly understand
what type of behavior of his will cause the violence to be
37
inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld.
Additionally, coercion by threat of damage and inflicting
pain reguires that "our interests and our opponent's not be
38
absolutely opposed." In short, coercion reguires finding
a bargain and "arranging for him [the adversary] to be
better off doing what we want -- worse off not only doing




Schelling maintains that suffering reguires a victim
that can feel pain and has something to lose. However, to
inflict pain and suffering gains nothing in and by itself —
it can only make people behave to avoid it:
The only purpose, unless sport or revenge, must be
to influence somebody's behavior, to coerce his
decision or choice. To be coercive, violence
has to be anticipated. And it has to be avoidable by










To exploit it is diplomacy — vicious diplomacy, but
diplomacy.
Schelling concludes his treatment of coercive diplomacy with
a reminder that the power to hurt is nothing new in the long
history of warfare. What disturbs Schelling, however, is
how extraordinary it is that most treatises on war and
strategy "have declined to recognize that the power to hurt
has been throughout history, a fundamental character of
military force and fundamental to the diplomacy based on
41
it."
The theoretical literature, as Blechman and Kaplan
note, has long recognized the importance of credibility for
bargaining in crisis situations: "Anyone who has played
40
Ibid . , p. 4.
41
Ibid., p. 24. For additional discussion on the
concept of coercive diplomacy see: James F. Cable, Gunboat
Diplomacy (London: Praeger for the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1971); Alexander L. George and
Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy : Theory
and Practice
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974);
Paul G. Lauren, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy,"
International Studies Quarterly , vol. 16 (June 1972) , pp.
131-65; Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Use of Seapower ,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Bruce M.
Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict
Resolution , vol. 7 (June 1963), pp. 97-109; Thomas C.
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966); J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A
Formal Model," American Political Science Review , vol. 57
(June 1963), pp. 420-30; Oran R. Young, The Politics of
Force : Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul
Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977), especially Chapter III on crisis
bargaining; Craig and George, Force and Statecraft (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983), chapters 14-15.
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poker seriously can attest to the importance of a player's
reputation when it comes to having threats taken
42
seriously." As the analysts point out, armed forces, when
used against a backdrop that includes a demonstrated
willingness to act, may in fact be quite effective. In
other words, the existence of a solid reputation for action
in a particular region of the world may lead an adversary to
be more cautious and more willing to retreat in the face of
43
insurmountable odds.
However, the obverse of this dictum is also true: in
regions of the world where the U.S. reputation for resolve
was absent, adversaries have been much more "confident in
testing the degree of U.S. commitment and more willing to
44
risk action in opposition to American interests." As
demonstrated later in this study (Chapter V) , the Persian










Ibid . For additional information on the importance
of credibility for bargaining in a crisis situation see:
Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row,
1964)
, pp. 74-86; Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force
:
Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968), pp. 35-36; Robert Jervis, The Logic
of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
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Since the United States chose to adopt a deterrent and
reactive strategy in the Persian Gulf, a brief word is in
order on the theory of deterrence and defense. Glenn Snyder
aptly defines deterrence as a means of discouraging the
enemy from taking military action by "posing for him a
prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective
46
gain." Defense, on the other hand, is defined as a means
to reduce one's own prospective costs and risks in the event
deterrence fails:
Deterrence works on the enemy's intentions ;
the deterrent value of military forces is their
effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy military
moves. Defense reduces the enemy's capability
to damage or deprive us; the defense value of military
forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse
consequences for us of possible enemy moves, whether
such consequences are counted as losses of territory
or war damaged?
Gordon Craig and Alexander George frame the concept in
a slightly different manner by defining deterrence as the
effort of one actor to persuade an adversary not to take
action against his interests by convincing the adversary
University Press, 1970), pp. 78-102; Snyder and Deising,
Conflict Among Nations
, pp. 185-195; George and Smoke,
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy : Theory and Practice
p. 60; and Craig and George, Force and Statecraft , pp. 172-
173.
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Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense," in R.J.
Art and K.N. Waltz, eds
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that the costs and risks of doing so will simply outweigh
the prospective gain. According to their formulation,
deterrence is based upon the assumption of a "rational"
opponent -- "one who can be expected to calculate the
utility of his alternative courses of action on the basis of
48
available information."
In formulating a deterrence policy, Craig and George
stress the importance of a clear and straightforward step by
step approach. For example:
The first step in formulating a deterrence policy
is to weigh the interests of one's country that
are engaged in the area that may be threatened by
hostile action and to assess how important they are.
The next step is to formulate and convey to the
opponent a commitment to defend those interests.
The deterring power backs its commitments by threats to
respond if the opponent acts. Such threats must be
both credible and sufficiently potent in the
eyes of the opponent — that is, pose a level of costs
and risks that he regards as of sufficient magnitude
to overcome his motivation to challenge the defending
power's position. 49
As mentioned previously, credibility plays a vital role in
the effectiveness of a deterrent strategy. The deterring
power must communicate to the adversary that it has the will
and resolve to defend its vital interests and it must
possess the capabilities necessary, appropriate, and usable
for the defense of those interests. In other words, the








— with the varying types of action an adversary may take.
And finally, theorists of international relations have
proposed that a deterrent strategy, as the one adopted by
the United States during the Persian Gulf crisis, is most
likely to succeed when a potential adversary is not sure of
his ability to control the risks involved in the military
action he is contemplating. In short, if that uncertainty
51




Theorists of international relations note that the
theory and practice of deterrence exists at three levels:
First, the deterrent relationship of the two superpowers at
the strategic nuclear level; second, and below the strategic
nuclear level, the deterrence of "limited wars" with
particular emphasis on the nuclear and conventional forces
facing each other in central Europe; and third, the
deterrence of "sublimited" conflict at the "low end" of the
spectrum of violence. While deterrence of nuclear war at
the strategic level has, by far, received the most attention
in the deterrence literature, this study focuses on the two
lower levels and their application to the Persian Gulf
crisis. The reader should be aware that the literature on
deterrence theory is quite exhaustive. However, for an
excellent overview of the theory and practice of deterrence
at all three levels, the reader is referred to the following
sources: Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence
Theory in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1974) especially part one
on "The Nature of Contemporary Deterrence Theory" and part
three "Toward a Reformulation of Deterrence Theory"; Gordon
A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter 13; Glenn
H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense : Toward a Theory of
National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961) . For a comprehensive analysis and review of the
pertinent literature see: James E. Dougherty and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff , Jr. Contending Theories of International
Relations (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1989)
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Framework for Sizing Naval Forces
In their article "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force,"
Ralph Arnott and William Gaffney attempt to develop a
rational, structured approach to choosing a force in
response to a crisis management situation. They note that
if forces are not properly chosen there can be a much greater
impact on fleet operations than may actually be necessary.
The authors define a show of force in the maritime sense as
the "specific deployment of naval forces that are planned in
pursuit of an identifiable political objective in which the
use of force is contemplated or could reasonably be expected
52
to occur if circumstances arise."
The first step in the force selection process is to
identify the true political objective and not necessarily
the publicly stated objective. Having clearly defined the
objective, the next step in the decision to use force is the
identification of whom we are trying to coerce and how we
are going to coerce them. The follow-on step must then be a
determination of the force structure and an accurate
assessment of the costs involved in employing then
sustaining that force. These cost assessments must include
the impact on other commitments, training, readiness and
particularly Chapter 9 on "Macrocosmic Theories of Conflict
Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control."
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Ralph Arnott and William Gaffney, "Naval Presence:
Sizing the Force," Naval War College Review , March-April
1985, pp. 18-19.

morale as well as the probability of success and the dollar
cost. They contend, the global commitments of our naval
forces provide little flexibility to respond to crises
without affecting other commitments. For example:
. . . when the U. S . S . Ranger battle group was
diverted to Central America, this required either
extension of the U. S . S . Vinson '
s
battle group
deployment or gapping of the Indian Ocean
commitment. When the Indian Ocean presence was
built up to two CVBGs after the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, naval forces had to be
withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Western
Pacific to fulfill that new commitment for
continued presence. Historically, crisis
response show of force requirements have not
developed in areas where training support and
services are available. Crisis response restricts
force mobility and reduces training exercises
necessary for unit combat proficiency and
integrated force training for general war
strategy. The newly emerging Caribbean presence
requirements may require the surging of forces
during their training cycle which will necessarily
result in loss of training and proficiency. The
show of force requirements may well justify the
loss of training. But it must be understood
that should the use of force be required, the
reduced combat proficiency of the force could
. 5 1have an overall negative effect.
As Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recently pointed out, "Congress
and the public expect us to dominate — to come through
unscathed. They won't tolerate big losses fighting a third
54
world country for limited objectives." In other words,
performance, rather than victory or defeat, is often the
53
Ibid . , pp. 26-27
.
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Terry Sheffield, George T. Raach, William E.
Pellerin, and Joseph P. Englehardt, "Force in the Persian




key. Additionally, critical to the successful employment
of force is an objective assessment of all possible outcomes
both successful and otherwise. Perhaps the key in making
this assessment lies in the determination that if the
outcome will not be satisfactory, "then the objective should
be re-examined to determine if it is attainable through the
56
use of military force."
Having defined the concept of the objective, framed the
issues, and explored the role force plays in obtaining
political objectives, it is now possible to analyze U.S.
Persian Gulf policy from the standpoint of both theory and
practice. Clausewitz's unique insight into "critical
analysis proper" — the discovery and interpretation of
facts, the tracing of effects back to their causes, and the
evaluation of the means employed -- provides the generic
57
model by which to analyze the Persian Gulf crisis.
Similarly, Arnott and Gaffney's structured framework for
choosing a force in response to a crisis situation is the
specific analytical model chosen to organize and evaluate
the relationship between the political objectives and
military means in the Persian Gulf.
Regional Stability?" Unpublished student research paper,
John F. Kennedy School of Government and Center for Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1989, p. 79.
Blechman and Kaplan, p. 7.
56 Arnott and Gaffney, p. 28.
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ENDS VERSUS MEANS: AN ANALYSIS
Open ended commitments with vaguely defined
political objectives are sure formulas for
embarrassment and failure. We learned that
in the Vietnam War. 1
James Webb, October 9, 1987
Secretary of the Navy
Background
The Persian Gulf crisis of July 1987, through December
1988, reminded us once again of the need to establish a sound
balance between political objectives and military means. A
well-defined and properly articulated strategy provides the
military means to guarantee achievement of the nation's
political objectives. While the experts differ widely over
the viability of the reflagging policy and the jury remains
out on how well the overall Persian Gulf policy has fared,
some preliminary conclusions can be made based on several
indices of success. From an operational perspective, the
reflagging and protection of shipping plan can certainly be
judged a success. The tenacity, expertise, and innovation
demonstrated by the U.S. Navy was a major factor in the high
number of successful convoys (see Table 10) . No tankers
were sunk and only two tankers and one U.S. warship were
1
Webb, "National Strategy, the Navy, and the
Persian Gulf," p. 43.
91

damaged throughout the year-and-a-half-long operation. The
U.S. Navy's ability to continually adjust to a rapidly
changing and sensitive political and military situation
inside the Gulf directly contributed to the success of the
protection of shipping plan. Similarly, the system of
contingency planning remained within doctrinally prescribed
2
frameworks thereby easing the execution of these plans.
Keeping it simple always pays high dividends.
However, when measured by the index of securing
Kuwait's oil exports, the decision to reflag the 11 tankers
fares less well. Prior to the convoy operation, these 11
tankers carried approximately 30% of Kuwait's oil exports.
Due to the complex logistics involved in assembling the
three to five tankers and combatants that made up a typical
convoy, these same 11 tankers could now carry only 15% of
3
the volume of Kuwait's total oil exports. This cost-
benefit ratio, when multiplied by the enormous dollar cost
in sustaining a substantial U.S. naval presence and coupled
with the adverse impact on other U.S. commitments, training,
readiness, and morale, forces one to seriously question
2
Terry Sheffield, et al., p. 73.
3
Pat Towell, "A Year After Escort Policy Was
Launched. . . Jury is Still Out on How Well it Works,"













































































whether or not the price tag fits the goods. Likewise,
the rationale of ensuring the unimpeded flow of oil to the
West loses credibility when less than 1% of Gulf oil
shipping had actually been disrupted. Additionally, there
has been a heavy and increasing use of pipelines to export
Gulf oil. According to a report by the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners, the growing use of
pipelines as alternative export routes drastically reduces
the number (and size ) of tankers required to handle the
Mideast output. Additionally,
Reduced tanker requirements due to existing
Mideast pipelines already far exceed all the
world's inactive crude carriers and account for a
fifth or more of the total world tanker
surplus. 5
Ironically, full 4.8 million barrels per day utilization of
Saudi Arabia's Petroline capacity to Yanbu on the Red Sea
and Iraq's pipeline through Turkey to Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean Sea would further cut tanker requirements by
6
an additional 413 billion ton-miles per year. Five
4
For an analysis of the opportunity, monetary, and
human costs associated with the Persian Gulf operation see:
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, U.S.
Economic and Energy Security Interests in the Persian Gulf ,
Hearing (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., July 14, 1988).
Hereafter referred to as: House Committee on Banking.
5
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new Mideast pipelines are presently under construction which
7
will significantly increase these figures.
The use of alternative pipeline export routes when
coupled with the long-suffering tanker industry, excess
production capacity outside the Persian Gulf, and
substantial strategic petroleum reserves should be able to
handle a complete cut-off of the 6 to 7 million barrels per
day transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. These
conditions, if not effectively eliminating the Strait of
Hormuz as a factor in the unimpeded flow of oil, certainly
reduces the criticality of the Strait as a strategic
chokepoint of world oil supplies. Military arrangements for
protecting these pipelines from sabotage or outright
military attack may be a better investment of the U.S.
security dollar.
7
For more information on these five new pipelines
see: John Cranfield, "Seeking Alternative Export Routes,"
Petroleum Economist: The International Energy Journal , May
1988, pp. 151-153 and "Iran and Iraq: Planning for
Reconstruction," Petroleum Economist: The International
Energy Journal, October 1988, pp. 326-327. See also:
"Payment in Oil for Iraq-Saudi Line Spawns Crude Deals,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly , 28 September 1987, p. 1;
"Iran Also Planning Ambitious New Oil Export Outlets,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly , 14 September 1987, p 1;
"Iraq's New Pipeline is Making Rest of OPEC Nervous,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly , 13 July 1987, pp. 1-2;
"Kuwait Looking to Possible Oil Pipeline Link With Red Sea,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly . 19 January 1987, p. 5;
"Mideast Pipelines Sharply Reducing Global Tanker Needs,"
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly , 16 may 1988, pp. 2-3;
"Pipeline Strategies: Saudi Arabia and Iran," Middle East
Economic Digest , 20-26 February, 1988, p. 29.
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On the positive side, there is evidence to suggest that
the U.S. strategic objectives of reinforcing our waning
influence with the moderate GCC states and limiting
Soviet regional influence have been at least partially
achieved. U.S. and allied presence in the region and
staying power throughout the operation demonstrated to the
GCC states that the United States could be counted on to
remain a reliable partner. This demonstration of resolve
was particularly successful in light of inconsistent past
performances and revelation of the embarrassing Iran-Contra
arms deal. By respecting regional concerns in an area with
a long history of great power interference, the United
States bolstered its image as a responsible superpower in
8
the eyes of the regional governments. This is
particularly relevant when taking into account the political
reality of the GCC states having to live with
historically dominant Iran after the convoy operations were
completed and the U.S. presence reduced.
While Soviet overtures toward Kuwait and U.S.
preoccupation with East-West competition in the region as a
zero-sum game provided the impetus for the reflagging
decision, it remains difficult to assess the extent to which
Soviet influence in the region has been limited. It is
equally difficult to make this assessment in light of the
8
Terry Sheffield, et al., p. 70.
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recent Soviet diplomatic inroads in the region — the
opening of embassies in 1985 in Oman, the UAE , and Qatar,
with the "major prize," Saudi Arabia, rumored to follow
9
shortly. However, traditional religious and cultural
impediments to such an influence certainly exist in the
politically sophisticated ruling families of the Gulf oil
sheikdoms. The opportunities for Soviet encroachment in the
region remain severely handicapped by long-standing local
suspicions of the purpose of Soviet (previously "Russian")
expansionism and overtures toward the region.
Ironically, U.S. policy may in fact be encouraging a
Soviet-Iranian rapprochement as evidenced by Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze's February 1989 visit to Tehran and
the reciprocal visit to Moscow by then Speaker of the
Iranian Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, in June of 1989. By
playing the Soviet card in reacting to the U.S. naval build-
up and perceived U.S. intervention in the tanker war, Iran
was, predictably, keeping entirely within the historical
context of its foreign policy in relation to the
superpowers. Iran's foreign policy of na sharg na gharb
(neither East nor West) "does not preclude a little tilting
9
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, "Statement,"
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic, and critical materials,
Intelligence , Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off.,





to either side if it serves Iranian interests." For
example, when the Western nations imposed economic sanctions
on Iran as a result of the 1979-81 hostage crisis, Teheran's
relations with the Soviet Union warmed up temporarily only
to wane again with the violent suppression of the Tudeh
Party in 1983 and Iran's continued intransigence in the
Iran-Iraq War. However, as the U.S. naval presence in the
Gulf began to increase, the Soviet-Iranian rapprochement
gained momentum as evidenced by the signing of a joint
economic cooperation protocol designed to reinstate the
Soviet-Iranian Permanent Commission for Joint Economic
10
This foreign policy doctrine is comparable to the
concept of non-alignment advocated by many Third World
countries since the end of World War II. However,
Khomeini's concept of "neither East nor West" envisions an
independent and non-aligned policy requiring confrontation
with the superpowers on political, economic, ideological,
and if challenged, military levels. According to Khomeini,
the policies of the superpowers are "diametrically opposed
to the interests of the Third World in general , and the
Islamic countries in particular," thereby making conflict
between Iran and the superpowers inevitable. This doctrine
views the superpowers as the mustakbarin (the oppressors)
and the Islamic Republic as the mostazaf in (the oppressed
and exploited) . Moreover, the superpowers are "illegitimate
players in the international system" because they seek to
dominate rather than work within that system. To remedy
this injustice, the doctrine calls for an alternative and
more just world order established along Islamic lines. For
more information on Iran's foreign policy doctrine see:
Nader Entessar, "Superpowers and Persian Gulf Security: The







Cooperation after a six year hiatus. Additional
agreements have recently been signed allowing for more than
a third of Iran's oil to be exported through the Soviet
Union by converting an existing natural gas pipeline (IGAT-
1) running between southern Iranian oil fields and the
Soviet Port of Baku on the Caspian Sea. Iran and the Soviet
Union have also agreed to construct another natural gas
pipeline (IGAT-2) which would transport gas from the Kangan
13
Field in southern Iran to Soviet Armenia. Unfortunately,
the recent Rafsanjani diplomatic maneuver may lead to the
disturbing possibility of arms transfers from the Soviet
Union to Iran -- a possibility raising grave questions as to
the viability of U.S. Persian Gulf policy let alone the
creation of a geopolitical nightmare for the moderate Gulf
14
states. It is interesting to postulate that if the




Entessar, p. 1446; See also: "Iran Planning
Ambitious New Oil Export Outlets," Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly , September 14, 1987, p. 1.
14
According to press reports, Iran and the Soviet
Union also concluded a bilateral agreement that included
economic cooperation through the end of the century,
cooperation in scientific, technological, and nuclear
matters, and huge Soviet arms sales to Iran. The agreement
also provided for the construction of a new railroad line to
link Teheran with Moscow and for exchange visits of
religious leaders. For more information see: James D.
Hittle, "Atheist Soviets Wooing Iran with Good Dose of
Religion," Navy Times , 7 August 1989, p. 23.
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of securing Kuwait's oil supplies, Kuwait (and even Iran)
may not have played the Soviet card.
On a broader strategic level, initial U.S. policy
statements framed the goal of protecting the 11 Kuwaiti
tankers in the more expansive context of protecting freedom
of navigation in international waters. By protecting
Kuwaiti tankers, policy statements indicated that Iran would
be deterred from attacking the hundreds of neutral ships
that pass through the Gulf each month. How this was to be
accomplished was never explicitly stated. Unfortunately,
this approach merely signaled to the Iranians that,
except for the 11 ref lagged Kuwaiti tankers, all other
ships were fair game. The fact of the matter remains
that both Iraqi and Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping
steadily increased throughout the latter half of 1987 and
into the first half of 1988 (see Table 3) . Quite
frankly, these attacks apparently had nothing to do with
the U.S. naval presence but were rather a direct result
of the dynamics of the Iran-Iraq War. In effect, U.S.
naval forces aligned against Iran remained "hostage" to
Iraqi war strategy and policy.
When placed at the broadest strategic level, the
reflagging policy failed to adequately address the question
of how the protection of shipping plan would assist in
pressuring Iran and Iraq to end their eight year old war.
By protecting Kuwaiti shipping, the United States in effect
100

reduced the downside risks in Iraq's attempt through the
tanker war to strangle Iran's economic capacity to wage
15
war. A closer examination of the subtle yet decisive
shift in the balance of power in the war during this
timeframe places this issue in its proper context: in war,
timing is everything and fortunately for the United States,
the decision to retaliate against Iran for the mining attack
on the Roberts could not have come at a better time. The
dynamics of the Iran-Iraq war began to shift in favor of
Iraq in late 1987. Almost bled to death Iran incredibly was
planning to launch a major offensive in early 1988 to
recapture the strategic Iraqi port city of Basra. The
Iranian government had great difficulty in mobilizing
volunteers for the offensive and faced with insurmountable
Iraqi defenses around Basra decided not to attack. Instead
of an offensive along the southern front, Iran made a series
of attacks in March of 1988 along its northwestern border
with Iraq in the mountainous region of Kurdistan. While
these attacks were initially successful, they had little
strategic importance. To help repel this offensive, Iraq
used chemical weapons and launched a counterof fensive which
effectively eliminated the Iranian threat to Iraq's
15
For an indepth analysis of Iraq's economic




hydroelectric complex at Darbandikham, which was believed to
16
be the Iranian objective.
While this fighting was taking place, the "War of the
Cities" also began to shift in favor of Iraq. Iran was
reported to be seriously suffering from constant Iraqi
missile attacks on Tehran and Qom while Baghdad was
receiving only sporadic Iranian SCUD missile attacks. Iraq
reportedly fired over 200 missiles at Iranian cites during
this timeframe. Ironically, while the U.S. Navy was
pounding Iran's navy and oil platforms on the 18th of
April, Iraqi forces recaptured the Fao Peninsula near the
strategic Shatt-Al-Arab waterway. As the morale of the
Iraqi military began to improve, so did their penchant for
17
tanker attacks deeper into the southern Persian Gulf.
With the Sirri and Sassan oil platforms, which had been
major sources of oil revenue for Iran, now destroyed by U.S.
naval forces, the only Iranian oil facility left remaining
as a significant source of revenue was the Larak Island
floating storage and transshipment terminal in the northern
16
Bernard E. Trainor, "The Effect of the Attack: No







Strait of Hormuz. On 15 May, 1988, while flying a U.S.
Navy reconnaissance mission over the Strait of Hormuz, the
author witnessed the devastating after-effect of a massive
Iraqi airstrike on the Larak Island terminal in which two of
Iran's biggest storage vessels were destroyed and one
shuttle tanker and one of the world's largest crude carriers
19
(a Spanish VLCC) were severely damaged. Iran's oil
export strategy of "safety in numbers" and the build-up of
its fleet of storage and shuttle tankers gave Iran the
capacity to cover its requirements while these damaged ships
were repaired or new ones chartered. However, the impunity
with which Iraq conducted the strike (use of "iron bombs"
and close-in delivery techniques vice stand-off weapons and
tactics in Iran's semi-invulnerable southern flank), clearly
demonstrated that Iraq's strategy of cutting Iran's economic
lifeline was entering a daring new phase. Iraq's signal to
Iran seems clear: if the war did not end soon, then Iraq's
air superiority would be brought to bear in ever-increasing
economic attacks ranging up and down Iran's Persian Gulf
littoral eventually forcing an end of the war on terms
18
The Sirri and Sassan oil platforms accounted for
an estimated 8-10% of Iran's total production. For more
information see: Ronald O'Rourke, "Gulf Ops," Proceedings ,
May 1989, p. 42.
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favorable to Iraq. One analyst at the time suggested Iraq
should be able to defeat Iran economically "within about 18
months, perhaps sooner if it can maintain the initiative on
20
the ground that it seized in April (1988)." Iraq's
militarily complex foray deep into the southern Persian
Gulf, which required in-flight refueling and a second
regional country's support, was simply one more pull on the
noose that was growing ever more tightly around Iran's
military and economic capacity to wage war. From a
psychological perspective, the accidental shootdown on 3
July, 1988, of Iran Air flight 655 by the U.S.S. Vincennes
may have been the final strangulating tug on the noose.
Within weeks of this tragic incident, Iran finally accepted
U.N. Ceasefire Resolution 598 thereby effectively ending one
21




Admittedly, the causes for the end of the war are
varied and complex. However, the accidental shootdown of
Iran Air 655 is directly linked to the Iranian decision to
accept UNSC 598. The letter of acceptance, from then
Iranian President Ali Khamenei to the U.N. Secretary
General, clearly states that "the fire of the war which was
started by the Iraqi regime on 22 September 1980 through an
aggression against the territorial integrity of the Islamic
Republic of Iran has now gained unprecedented dimensions,
bringing other countries into the war and even engulfing
innocent civilians." The letter specifically refers to the
loss of 290 civilians in the tragedy as "a clear
manifestation of this contention" and then declares that
Iran, "because of the importance it attaches to saving the
lives of human beings and the establishment of justice and
international peace and security," accepts the resolution.




The Arnott and Gaffney model of analysis provides a
workable framework within which to further analyze the
military means used to achieve the political objectives of
the year-and-a-half long Persian Gulf operation. As
mentioned above, the first step in the force selection
process is to identify the true political objective. Having
clearly defined the objective, the next step in the decision
to use force is the identification of who we are trying to
coerce and how we are going to coerce them. Additionally,
the selection of forces for a particular mission requires an
accurate and realistic assessment of the available time
needed for decision making, a choice between the use of
committed or uncommitted forces, and a determination of
whether those forces are to be used in a dominate or hostage
role. Likewise, an assessment of force effectiveness must
to accept the resolution, other factors clearly had an
impact on the Iranian government: For example, according to
some analysts, Iran's decision resulted from a combination
of a series of military defeats in 1987-88, the crippling of
the Iranian Navy by U.S. forces, the failure of the Basra
offensive and the loss of the Fao Peninsula, Iraqi chemical
and missile attacks, effective Iraqi air attacks on the
Iranian oil economy, and Iranian fears that continuation of
the war would severely threaten the "revolution." In this
light, the Iran air incident can be interpreted as the final
psychological straw that broke Iran's will to continue the
fight. For additional information see: North Atlantic
Assembly, Political Committee, General Report on Alliance
Political Developments in 1987-88 . Arms Control, Bases, the





be made based on the perceptions of the potential adversary,
repercussions in other nations not directly involved, the
applicability of the force in obtaining the desired
objective, and an accurate threat evaluation. Once the
force is selected, it needs to be evaluated as to its
sustainability and cost. In other words, when is the
probable decision point for its removal or reinforcement?
And does the objective justify the overall cost (monetary
and opportunity) or would a different force be more cost
effective?
Arnott and Gaffney clearly point out that the measure
of effectiveness of the use of naval forces in a political
role to influence a specific adversary is subjective in
nature and "requires thoughtful attention as to the specific
22
action the force is to carry out." Likewise, the resort
to the actual use of force in a crisis situation demands
special consideration, as the primary focus of the military
commander will be on the objective to be achieved. For
example, if the "performance" of the force has been
determined to be more important than the ends achieved, then
the military commander must be made aware of this subtle
shift in emphasis in order to properly direct the force
22
Arnott and Gaffney, p. 27
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commander in his strike planning phase. Finally, the
military commander needs to anticipate then analyze all
possible outcomes — both successful and otherwise — and if
it is determined that the outcome will not be desireable,
then the political objective needs to be re-evaluated to
establish if it can be achieved by military means. Domestic
political considerations must also be factored into this
equation as the removal, maintenance, or augmentation of
forces, while technically correct from a military
perspective, may not be advisable due to the political
23
impact at home (see Table 11)
.
The True Political Objective
As mentioned above, the specific military operation of
escorting and protecting the Kuwaiti tankers can be judged a
success. However, when applied to the attainment of the
broader strategic goals of ending the Iran-Iraq War and
preventing Soviet and Iranian expansionism, the military
tactic of protecting the 11 tankers has little relation to
these publicly stated political objectives. In order to
tailor the force to the specific situation, the
identification of the true political objective — the what
— is required. For example, was the objective of the
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and allied ships in the Gulf to secure Kuwait's oil
supplies, or was the true political objective to prevent
the Soviet Union from reflagging the tankers thereby
inhibiting Soviet influence in the region? The point of
this exercise is that the military commander must know
the true political objective in order to properly size the
force and take appropriate action. Unfortunately, the
confusion over the proper definition of the objective
resulted in the allowance of available options to remain
limited to two unattractive alternatives: reflag and protect
Kuwaiti tankers or abandon the (already public) commitment
to Kuwait and suffer the loss of credibility in the Arab
world. By going public early, the United States literally
boxed itself into a corner with reflagging the only way back
into center ring.
Once the true political objective is identified, the
next question in need of an answer is, who are we trying to
influence: the Iranian government, people, or perhaps a
third party such as Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia or even the
Soviet Union? A specific answer to this question is
essential in that the forces chosen must in some finite way
be able to communicate their presence, intentions, and
capabilities. Based on the available evidence, it seems
safe to conclude that, in terms of the Persian Gulf policy,
this question was never properly framed let alone adequately
answered. Moreover, the official answer appears to have
109

been the proverbial multiple choice test response of "all of
the above." Unfortunately, such a response only serves to
exacerbate the military commander's tactical problem of
where to concentrate the full effect of his force.
Force Choice Assessment
If the true political objective was in fact to limit
Soviet influence, then perhaps the concentration of U.S.
naval force just outside the Gulf in an uncommitted but
highly visible posture may have been a more prudent strategy
to follow. Blechman and Kaplan note that some strategists
argue that because committed forces convey a higher degree
of resolve they are more likely to achieve the stated
political objectives than uncommitted forces. However, they
also point out that opinion is far from unanimous on this
24
point. Most analysts agree that committed forces are
more vulnerable, difficult to sustain, are in more physical
danger, and once in place are much more difficult to remove.
If removed prior to attaining their objectives, the
political damage can be extensive. On the other hand,
uncommitted forces can be easily removed from an area
"although history shows a tendency for short-term crises
25
response requirements becoming long-term commitments."
24
Blechman and Kaplan, p. 529.
25
Arnott and Gaffney, p. 23.
110

Likewise, the Soviet's ability to concentrate an equally
capable naval presence in the region, while an improvement
over previous years and capabilities, in no way matches the
ability of the United States to deploy and sustain (in a
combat ready posture) large numbers of naval units to the
region. Some intelligence analysts have gone as far to say
that "the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is
modest, extremely vulnerable, and virtually defenseless in
time of war" and that it is the Soviet Union rather than the
United States that faces the greatest logistical hurdle in
26
getting to the Strait of Hormuz. In a recent statement
before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the
Director of Naval Intelligence noted that, as a result of
the Gulf War and for the first time, the Soviet Union has
"established a more or less permanent naval presence in the
Gulf. This presence is not large, generally consisting of
one or two warships engaged in convoying Soviet arms
27
transporters to Kuwait ..." At the height of the
crisis, the Western naval presence totaled approximately 45
26
Ralph A. Cossa, "America's Interests in the Gulf are
Growing, Not Decreasing," Armed Forces Journal
International
. June 1987, p. 62.
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U.S. and 35 European ships. Most analysts agree that
this Soviet naval presence is likely to remain to complement
the Soviets increased diplomatic presence regardless of U.S.
29
efforts to limit Soviet influence in the region. The
approach of concentrating forces outside the Gulf in an
uncommitted role would have allowed the uncertainty factor
of these forces to act as a force multiplier in the eyes of
an adversary while providing additional time with which to
simultaneously (and intensely) pursue alternative methods to
secure Kuwait's oil supplies. Unfortunately, there exists a
common belief in the crisis decision-making process that the
time available for responding to the crisis is necessarily
short. This common belief manifested itself in the manner
in which the United States responded to the Kuwaiti request
to reflag once it became apparent the Soviets were involved.
On 10 December, 1987, U.S. Coast Guard headquarters
received a telex from the KOTC inquiring as to the
feasibility of placing its tankers under the U.S. flag.
Ironically, the Coast Guard "thought so little of the idea
that it took more than a month, until Jan. 12, just to mail
the Kuwaiti's a pamphlet about the regulations and
28
Nick Childs, "Gulf Points Up Out of Area Forces,"
Jane ' s Defence Weekly . 25 March, 1989, p. 513.
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procedures involved." The interagency process regarding
the reflagging policy grew out of a series of National
Security Council meetings in February which had addressed
U.S. policy in the Middle East and U.S. posture in the
Persian Gulf. However, this slow-moving process was
significantly accelerated in early March when the United
States learned that the Soviet Union had agreed to reflag
five Kuwaiti tankers and that a Soviet delegation was headed
31
to Kuwait to sign the accord on 12 March. Within five
days, U.S. government officials gained President Reagan's
approval and formally told Kuwait on 7 March that the United
States would reflag all 11 tankers. Interestingly, this
rushed decision took place during a period in which White
House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan was fighting to keep
his job and the president was recovering from prostate
surgery. Some administration officials have openly admitted
serious mistakes were made not only in dealing with Congress
on the matter but also in a lack of coordination, and
sometimes blatant disagreement, between political advisors
in the White House and the National Security Council Staff.
Former chiefs of staff James A. Baker III, Regan,
30
Don Oberdorfer, "Soviet Deal with Kuwait Spurred
U.S. Ship Role," The Washington Post , 24 May 1987, p. A.l
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and then Howard Baker have all complained of "politically
32
insensitive moves" by the National Security Council staff.
By the time Howard Baker became Chief of Staff on 2 March,'
Frank C. Carlucci, the President's National Security Advisor
(who had been promoting a new "activist" policy to show
renewed U.S. support for the moderate Arab Gulf states
following the damaging revelations of the secret arms
shipments to Iran) had made all the basic decisions
33
regarding the reflagging policy. Additionally, many
questions were raised over why the Administration continued
to deal with Congress in such a confrontational manner over
34
serious, difficult, and complex foreign policy issues.
The traditional bureaucratic politics model notwithstanding,
the rush to arrive at a decision, once Soviet involvement
was known, may have been premature. As Snyder and Diesing
point out, while such crises undoubtedly involve a sense of
urgency to formulate policy and make decisions due to the
atmosphere of risk and danger, it does not follow that short
32
David B. Ottaway and David Hoffman, "Reflagging
also Protects Wealth of Kuwait Inc.," The Washington Post , 5








decision time is inherent to a crisis. In short,
"identification of the time interval early in the force-
sizing process will allow for a realistic estimate of the
36
time available for decision making."
According to Arnott and Gaffney, a dominate force
represets the superior military capability in a particular
region, has the capability to protect itself from any
potential adversary, and is likely to prevail thereby making
37
the desired political outcome more evident. Such a force
is best suited in a case where coercion is required and
behavior modification versus maintaining the status quo is
the plan of the day. Conversely, a hostage force is a
comparatively weaker force that is "interposed between two
or more competing parties to cool a situation. As such it
is dependent upon limited objectives and reasonable rules of
engagement from competing factions for its very
38
survival." If the hostage force is perceived as being
other than neutral or if one or more of the competing
factions wishes to draw the force into the fray, then the
35
Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among
Nations : Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure





Arnott and Gaffney, pp. 22-23.
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hostage force has a limited chance of success in achieving
the stated political objectives. While the United States
certainly enjoyed naval superiority in the region, the
essentially neutral mission assigned to those forces
(protecting 11 tankers) as well as reacting to rather than
controlling the tactical situation as dictated by the
peacetime rules of engagement (sweeping mines instead of
removing the minelayers) handicapped what could have been a
dominate force and relegated it to the position of a hostage
force dependent on Iraqi war aims and Iranian restraint to
achieve its objectives. By limiting the protection of
shipping plan to Kuwaiti tankers the United States, in
seeking to lower its great power visibility, simply
interposed itself between the two belligerents and shed its
neutrality by tilting toward Iraq. This strategy merely
encouraged Iraq to continue its economic warfare against
Iran and signaled to Teheran that, except for the 11
Kuwaiti tankers, all other merchant shipping in the Gulf
was fair game.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the
presence of escorting U.S. warships and large numbers of
carrier-based tactical aircraft in close proximity to the
Iranian coastline clearly visible on Iranian radar screens
during the Earnest Will convoy operations provided a
powerful disincentive to attack the tankers by conventional
and attributable means. Any Iranian military commander,
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from the regular armed services to the Revolutionary Guards,
who is even vaguely aware of the destructive capacity of a
section of fully-armed A-6E's let alone an entire carrier
airwing, would certainly think twice about attacking a
ref lagged Kuwaiti tanker or an escorting U.S. warship.
However, such a deterrent may not necessarily provide a
disincentive to a more unconventional and non-attributable
attempt by Iran to disrupt the tankers. While the use of
mobile barges, minesweepers, small patrol craft, and attack
helicopters were designed to counter this threat, the tactic
of continually sweeping mines (and allowing them to be laid
again) and reacting to instead of controlling the tactical
situation simply served to reinforce Iran's attempt (as in
Beirut) to "win the tragedy sweepstakes" by inflicting a
desperate however lucky blow to U.S. prestige and morale as
the small boat attacks on neutral shipping and
indiscriminate minelaying continued. By engaging in a
systematic, defensive, and essentially rear-guard operation
over an extended period of time and then limiting
retaliatory strikes to maritime targets, the United States
in effect signaled to Iran that its behavior toward neutral
shipping was acceptable as long as a U.S. -owned ship was not
overtly attacked. It is a matter of statistical record that,
when coupled with the somewhat restrictive ROE's adopted for
the convoy operations, this defensive action simply had the
effect of increasing the number of ship attacks by Iraq and
117

Iran on unprotected shipping. In fact, Iran specifically
attempted to circumvent U.S. ROE ' s by firing on a Kuwaiti
tanker and a U.S. -owned ship with Silkworm missiles inside
Kuwaiti territorial waters — waters where escorting U.S.
39
warships were not allowed to proceed.
Additionally, the adoption of this deterrent and
reactive strategy signaled Iran that if a U.S. -owned ship
was attacked and damaged by non-attributable means, then the
United States would assume Iran was responsible and that a
measured response directed against an off-shore target was
sure to follow. While the naval presence inside the Gulf
was at all times linked to the CVBG stationed in the North
Arabian Sea, such a deterrent strategy relies on the
potential adversary's perception that "an unacceptable level
of punishment would occur were he to take hostile
40
action." As former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb,
Jr. tersely pointed out, "conducting target practice on a
couple of oil platforms was hardly designed to send chills
up the spine of the average Iranian sailor, particularly
41
those who make a living laying mines." One of the main
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use military force is the credibility of that force as
viewed "through the filters of others' [Iran's]
42
perceptions." The choice of a reactive strategy and
minimal courses of retaliation served to undermine force
credibility and reinforced Iranian perceptions that the U.S.
policy of "gunboat diplomacy in the Persian Gulf in support
of Iraq's foreign policy objectives" could be defeated by
adopting non-attributable means of attack then simply
43
waiting for the Americans to leave. Adoption of such a
strategy is forebodingly reminiscent of Clausewitz's warning
that:
If the enemy is to be coerced you must
put him in a situation that is even more
unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him
to make. The hardships of that situation must
not of course be merely transient — at least
not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would
not give in but would wait for things to
improve . 4 4
Fortunately for the United States, the dynamics of the Iran-
Iraq War forestalled a lengthy waiting period to an already
open-ended commitment. Given the highly successful
deterrent effect on Libyan-sponsored terrorism that followed
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Benina-Bengazi, one cannot help but beg the question why this
fresh-in-the-corporate-memory lesson was not reapplied in
the Persian Gulf? If such an application of force against
Iran's minelaying assets took place after the first overt
act of minelaying was discovered in September of 1987, then
it remains questionable whether the Roberts would have been
damaged at all. As Webb emphatically concludes, it was not
until half of the Iranian Navy lay on the bottom of the
Persian Gulf that Iran's leaders began to comprehend the
power of our military: "Such a lack of comprehension
directly affects political machinations, and the
administration's leaders are at fault for not having made
45
the Iranians aware sooner." Theorists of international
relations have proposed that a deterrent strategy is most
likely to succeed when a potential adversary is not sure of
his ability to control the risks involved in the military
action he is about to undertake. If that uncertainty
46
exists, then deterrence will probably be effective. By
adopting somewhat predictable and minimal courses of
retaliation, the United States simply did not cultivate the
required amount of uncertainty in the minds of the Iranian
leadership.
45
Webb, "At Least the Navy Knows What it's Doing in
the Gulf," P. A. 21.
46
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 529-530.
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The applicability and effectiveness of the forces used
in obtaining the desired political objective and its
relation to the military threat must also be analyzed prior
47
to the insertion of those forces into the threat area.
Incidentally, the accidental attack on the Stark reignited
the 1970' s era debate over the "high-low mix" ship structure
48
of the U.S. Navy. The Persian Gulf experience also
appears to have further clouded the distinction between high
and low threat areas . For example, the presence of Silkworm
and Exocet anti-shipping missiles, fighter/attack aircraft,
mines, and lightly-armed Boghammer speedboats all deployed
within relatively restricted waters, required warships
capable of neutralizing this combination of low and high-
technology threats. The deployment of the U.S. Navy's most
modern and capable warships, most notably Ticonderoqa class
guided-missile cruisers, illustrates the seriousness the
Navy placed on countering the missile and high performance
49
aircraft threat. Additionally, the employment of mobile
sea barges, attack helicopters, small patrol craft, stinger
47
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missiles, small caliber machine guns, and special
operational forces (SOF) reflected the unique and creative
manner in which the U.S. military chose to deal with the
low-tech end of the threat. Given the come as you are
nature of modern warfare and, except for the late arrival of
the more capable U.S. and allied minesweepers, the
modifications made to U.S. equipment and tactics proved
quite effective in providing adequate (though static)
defense against the threat as evidenced by the high number
of successful convoys. However, the attack on the Stark and
the Roberts clearly reveal that the threat posed by a small
power equipped with a mix of high and low-technology weapons
must not only be taken seriously but factored into the
50
force-sizing equation as well.
Selected Forces
Once selected, the force must then be evaluated as to
51
its sustainability . The essential ingredient in
evaluating sustainability lies in the elemental strategic
concept of identifying the time-frame over which the force
is to be sustained. This, quite frankly, was never
determined for the Persian Gulf operation. It is rather
disingenuous to claim that the force will remain in place
50





until all of the political objectives have been achieved
when one of those objectives, the end of the Iran-Iraq War
(which had been raging for over six years) , had no end in
sight at the time the decision to reflag was made. Without
a clear articulation of when the commitment would end and
lacking a standard by which to measure success, such hazily
defined objectives of preventing Soviet influence or
protecting U.S. interests in international waterways stood
little chance of being realized. Even if the time-frame
cannot, for political or any other reasons, be readily
identified and the commitment must remain open-ended, then
the fall-back position must be a determination of how long
the force can be sustained and at what point is the decision
made for its removal or reinforcement? In other words, at
what cost and level of commitment is the point of
diminishing return reached? Again, this was apparently
52
never determined with respect to the Persian Gulf.
52
This position is reflected in Secretary Weinberger's
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
23 October, 1987 (four months into the operation) in which
he attempted to answer a question regarding the point at
which the operation would end: "I think basically what would
have to happen would be that you would have to get some
stability in the Gulf, probably ending the Iran-Iraq War,
certainly ending the tanker war ..." Additionally, this
stability would be achieved "when the war ends or when we
are able to get such a United Nations resolution [arms
embargo] not only passed . . . but enforced." Ironically,
unless the United States was politically willing to place
direct military pressure on Iran to end the war, achieving
the stated criterion for withdrawal — "stability" in the
Gulf — depended more on the dynamics of the war itself
rather than on the U.S. naval presence. For more
123

There can be little doubt that the United States,
through sheer determination and economic might, could
sustain a large naval force in the Gulf for months or even
years. But does the objective and probability of success
justify the cost or would a different force be more cost-
effective? In an analysis prepared by the Congressional
Research Service for the House Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs, a conclusion was reached that
the U.S. Navy could not maintain an indefinite nor expanded
presence in the Gulf without incurring severe opportunity,
monetary, and human cost setbacks. The opportunity cost of
a particular operation is normally measured in terms of
other commitments, training, and readiness. One method of
determining the opportunity cost in relation to other
operational commitments is to examine the required
deployment ratio of ships for the Gulf region. The rule of
thumb in calculating this ratio is that to maintain one ship
in the Gulf, there must be three of the same class in the
inventory — the other two being in transit, training, or
upkeep. This ratio may in fact be closer to four to one due
to the 12,000 mile long transit of ships from the United
States to the Gulf. Additionally, ships deployed to the
Gulf were not available for contingencies in other parts
information see: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf (Washington: U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., 23 October, 1987), pp. 134-135.





of the world and the remaining ships in the fleet had their
steaming and training time reduced to compensate for the
53
added cost of maintaining a high profile in the Gulf.
The report also substantiated that an indefinite
commitment or any expansion in the level of U.S. presence
in the Gulf would have a cumulative effect on the rest of
the fleet. If for example, a requirement for a second
CVBG in the North Arabian Sea emerges, "then the strain on
the carrier force, which now stands at 14 deployable
ships, could become significant unless carrier deployments
54
to other areas were curtailed." Likewise, if a
requirement to expand the number of ships inside the Gulf
were to emerge, then those surface ships considered most
suitable for Gulf duty — one's equipped with Phalanx CIW's,
for instance — would be "somewhat scarce in the rest of the
fleet" and could have an adverse effect on "overall fleet
readiness for contingencies that differ in character from
55
the one now being addressed in the Persian Gulf."
An analysis of the monetary cost involved in the
operation (to date) reveals a scramble to cover expenses
through a shifting of operations and maintenance (O+MN)
53








monies and through supplemental appropriations. It also
underscores the absolute necessity to identify the
sustainability time-frame prior to the insertion of forces
as the cost of such open-ended commitments tends to
skyrocket in direct proportion to political and military
attempts to demonstrate resolve by extending the force on
station.
The monetary cost associated with the Gulf operation
has normally been framed in terms of incremental cost which
includes only the "above-normal costs incurred by U.S. ships
56
and aircraft in the region." The FY-1987 incremental
cost was fixed at $69 million. This cost was absorbed by
the military services during FY-1987 by deferring some
scheduled maintenance. The FY-1988 incremental cost was
approximately $10 to $15 million per month or about $130 to
$150 million on an annual basis. Some estimates had the
cost fixed at $20 million per month. Congress, as a part of
the FY-1988 Continuing Resolution, provided $100 million to
help cover the FY-1988 incremental cost incurred in the Gulf
region. The U.S. Navy has testified before Congress that
this $100 million would be enough to cover incremental costs
57
only through the third quarter of FY-1988. Incremental
cost includes expenses for spare parts, fuel, and hazardous
56
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duty pay which was authorized in August of 1987. A more
accurate assessment of the incremental cost of the Gulf




the Roberts ($100 million) , three crashed
helicopters ($1 million each), and perhaps even the possible
monetary compensation to the families of those on board Iran
Air Flight 655 estimated to be in the tens of millions of
60
dollars. If the Roberts cannot be economically
repaired, a replacement ship of the same class would cost
61
$350 to $400 million.
An analysis of the costs involved in the Persian Gulf
would not be complete without the additional, and perhaps
most important, dimension of the human factor. Aside from
the casualty figures (37 killed on the Stark , 7 killed
58
U.S. forces in the Gulf region received free diesel
marine and jet fuel from the government of Kuwait. For more
information see: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Security and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East,
U. S . Policy in the Persian Gulf (Washington: U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 15 December 1987), p. 27.
59
The Iraqi government has agreed to pay the cost to
repair the ship, but there remains concern over whether the
Iraqis will renig on their promise or how quickly payment
will be made. See: House Committee on Banking, p. 76.
60
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61
As of this writing, the Roberts has undergone
extensive repairs, conducted sea trials in October 1989, and
is back in the fleet.
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in the helicopter crashes, and other wounded on the Stark
and Roberts ) , there is a cost associated with the daily
62
strain on the personnel deployed to the region. Long at-
sea periods, extreme weather conditions, lack of quality and
accessible liberty ports, and extended family separations,
unless properly managed, can all lead to low morale and poor
retention. While morale was maintained at an exceptionally
high level due to the "real world" nature of the Persian
Gulf operations, extended deployments and reduced stateside
periods result in increased family separations and is
"bound to have a negative impact on morale and overall
63
retention." The dramatic increase in our 1979 Indian
Ocean presence precipitated by the Iranian Revolution and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with the drastic
force cutbacks of the 1970 's led to dismal retention rates
and low morale in the early 1980' s — as one observer flatly
64
commented: "We nearly wore out our people." Such lessons
are indelibly etched in the corporate memories of those
servicemen who labored through those lean years and can ill-
afford to be overlooked when sizing the force for future
operations. Due to the length of enlistment contracts, a
62
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more accurate assessment of how the Persian Gulf operations
affected morale can not be made until the retention figures
can be calculated upon the expiration of those contracts.
Desired Actions
As Arnott and Gaffney point out, the actual use of
force in a political role to influence another nation
65
requires careful consideration and analysis. The primary
focus of the military commander will be on the ends to be
achieved. In other words, what is the military objective
and how can it best be achieved? The U.S. Navy's skillful
modification of equipment and tactics along with good old-
fashioned perseverance, hard work, and professionalism led
to the successful achievement of the immediate military
objective: the safe escort of the 11 reflagged Kuwaiti
tankers. However, as mentioned above, the perception of
performance often times can be more important than the ends
achieved. This was painfully demonstrated in the aftermath
of the 1983 Beirut bombing raid in which the loss of two
aircraft with one airman killed and another captured,
66
"totally overshadowed the results achieved." Likewise,
the force commander needs to know if there are specific
areas in which the force should or should not operate and
65






more specifically what actions are to be avoided.
Answers to these questions are normally found in the
peacetime ROE and any supplemental ROE requested by on-scene
commanders and issued by higher authority to keep pace with
a changing tactical situation.
An analysis of the Persian Gulf ROE reflects an
incremental broadening of their scope after each of the
three major U.S. -Iranian clashes along with a concomitant
shift in policy which has been described as going from "low-
profile reluctance to cautious engagement and finally to
68
exuberant intervention." After the first mining and
missile incidents in September and October of 1987, the
United States expanded the ROE to include protection of all
U.S. -owned shipping in the Gulf (in addition to the 11
reflagged tankers) . After the April of 1988 mining
incident, the ROE was expanded to include any ship finding
69
itself under attack by Iran. In a 29 April, 1988 press
conference, former Secretary of Defense Carlucci defined the
new rules by announcing protection for "friendly, innocent,
neutral vessels, flying a non-belligerent flag, outside









contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a
70
Persian Gulf belligerent." This change in ROE would,
theoretically, allow the United States to aid the types of
ships that had been the primary focus of Iranian attack. In
a curious qualification of the new policy, Carlucci stated
that "following a request from a vessel under attack,
assistance will be rendered by U.S. warships or aircraft if
the unit is in the vicinity and its mission permits
71
rendering such assistance " (emphasis added) . The two-
pronged qualification to this pledge of assistance (access
and mission permitting) sent a series of mixed signals not
only to Iran but to U.S. operational commanders as well. To
the driver of an IRG Boghammer gunboat, the signal was
clear: simply ensure no U.S. warship (particularly those
with embarked attack helicopters) was within striking
distance when conducting an attack and then beat a faster
than normal retreat back to your sanctuary to be able to
come out and fight again another day. While procedures to
link CVBG based attack aircraft outside the Gulf to surface
ships inside the Gulf had been developed, distance and CVBG
positioning generally precluded a response timely enough to
stop the attack or intercept and destroy a fleeing attacker.
70
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Without clearance to attack staging bases, providing
"assistance" after the fact was unlikely to deter future
attacks. The quick response by a section of A-6E's to the
attack on the Willie Tide is certainly an exception to this
rule, but the aircraft were already on-station in the Strait
of Hormuz as part of the retaliatory strike package and were
forbidden to attack the surviving Boghammers as they beached
themselves on Abu Musa Island. As mentioned previously,
small boat attacks continued — some with reckless abandon
— as evidenced by the skirmish with the Vincennes on 3
July.
To the U.S. operational commander such a "mission
permitting" qualification presented a dilemma analogous to
that faced by the fighter pilot schooled in the tactic of
"never leaving your wingman" and only served to further
frustrate those naval commanders finding themselves in
positions unable to render assistance (due to mission
requirements) to those frightened voices making frantic
radio distress calls while under attack, for help from any
U.S. warship. This situation is bound to introduce an
element of uncertainty into not only what the military
objective really is, but what courses of action are desired
by higher authority, appropriate for the immediate tactical




One can only have sympathy for the naval
commanders in the Gulf who are operating in
close quarters, close to a hostile coast,
surrounded by hundreds of commercial ships
and planes, among which may be lurking an
enemy. These skilled professionals are
required to make split-second decisions of
life and death every working day on the
basis of fragmentary information. 72
In short, the (all-too-of ten) silently-posed question from
policy implementers to policymakers — what is it that you
really want me to do? — apparently went unheeded in the
Persian Gulf. Perhaps Bull Halsey's 24 November, 1943
operations order to Arleigh Burke regarding the Buka-Rabaul
evacuation may help put this problem in perspective as it
provides an interesting case study by which to illustrate
this point: "Thirty-one-knot Burke get athwart the Buka-
Rabaul evacuation ... If enemy contacted you know what to
73
do." One wonders how a similar message to the CJTFME
would have played-out in the Persian Gulf forty-four years
later: "Thirty-one-knot Burke get athwart the Strait of
Hormuz ... If just one Iranian attack on neutral shipping
observed, you know what to do." While such a latter-day
version of Halsey's execute order may seem out of place in a
high-tech weapons and high-speed communications environment,
72
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the point of clear, concise and achievable ROE should not be
lost on the policymaker.
Outcome
Finally, Arnott and Gaffney note that the military
commander must try to anticipate all possible outcomes prior
to inserting forces. Primarily, this process involves an
objective determination of the factors which define success
and achievement of the objective. If the anticipated
outcome is deemed unsatisfactory, then the objective should
be re-evaluated to determine if it can be achieved by the
74
use of force. Also central to this process is a
determination of when the crisis is over and at what point
the forces can be withdrawn. Conversely, what factors
indicate that events are not proceeding according to plan
and either additional forces or another course of action is
required? With respect to the latter question, a recent
study correctly concluded that the success of the protection
of shipping plan was due in large part to the fact "that
most of the contingency planning, response to crises, and
command and control procedures were all done within
doctrinally prescribed frameworks . . . without inventing
75
radically different methods." Likewise, the effective
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military responses to subtle political shifts inside the
Gulf or in U.S. objectives played a direct role in the
tactical success of the operation. This accomplishment was
the result of effective political-military coordination at
the tactical level coupled with the intelligent use of
sophisticated communications systems to relay information
76
and orders up and down the entire chain-of-command.
However, with respect to the former questions, there is
evidence to suggest that the process of anticipating
outcomes was not adequately addressed in the months
preceding the implementation of the protection of shipping
plan nor in the establishment of escalatory ROE. For
example, the ex post facto nature of the identification,
friend or foe (IFF) agreements worked out between the United
States and Iraq in the aftermath of the Stark tragedy
attests to the claim that such procedures should have been
contemplated and in-place prior to inserting forces into a
war zone. If such agreements were not politically desirable
or unobtainable, then U.S. ships (and aircraft) should have
been kept well-outside the declared exclusionary zones (see
Table 7) . The Stark incident also raised the issue of
adequate force structure in terms of force levels and CIWS
capable ships. In fact, the incident precipitated the
decision to substantially increase U.S. naval presence. In
76




other words, the Stark tragedy forced a reassessment of what
it would take to successfully conduct the protection of
shipping plan — a reassessment, due to its potentially
adverse domestic political impact, the administration did
not want to make. Similarly, in an equally dramatic but
less costly manner, the failure to adequately prepare for
minecountermeasures (MCM) in the months preceding the
Bridaeton incident once again reflects (this time) the
navy's admitted failure to think through and be prepared for
all possible outcomes. Given the previous evidence of the
mine threat off Kuwait, it remains difficult to understand
why the convoy sailed in the first place, let alone not
77
having MCM forces prepositioned in the Gulf. In a 29
September 1987 statement before Congress, the Chairman of
the JCS admitted that the navy had simply underestimated the
seriousness of the mining threat. In the scramble to
correct the deficiency, the United States airlifted a
squadron of CH-53 (Super Stallion) MCM helicopters to the
U.S. base at Diego Garcia for further transportation to the
77
Both Iran and Iraq mined each others ports early in
the war and mines that had broken their moorings had been
found floating in the Gulf ever since. Prior to July of
1987, four ships had struck mines in the channel leading to
Kuwait's Al-Ahmadi oil terminal. A U.S. Navy Explosive
Ordinance Disposal Team (EODT) had found ten mines in that
channel presumably covertly laid by Iran. For more





Gulf on board the amphibious ship, the Gaudalcanal . With
the exception of the April 1988 Roberts incident, no other
U.S. -owned ship was damaged by mines throughout the
remainder of the operation.
The political failure to obtain even a token commitment
of assistance from U.S. allies prior to the public
endorsement of Kuwait's ref lagging request illustrates
another case in which the failure to think through policy
manifested itself. By framing the initial protection of
shipping plan in unilateral terms and then pursuing
diplomatic efforts to enlarge the commitment into a
multilateral operation by securing allied assistance, the
United States forced a showdown with its allies over who had
the greater share of responsibility in protecting Western
oil supplies. For the Europeans, the disruption of less
than 1% of the oil flow simply did not justify the dispatch
of scarce resources to the Gulf. It was not until several
European nations perceived the threat to their interests as
substantial (as a result of mining incidents in the Khor
Fakkan international anchorage in the Gulf of Oman ) that
assistance was finally provided and the operation became (de
facto) multilateral. (See Chapter VII for a detailed
analysis of allied cooperation in the Gulf.)
78
Robert J. Hanks, "The Gulf War and U.S. Staying
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The history of warfare is replete with the accidental
killing of non-combatants as well as friendly and neutral
forces. One only need recall Clausewitz's concepts of
friction and the fog of war and his admonition that each
part of the military machine is composed of individuals each
retaining his own potential of friction to understand why
79
things go wrong in war. As both the Stark and Iran Air
tragedies clearly demonstrate, inserting forces into a
declared war zone with a tremendously high-concentration of
tanker and commercial air traffic is not only dangerous but
requires a willingness on behalf of policymakers to accept
the risks and responsibilities inherent in this historical
fact of life. If such risks are deemed politically or
militarily unacceptable, then the objective should be re-
evaluated to determine if it is attainable by the use of
force. If the level of risk is judged acceptable, then
appropriate ROE should be constructed to enable the on-scene
commander to properly defend his assets while simultaneously
controlling the initiative thereby allowing "diplomacy to be
tested without offering up our naval assets as convenient
80
targets." Settling on some middle ground has the
unintended effect of accelerating the inherent tendency for
79
von Clausewitz, pp. 119-121.
80
Webb, "At Least the Navy Knows What it's Doing in
the Gulf, " p. A. 21.
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things to go wrong in war and places the military officer
with his finger on the trigger in a terribly compromising
position. The available official records are repleat with a
myriad of assessments on the risks to U.S. ships from
various forms of Iranian attack, including terrorist and
suicide attack, or with the risks associated with becoming
involved outright in the Iran-Iraq War. However, based on
the flurry of activity and finger-pointing between and
within the executive and legislative branches of government
in the wake of the Stark , Bridqeton . and Iran Air incidents,
there is little open-source evidence to suggest whether or
not an adequate risk assessment was ever made on the effect
friction would have on non-combatants. Late night "what




Four months prior to the Iran Air tragedy, the
author had a fascinating and enlightening dinner discussion
at a Mombassa, Kenya, hotel with the captain of a Swiss Air
A-300 Air Bus who routinely flew the airway linking Bandar
Abbas and Dubai. Aside from listening to amusing anecdotes
about his routine visual sightings of and idle radio chatter
with U.S.A.F. /Saudi AWACS patrols and not so amusing
anecdotes about being shot at while making an approach to
the Teheran Airport (Swiss Air subsequently terminated
flights into Teheran) , the author came away from the
discussion disturbed by the volume of international air
traffic in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz and
immediately notified the appropriate intelligence
authorities regarding the discussion and impressions.
Subsequent "in-house" discussions regarding the high density
of air (and surface) traffic ensued yielding a healthy (and
sometimes heated) debate over the proverbial "shoot first
and ask questions later" dilemma. As a result of these
139

In direct relation to the decision to reinforce is the
inevitable point at which forces must be withdrawn from the
crisis situation. Without a definition of success, this
often becomes an elusive point to reach. In a carefully
worded statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, former Secretary of Defense Weinberger attempted
to define "victories" in relation to the stated political
objectives: First, the objective of maintaining freedom of
navigation for U.S. -flag vessels and the protection of
Western access to oil is described as being "obtained every
82
time a tanker convoy moves through the Gulf safely."
Secondly, the security and stability of moderate Gulf Arab
regimes, while admittedly "somewhat more intangible," has
already been achieved based on "their public and private
statements that they have been greatly reassured by our
actions. ..." Allied support and participation is given
as another example of the success of U.S. policy. Thirdly,
the objective of limiting Soviet influence is defined as
having succeeded based on the fact they [Soviets] have been
"what if?" sessions and coupled with the skill and
professionalism of the planners and operators, the
Enterprise CVBG completed its tour on station in the North
Arabian Sea without incident. It should also be noted that
according to the formal investigation into the downing of
Iran Air 655 (p. 15), the first time that CJTFME promulgated
commercial airline flight information to ships in the
Persian Gulf was on 28 June, 1988 . . . approximately one
year after the insterion of forces into the Gulf.
82
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given only three Kuwaiti ships to protect and they "have not
been provided access to facilities anywhere in the
83
region. ..." Ten months later in another carefully
crafted answer to a direct question regarding his definition
of victory, then Secretary of Defense Carlucci responded:
We will know that we have won when Iran stops
attacking non-belligerent shipping in the Gulf.
The best hope for that to occur is when we have
successfully persuaded Iran to comply with UNSC
resolution 598. 84
However, when examined closely, each one of these
definitions of "success" remains somewhat limited in scope.
For example, claims that Western access to oil was secure
based on the safe passage of the 11 Kuwaiti tankers fails to
recognize that attacks on the remaining neutral ships
increased over time. Perhaps a more realistic assessment
would be to claim that portion of Western oil supplied by
Kuwait as secure as not one drop of Kuwaiti oil was spilled
85
while under U.S. escort. Similarly, declaring that




U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1989 , Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 18 February 1988), p. 99.
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The Bridqeton was empty while on the inbound run to
Kuwait when she struck the mine.
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number of ships and facilities they have in the Gulf ignores
geopolitical reality — by competing with the Soviets in a
limited area defined by Kuwait, the United States cleared a
direct path for major, and as one strategist notes decisive ,
Soviet influence in Iran as the Rafsanjani demarche clearly
86
demonstrates. Curiously, if not surprisingly, the
"somewhat more intangible" goal of demonstrating resolve and
instilling confidence in our regional friends appears to
have been a resounding success regardless of the low-key
(public) manner in which they have extended appreciation.
In their seemingly contorted and painful attempts to define
victory, perhaps our policymakers would have been wise to
heed Clausewitz's advice that:
A major victory can only be obtained by
positive measures aimed at a decision ,
never by simply waiting on events. In short,
even in the defense, a major stake alone can
bring a major gain. 87
Having defined his version of "success," Secretary
Weinberger, when pressed, attempted to define the point at
which forces could be withdrawn to pre-crisis levels.
Drawing an analogy between previous increases in force
levels in relation to the threat in other international
86
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von Clausewitz, p. 616.
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bodies of water, he stated that forces would be reduced
when the threat to the "passage of free, non-belligerent,
innocent commerce over these international waters" no longer
existed. Accordingly, elimination of the threat to Gulf
shipping, he stated, would require the passage and
enforcement of a U.S. arms embargo and an end to the Iran-
Iraq War on land and at sea. Once these ends were achieved,
88
then forces would be reduced to pre-crisis levels. This
approach lacks credibility on several counts: First, it
lacks an appreciation for the protracted nature of the Iran-
Iraq War. At the time the decision to reflag was made, the
dynamics of the war had not shifted enough in favor of
either belligerent to indicate that an end of the war was in
sight. Likewise, if the insertion of forces into the Gulf
was intended to carry with it the veiled threat of
pressuring Iran to quit the war, then the insertion should
have been timed to coincide with a significant shift in the
dynamics of the war in favor of Iraq . The summer of 1987
simply did not provide such a strategic moment. Adding a
portion of patience to the overall Gulf strategy would have
eventually revealed the first months of 1988 as the ideal
time for a show of strength and solidarity. Secondly, the
comparison of the Persian Gulf naval build-up to previous
peacetime build-ups in response to threats in the
88
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 127-130.
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Mediterranean or Caribbean as an example of when the Gulf
forces could be reduced to pre-crisis levels is a classic
case of mixing apples and oranges. This (false) analogy-
fails to appreciate the fact that the vast majority of post-
World War II uses of naval power have been in the naval
presence role and as such were rarely interposed between two
implacable belligerents locked in a protracted and fierce
conflict — a conflict which had spilled over in to
89
treacherous and restricted waters. The insertion
of forces into these waters (a declared war zone) introduced
a host of political and military complications that could
have precluded an orderly and timely reduction of forces to
pre-crisis levels. Finally, and as mentioned previously, by
protecting the Kuwaiti tankers the United States merely
encouraged Iraq to continue the tanker war and signaled Iran
that, accept for the 11 Kuwaiti tankers, all other merchant
shipping was fair game. In short, the tactic of protecting
the tankers ran counter to the U.S. strategic objective of
ending the Iran-Iraq war. Ref lagging, as a means to an end,
could only bring about an end to the war if additional,
expanded, and coordinated means were brought to bear upon
89
An indepth review of the two major analytical
studies conducted on the use of force as a political
instrument (Cable's Gunboat Diplomacy : 1919-1979 and
Blechman and Kaplan's Force Without War : 1946-1975) reveal
an overwhelming majority of incidents involving the use of
force falling into the following categories: presence,
exercises, surveillance, port visits, logistic and
intelligence support, evacuations, civic action, transport,
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Iran. Without such an effort, ref lagging was nothing more
than a limited political statement of support for Kuwait and
the other GCC members.
The inability to give satisfactory strategic definition
to crisis termination was manifested in several attempts to
draw-down forces in response to mounting domestic political
pressure over the course of the operation. The decision to
reduce forces (however slightly) in February of 1988 to 29
ships may have been ill-advised. The rhetoric emanating
from Teheran in response to this public announcement, while
difficult to assess, indicated that Teheran may have
perceived the decision as a slight crack in U.S. resolve and
emboldened Iran to continue its mine-laying operations after
a considerable hiatus — the Roberts was attacked within
five weeks of the announcement. Conversely, the decision to
maintain a high level of visibility in the wake of the U.N.
sponsored cease fire was well-thought out and signaled Iran
that whatever role U.S. forces played in pressuring Iran to
stop fighting, that pressure would remain until it became
readily apparent the ceasefire would hold. In summary,
construction, and alerts. Likewise, a more recent study by
Philip D. Zelikow takes up where Blechman and Kaplan left
off and catalogues the political use of force by the United
States from 1975 to 1984 with similar results. Very few of
the over 300 incidents examined in these studies fall into
the invasion, attack, convoy, or mine clearing categories
and none involve convoy and mine clearing operations in a
declared war zone in restricted and hostile waters (the 1984





these force level decisions illustrate just two of the many
policy twists and turns that result from inserting forces,
then debating the strategy. Anticipating outcomes, defining
success, and establishing mission completion criteria prior
to the insertion of forces provides a framework within which
to conduct the operation as well as a firm foundation upon
which to size those forces and room to adjust to any
political or military changes in the environment.
Summary of Findings
As the preceding analysis outlines, U.S. policy in the
Persian Gulf as it pertained to the reflagging of the 11
Kuwaiti tankers is found to be tactically successful but
strategically deficient as the military tactic of protecting
the Kuwaiti ships was not placed in a comprehensive
strategic context. The confusion over the proper definition
of the objective allowed the available options to remain
limited to two unattractive alternatives: reflag and protect
Kuwaiti ships or abandon the public commitment to Kuwait and
suffer the loss of credibility in the Arab world. The
strategic course of action chosen to achieve the stated
political objectives depended on Iraqi war aims and Iranian
restraint to succeed. Additionally, the decision to reflag
was worked out independently of the logistical and operational
details of escorting the Kuwaiti ships. In other words, the
formulation of the logistical and operational plans lagged
behind the formulation of the overall strategic plan
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rather than being an integral part of the original
decision. Moreover, the Gulf policy violated one of the
cardinal precepts of matching political objectives with
military realities: avoid multiple objectives with
competing priorities. Even a cursory inspection of the
mission statement contained in the first paragraph of The
Weinberger Report reveals a host of platitude-sounding
objectives with no clear sense of which objective has
priority over the others:
Protecting eleven Kuwaiti tankers under U.S.
flag is not part of an open-ended unilateral
American commitment to defend all non-belligerent
shipping in the Persian Gulf. It is a limited but
effective signal of our determination to stand up
to intimidation, to support our friends, and to
help contain, and eventually end, the Iran-Iraq
War.90
Achievement of these objectives, particularly with the
limited political and military means chosen, presented a
formidable challenge to CENTCOM. Unfortunately, short of
kidnaping Saddam Hussein and turning him over to the
Iranians, the only way to stop the war was to deny Iran the
means by which to wage it. Ref lagging, as a means to an
end, could only bring about an end to the war if additional,
expanded, coordinated, and enforcable methods were brought
to bear upon Iran. If the United States was serious about
stopping the flow of arms to Iran, then a strategy should
have been developed to dovetail Iraq's strategy of cutting-
90
The Weinberger Report , p. i
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off Iran's oil revenues. Without such an effort, reflagging
was nothing more than a limited political statement of
support for Kuwait and the other GCC members. For
example, since the deployment of Silkworm missiles
precipitated the crisis and expanded U.S. involvement in the
Gulf, then an effective strategy to remove or neutralize
those missiles and prevent further deliveries should have
been developed. Simple diplomatic protests to China
regarding the sale of missiles to Iran and a polite plea
that no further sales nor deliveries take place, flies in
the face of an effective policy designed to stem the flow of
arms to Iran. Effective retaliatory action should have been
taken against China for its outrageous and fallacious denial
of providing Silkworms to Iran. The Chinese should have
been confronted with a choice of whether they desired to
continue to receive the transfer of U.S. technology or
continue the transfer of their technology (Silkworms and
91
other supplies) to Iran. To pretend that diplomatic
protests alone would stop the flow of missiles to Iran or
even punish the Chinese, obfuscates the policymakers moral
obligation to the implementers of the policy — after all,
the Silkworms were aimed at U.S. sailors and ships plying
the waters of the Gulf while protecting other nations'
access to oil. Unfortunately, a similar case can be made
91




for the secret sale of U.S. Hawk surface-to-air missiles to
Iran as disclosed by the Iran-Contra affair. While
admittedly an aberration in U.S. policy, the sale undermined
Operation Staunch and left those U.S. airmen flying missions
in the Gulf wondering whether or not one or more of those
missiles would be fired in their direction in the event the
policymakers decided to send U.S. aircraft over the beach.
The preceding analysis also illustrates that the
primary objective of the United States in agreeing to reflag
the Kuwaiti tankers was to limit Soviet influence and naval
activity in the region. However, several indepth analyses
of the U.S. -Soviet naval arms limitation talks of the mid to
late 1970 's have revealed an interesting and often
overlooked insight into Soviet military activities and
objectives in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions: the
Soviets simply do not regard the Persian Gulf as an area of
naval rivalry with the United States. After learning from
the arms limitation talks that technological difficulties
precluded the deployment of U.S. ballistic missile
submarines to the Indian Ocean and that the strategic
nuclear threat to its southern underbelly was thereby
negated, the Soviets have yet to surge large numbers of
naval forces into the region neither in response to repeated




coordination with their invasion of Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the U.S. reflagging policy was based on the
false assumption that a major Soviet gain and a
corresponding U.S. loss in the region was about to take
place. As mentioned previously, U.S. Persian Gulf policy
merely cleared a direct path for major, if not decisive,
Soviet influence in the region as the Rafsanjani demarche
clearly demonstrates.
U.S. policy also appears to have been based on a second
false assumption regarding the nature of Kuwait's motive for
requesting outside help. By enlisting superpower
assistance, Kuwait hoped to put an end to the threat to its
domestic security and territorial integrity posed by the
potential fulfillment of the Khomeini regime's publicly
declared hegemonic objectives in the region that would
surely follow in the wake of an Iranian victory in the war.
In retrospect, it is clear that Kuwait's primary reason for
requesting assistance was not to protect its oil supplies
but rather to provide a security buffer between itself and
Iran so that attacks on Kuwait would occur at sea rather
than against Kuwaiti territory. If a proper analysis of
92
Sick Statement , pp. 45-47. For further information
on the Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks and the
internal Soviet debate over the role of naval forces in
power projection see: Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Civil-
Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission," Rand
Report R-3504-AF. April 1987.
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Kuwait's motive had taken place, then other policy options
could have been developed without abruptly abandoning the
commitment to Kuwait for a course of action that accounted
for the achievement of the overall strategic objective. In
other words, in order to ease Kuwait's domestic security
fears, alternative methods of protecting Kuwait's oil
supplies should have been developed. For instance, efforts
could have been focused on the accelerated construction of
the pipeline from the Kuwaiti oil fields to Saudi Arabia's
East-West Petroline. In the construction interim, Kuwait
should have been strongly encouraged to adopt a shuttle
tanker system similar to the system being used by Iran to
offset Iraqi air attacks. Additionally, the formulation and
implementation of an Arab oil sharing plan should have been
actively pursued by the United States as an integral part of
its overall strategy. Under such a plan, the GCC members
would lend each other oil exports in the event a major
disruption is experienced by any one member. Modeled on the
industrial countries 1974 "Safety Net" Agreement, the plan
would make available compensating oil exports if any GCC
member's oil producing capacity is adversely affected.
Repayment would be made in a similar fashion to Iraq's War
Relief Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: barrel-for-
barrel without interest and irrespective of current price.
Such a plan was under serious consideration in January of
1988 by the GCC and should have been implemented in
151

conjunction with other methods of securing Kuwait's oil
93
supplies. Incorporating these alternative methods into
the overall Gulf strategy, would have allowed U.S. naval
units to concentrate on the specific and more narrow
military mission of freedom of navigation in international
waterways (possibly on a multilateral basis) thereby
bringing direct, rather than indirect, military pressure to
bear upon Iran to quit the war. By pushing for additional
strategic payoffs, the United States, in its limited effort
to protect freedom of navigation, merely reduced the chances
of attaining its ultimate objective — ending the Iran-Iraq
War — within a reasonable time frame. Since outright
collaboration with Iraq was not politically feasible and
multilateral cooperation in the form of a U.N. naval
peacekeeping force not operationally feasible, then the
United States should have either been prepared to accept the
mantle of "policeman of the Gulf" and muster the political
will and military resolve to end, once and for all, the
menace to international shipping being perpetrated by Iran
or have simply ignored the Kuwaiti request and waited for
the dynamics of the Iran-Iraq War to take effect. As
mentioned above, settling on some middle ground may make the
policymakers look less warlike, but it also has the
93
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unintended effect of accelerating the inherent tendency for
things to go wrong in war and places the implementers of the




Due to the premature public commitment to Kuwait, the
above "what should have been" approach to the dilemma faced
by U.S. policymakers regarding the Persian Gulf must remain
in the realm of the academic. However, such an analysis can
provide valuable lessons learned for future applications of
U.S. military power in pursuit of political objectives.
Given the nature of the commitment to Kuwait and the
subsequent strategic course of action chosen by the United
States, what then are the main lessons learned from our
experience in the Persian Gulf crisis? Ironically,
perhaps the most articulate and straightforward answer to
this somewhat elusive and complex question lies in the
response by the First Sea Lord of the Admirality, Admiral
Sir William Staveley, to a similar question regarding his
Armilla Patrol — a response which reflects a rare sense
of strategic insight that bears quoting in its entirety:
First, ensure your political objectives fit with
the military realities; second, when you send
naval forces into a region to protect national
shipping, keep that aim firmly in mind and
avoid any temptation to push for additional
political or strategic payoffs; thirdly, ensure
you are rapidly informed about day to day
changes in the potential threat (especially by
keeping closely in touch with the merchant
shipping you are there to protect) . In addition,
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only send first rate ships and men, equipped and
trained to cope with the most intense and
demanding levels of conflict and set de-escalatory
and non-provocative rules of engagement which do
not hamstring your ship's capacity to defend
either themselves or vessels under their
protection but which incorporate the principle
of minimum force. Without revealing details,
allow the general principles behind the ROE
to generally be known to prevent painful mis-
understandings. Review your ROE regularly as
the situation evolves. Finally, ensure that
your objectives and reasons for sending naval
forces are clearly understood by the inter-
national community. 9Zf
Similarly, the resort to force by the United States on
18 April, 1988, in response to the mining attack on the
Roberts raised yet another set of questions as well as a
corresponding set of lessons learned regarding the
appropriate use of force. Some reasoned that the use of
force was measured, restrained, and in proportion to the
violent act committed by Iran. All aspects of international
law had been strictly adhered to in conducting the strike
and the act of reprisal completely justified under the law
of armed conflict. Others held that if the objective of
force is to prevail, to punish an aggressor beyond his
ability to respond and to deter future acts of aggression by
"exacting a political and at times a human cost," then the
U.S. response was disproportionate at the lower end of the
scale — you don't protect your sailors from future mining
attacks by shooting up oil platforms or by continually
94
"Interview with the First Sea Lord," NATO ' s Sixteen
Nations , Special Issue, Vol. 34, 1989, pp. 34-35.
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sweeping mines: you do it by removing the mine-
95,96
layers. Still, others argued that the use of force
and the principle of proportionality assumes a moral
obligation to the implementers of the policy: by placing
combat forces into combat situations without a clearly
defined combat mission, we give our adversaries a "weird
sort of equality: we reduce our own level of power to the
point that our enemies can compete. We call this
97
restraint." Or succinctly stated another way:
It's like kicking the shins of a man with a
machine gun. You do not take his capabilities
away, and you do not demonstrate to him that
you are serious about using your own capabilities
And you must nervously await his reaction, at the
time and place of his choosing. 98
Additional groups maintained that the political constraints
inherent in obtaining our strategic objectives in the Gulf
region required discreet and well-timed "signal-sending"
which in turn precluded a firmer response on a much higher
95
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96
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rung of the proportionality ladder. These groups claim that
when the political objective is strictly limited, immediate
resort to the higher and more potent modes of retaliation
99
will be ruled out.
Regardless of one's position on these issues, most
objective analysts agree that the initial military reprisal
to the mining attack on the U. S.S. Roberts (destruction of
two GOSP's and one warship) was entirely within the
constraints of the principle of proportional response.
Likewise, the subsequent reaction by U.S. naval forces later
in the day to the additional hostile acts committed by the
Iranian SAAM class frigates and Boghammer speed boats is
axiomatic in that "the use of deadly force is lawful when
100
defending against deadly force."
What is not as clear, is the political and moral
context within which the "measured response" decision took
place. Obviously, the restrained use of force was not
designed to physically keep the sealanes clear of mines.
But rather to send a series of diplomatic signals to our
regional friends that this type of response was in keeping
with their strategic interests and to deter our adversaries
99
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100
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from committing further violent acts. However, the danger
in signal sending lies in the interpretation on the
receiving end: there's no guarantee the signal will be
interpreted in precisely the way intended and may in fact be
seen as a lack of resolve instead of strength. Those who
argue that a restrained use of force is required when
attempting to coerce an Iranian leadership caught up in
revolutionary fervor and irrationality to stop laying
mines, may have lost sight of the fact that even an




ENDS VERSUS MEANS: ALLIANCE COHESION THEORY
A state located between two powerful
states should seek collaboration and
protection from the stronger of the two. 1
Kautilya
Arthasastra
Alliances are broken from considerations
of interest; and in this respect
Republics are much more careful in the
observance of treaties than Princes.
Machiavelli
The Discourses
I have only one purpose, the destruction
of Hitler, and my life is much simplified
thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell I would
make at least a favourable reference to




When analyzing international alliances, Churchill's
concept of grand alliances notwithstanding, theorists of
international relations pose two fundamental theoretical
1
T.N. Ramaswamy, Essentials of Indian Statecraft ,
(Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 112.
2
Nicoli Machiavelli, The Discourses , Book 1.59
(New York: Random House, 1940), p. 268.
3 Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 370
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questions: first, what factors explain the formation of
alliances? And second, once an alliance has been created,
what factors affect the level of cohesion (or discord) among
the alliance members? This chapter will focus on the latter
question by examining the factors that determine intra-
alliance cooperative and noncooperative behavior. Moreover,
this examination establishes the analytical framework within
which the analysis of NATO's efforts to address Persian
Gulf security issues as they pertained to the U.S. decision
to reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers is made in Chapter
Seven.
Nature of Alliances
Prior to establishing the analytical framework for
intra-alliance cooperative and noncooperative behavior, a
word is in order on why states make alliances. Alliances,
as Robert Osgood notes, are the most binding obligations
nations can make in order to stabilize international power
4
configurations that may affect their vital interests. They
add a degree of precision and specificity to informal or
tacit agreements. Alignments of nations, as George Liska
points out, have long been associated with the balancing of
power in both theory and practice. Using economic
terminology, Liska states that "alliances aim at maximizing
4
Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign
Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 17-18
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gains and sharing liabilities. The decision to align
5
is made with reference to national interests."
Theoretically, the relationship of alliances to balance
of power has both a positive and negative component:
positively, states enter into alliances in order to enhance
or even complement each other's capability. Negatively, an
alliance can be viewed as a "means of reducing the impact of
an antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which
6
threatens one's independence." In short, all alliances
depend on the existence of identical interests and potential
gains. But the question arises: interests and gains in
what? Liska answers this question in terms of national and
international security, stability, and the status of states
7
and regimes.
Similarly, many theorists of international relations
have categorized the functions of alliances to include,
inter alia , the accretion of external power, internal
8
security, restraint of allies, and international order.
Likewise, these same theorists, in their examination of the
5
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evolution of alliances, categorize alliances by type to
include offensive and defensive, wartime and peacetime,
bilateral and multilateral, guarantee and mutual assistance,
9
and institutionalized and noninstitutionalized. The common
theme, however, running throughout all alliance formation
theory remains the dependency on the existence of identical
and commonly shared interests. These common interests
remain at the center of the security dilemma faced by the
United States and its NATO allies in dealing with the
complex Persian Gulf crisis.
Hypotheses on Intra-Alliance Cooperation
Prior to refining the four propositions regarding
intra-alliance behavior, a method of measuring cooperation
and discord within the context of NATO should be
established. In his article, "NATO and the Persian Gulf:
Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," Charles A. Kupchan notes
that cooperative behavior can be measured along three
dimensions
:
First, allies can engage in joint operations or offer
explicit military assistance to each other. Put bluntly,
they can undertake coordinated actions. Second,
cooperation can take the form of compromise on policy
issues, which is then reflected in official statements
and documents. Third, cooperative behavior can be
measured by economic contributions to collective defense
capability. Allies cooperate when they reach some
9




mutually acceptable and reasonable agreement about sharing
the defense burden. 10
Kupchan then draws on three theories — balance-of-power
theory, collective action theory, and pluralist theory — to
assist in examining and explaining the emergence of
cooperative and noncooperative behavior between alliance
members. The balance-of-power theory asserts that alliance
cohesion fluctuates with each members' shared perceptions of
threats to their security interests. Collective action
theory focuses upon the distribution (even or uneven) of
military and economic capability of each member and group
action dynamics as the two key independent variables which
determine alliance cohesion. Finally, pluralist theory
shifts away from systemic considerations and views
cooperation in terms of second image (state level)
considerations. According to this theory, domestic
political and economic variables are the main determinants
of alliance behavior.
From these three theories, Kupchan develops four
hypotheses which can be used to test against the reflagging
case study:
10
Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO and the Persian Gulf:
Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," International




The external threat hypothesis proposes that states
cooperate to check threats from external powers. In other
words, an increasing level of threat leads to alliance
cohesion because member states seek to reinforce their
11
declining security situation through cooperation. This
proposition has been formulated from George Liska's thesis
that "a sudden increase of pressure in the form of a
political demand or military threat is likely to consolidate
12
an alliance." The opposite effect — discord — has a
tendency to occur when these pressures are relieved. In
fact, alliances which obtain their cohesiveness from an
external threat may disintegrate — sometimes rapidly —
13
when that threat is removed.
Theorists of international relations, most notably Ole
R. Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan have drawn
on social-conflict studies to buttress the external threat
hypothesis. They assume that cohesion is composed of some
mix of behavioral and attitudinal aspects while conceding
that the relationship between these two components is not
11




Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D.
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always clear. They also note an additional problem with
cohesion in international alliances in that cohesion may be
derived either from group consensus or coercion:
Presumably most consensual alliances are based upon
an attempt to minimize liabilities which threaten the
group from outside, and the alliance thereby provides
benefits for its members in the form of protection
against an external threat. Conversely, in coercive
alliances, one major source of liabilities for
noncohesive behavior may be the dominate member within
the coalition instead of, or in addition to, the
external enemy. In this case, at least one benefit of
membership is a reduction of the threat from one's own
allies. 15
Holsti and company argue that, whether based on coercion
(Warsaw Pact) or consensus (NATO) , there appears to be validity
in Liska's thesis that alliances will remain cohesive as long as
they are able to "maintain the initial balance between the gains
16
and liabilities which can be attributed to the alliance." In
their analysis, Holsti and company treat both consensus and
coercion-based alliances as cohesive as long as the alliance
members maintain similar approaches to objectives and targets and
continue to behave in a cooperative manner.
Holsti and company further buttress their proposition that
alliance cohesion is a direct function of the degree of
14
Ibid . , p. 94.
15
Ibid . . p. 95. As an example, Holsti uses the 1968
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to illustrate this point:
When Czechoslovakia began to deviate from the communist
system, Soviet action was designed to make painfully clear





cooperation (or conflict) between alliances and among alliance
members by citing the work of the nineteenth-century German
social scientist, Georg Simmel. According to Simmel, inter-group
conflict tends to solidify the internal unity of a specific group
as long as the basic values of that group remain intact. In
short, "Groups at peace can allow antagonistic members to exist,
since they can go their own way without creating severe internal
17
schisms." On the other hand, as Simmel points out, conflict
"pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such
a uniform impulse that they either must completely get along
18
with, or completely repel, one another." Furthermore, in the
absence of a central sovereign power an alliance tends to
disintegrate unless all members of that alliance share a common
external threat (emphasis added) . This line of reasoning,
therefore, brings Holsti and company to the conclusion that
conflict increases the concentration of an existing group, clouds
boundaries between individual group members, and often times may
bring certain members together who normally would have little if
19
any contact with each other.
17
Holsti, et al., p. 95.
18




. , p. 95.
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An expansion of Simmel's hypothesis can be found in
Lewis Coser's The Functions of Social Conflict . Coser
proposes that "outside conflict will strengthen the initial
20
cohesion of the group and increase centralization." Coser
maintains that external conflict has a variety of unifying
effects on a specific group: first, it increases the groups
sense of identity by clearly establishing the boundaries
which separate it from the "outside" world. Second,
conflict mobilizes the energies and resources of a group in
a concerted effort to provide for its own defense. Third,
external conflict tends to make the group more intolerant of
internal dissent and may in fact cause the group to search
for and root out internal dissenters. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, external conflict may in fact bring
certain members together who normally would have little if
21
any reason to cooperate with each other. Coser does,
however, provide one major qualification to his hypothesis
that external conflict causes increased internal cohesion by
noting that "conflict may enhance the cohesion of a group
only when it concerns values, beliefs, and goals which do
not contradict the basic assumptions or consensual values
20
Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York
Free Press, 1956), p. 88.
21
Holsti, et al., p. 96. For a more detailed analysis
of Coser's thesis on the unifying effects external conflict
has on group dynamics see his The Functions of Social




upon which group unity is based."
Additional theorists of international relations, such
as Morton Kaplan, Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers and Amitai
Etzioni maintain that the external threat hypothesis can be
carried over into systems theory in that conflict between
"actor systems" will produce a greater need for cooperation
23
within each system. Interestingly, Liska takes the
proposition to its highest level by claiming that a common
enemy is the most important cause for alliance formations:
Movement toward alignment sets in only when another
state intervenes as a threat. The weaker state rallies
then to one stronger power as a reaction against the
threat from another strong power. The stronger state
assumes the role of a protective ally, interested
mainly in keeping the resources of the potential victim
out of the adversary's control. 2 *
It should also be noted that systems theorists see a
direct relationship between conflict and cohesion in terms
of the degree of polarity present in the international
system. Kaplan, in particular, contends that the presence
of conflict within a tight bipolar international system
tends to produce very cohesive alliances. Conversely,
conflict within a loose bipolar system may not produce
22













Holsti and company have attempted to design an
empirically-based model to test their alliance cohesion
thesis based on the measurement of three sets of variables.
The dependent variable in the external threat hypothesis (as
well as the alliance security dilemma, collective action and
domestic politics hypotheses) is, of course, the degree of
alliance cohesion defined in both behavioral and attitudinal
terms. The independent variable is the degree of conflict
between alliance systems and the perceptions of each
internal alliance member toward the external threat to that
alliance. Measurement models were then developed to analyze
the behavioral and attitudinal components of alliance
cohesion: computer content analysis was used to measure
attitudinal consensus as a component of alliance cohesion
and the perceived external threat to an alliance while
25
As Holsti points out, a tight bipolar system is one in
which there are two major blocs or power centers existing within
the international system. These two blocs are organized
hierarchically and dominated by the two major actors in the
international political setting. Each bloc attempts, at a
minimum, to match the unity and capability of the other bloc.
Each is prepared to resort to war in order to prevent the other
from achieving hegemony in the international system. On the
other hand, a loose bipolar system finds a universal actor
attempting to reduce the incompatabilities between blocs. As
Kaplan notes, nations not belonging to either bloc try to
"coordinate their national objectives with those of the universal
actor and to subordinate the objectives of bloc actors to those
of the universal actor." For a more detailed analysis see Morton
A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New
York: John Wiley and sons, 1957), p. 38.
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events interaction data were used to measure conflict and
26
cooperation between and within competing alliance systems.
While the actual mechanics of these models remain
outside the scope of this particular analysis, Holsti's
findings (in terms of the external threat hypothesis) remain
central to this analysis of allied cooperation during the
Persian Gulf crisis. Based on their empirical research,
Holsti and company have found that cooperation by actors in
an international alliance toward an external actor or event
is likely to increase cohesion and cooperation among those
actors. This proposition is summarized by the following
postulate
:
The greater the similarity of orientations toward a
common external object by the decision-makers in all
member nations of an international alliance, the greater
the cohesion of the alliance, at least with regard to
that object. 2 ?
Likewise, and using events interaction data to measure
interactions among nations within an alliance, Holsti has
formulated the following postulate upon which the behavioral
component of alliance cohesion and cooperation is based:
The greater the cooperation and the less the conflict
among members of an alliance, the greater the cohesion











Ibid . , p. 109.
169

In summary, the external threat hypothesis asserts that
states cooperate to check threats from external powers.
Thus an external threat may bring alliances into existence
and preserve their cohesion while periods of relaxation of
an external threat may reduce alliance cohesion or lead to
their disintegration or even promote fundamental structural
changes as evidenced by the reduced Soviet threat to NATO in
1990. As Robert Osgood notes, "the internal concern of
alliances tends to increase with their duration and with the
29
diminished perception of an external threat." Perhaps
Amitai Etzioni summed it up best when he stated that "the
threat of a common enemy is probably the condition most
30
often credited with initiating the union of countries."
It therefore follows that an increasing level of threat
leads to alliance cohesion because member states seek to






Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative
Study of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1965), p. 30.
31
Kupchan, p. 324. For additional information on the
derivation of the external threat hypothesis, the reader is
referred to the following seminal works on alliance theory:
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics , (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 130.
Joseph Frankel, International Relations , (London: Oxford
University Press, 1964, p. 133; Hans J. Morgenthau,.





The alliance security dilemma hypothesis, also drawn
from balance-of-power theory, focuses on intra-alliance
threats rather than external threats. Alliance cohesion is
explained as a function of the coercive capabilities of the
stronger alliance leader to exact cooperation from the
weaker members. If the weaker states choose to support the
alliance leader, they face possible "entrapment" in both the
positive and negative aspects of the alliance leaders
decisions. If they choose to withdraw support (or pursue
alternative policies — to defect) , they risk "abandonment"
32
by the alliance leader.
Kupchan refers to Glenn Snyder's "The Security Dilemma in
Alliance Politics" and Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International
Politics ("Structural causes and military effects") for the
formulation of this hypothesis. According to Snyder, once states
Alliance Policy in the Cold War , (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), p. 193; Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting,
Dynamics of International Relations , (New York: McGraw Hill,
1956), p. 167; K.J. Holsti, International Politics
:
A
Framework for Analysis , (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967),
p. 116; Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General
Theory
. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 162; Amitai
Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of
Leaders and Forces , (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,
1965)
, pp. 30-31; Robert C. North, H.E. Koch, and Dina A.
Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of Conflict," Journal of
Conflict Resolution , 4, 1960, p. 367; Arnold Wolfers,
"Stresses and Strains of Going It With Others," in Arnold
Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War , (Baltimore:





have formed alliances, they move into a phase characterized
by a decision-making process that is no longer concerned
with whether or not to ally in the first place, but rather
how firmly to commit themselves to the alliance (and the
alliance leader) and how much support to give that partner
in the event of a confrontation with an adversary. The so-
called proverbial horns of this dilemma can be characterized
by the traditional labels "cooperate" and "defect" where
"cooperation means a strong general commitment and full
support in specific adversary conflicts, and defection means




Rousseau's "Stag Hunt" has been used by theorists of
international relations to illustrate the dilemma raised by
the choice between cooperation and defection. In short, if
the men in the hunt cooperate to trap the stag, they will
all eat well. However, if one hunter decides to defect and
chase a rabbit (which he prefers to eat over stag) , then
none of the remaining hunters will get anything. Thus, as
Robert Jervis points out by placing this illustration in an
international political context, all actors have the same
preference order and there is a solution that gives each his
first choice:
33
Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance
Politics," World Politics 36, July 1984, p. 466. As Snyder
points out, the concept of the security dilemma was originated by
John H. Herz who maintained that the "security power dilemma" is
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(1) Cooperate and trap the stag (the international
analogue being cooperation and disarmament) ; (2) chase
a rabbit while others remain at their posts (maintain a
high level of arms while others are disarmed) ; (3) all
chase rabbits (arms competition and high risk of war)
;
and (4) stay at the original position while another
chases a rabbit (being disarmed while others are armed)
.
Jervis is quick to qualify this line of reasoning, however,
by noting that even when there is a solution that is
everyone's first choice, the international case is
characterized by several problems not present in the case of
the Stag Hunt. The principle reason lies at the heart of
the security dilemma: "Many of the means by which a state
tries to increase its security decrease the security of
35
others." In other words, in international politics
34
a fundamental condition which underlies all social and
political phenomena that face individuals and groups in
society:
Politically active groups and individuals are concerned
about their security from being attacked, subjected,
dominated, or annihilated by other groups and
individuals. Because they strive to attain security
from such attack, and yet can never feel entirely
secure in a world of competing units, they are driven
toward acquiring more and more power for themselves, in
order to escape the impact of the superior power of
others. It is important to realize that such
competition for security, and hence for power, is a
basic situation which is unique with men and their
social groups.
For detailed information see: John H. Herz, Political
Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951), p. 14.
34
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security
Dilemma," World Politics 30 , January 1978, p. 167.
35
Ibid . , p. 168.
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one state's gain in enhancing its own security is often (and
inadvertently) accomplished at the expense of others.
Each horn of this dilemma carries with it both
prospective good and prospective bad consequences. In the
alliance security dilemma proposition the prospective bad
consequences are "abandonment" and "entrapment" while the
prospective good consequences are a reduction of the risks
36
of being abandoned or entrapped by the alliance leader.
As Kupchan quite clearly points out:
The notion of "entrapment" usually refers to
involvement in unwanted conflict or the assumption of
what are perceived as unnecessary and excessive defense
responsibilities. "Abandonment," in its extreme form,
refers to realignment and the breaking of defense
commitments, but it may also take more moderate forms,
such as the alliance leader moving closer to the
adversary, imposing sanctions on its weaker allies, or
ignoring the interests of small powers in the,
designation of alliance policy and strategy.
The alliance security dilemma, according to Snyder, is
mostly a function of tension between the risk of abandonment
and the risk of entrapment: reducing one tends to increase
the other. In a bipolar alliance, such as NATO, the risk of
entrapment is normally dealt with simply by disassociation
from the ally's policy or by various methods of restraining
36
Snyder, p. 466. Snyder credits Michael Mandelbaum as
having first posited the concepts of abandonment and
entrapment. For more information see Mandelbaum 's The
Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After






the ally without concern that the ally may defect or the
alliance leader might abandon the ally as a consequence.
The two classic cases of this phenomenon remain the
withholding of support and the application of economic
pressure by the alliance leader, the United States, during
the Suez crisis of 1956 and the weaker allies failure to
support (and even hinder) the alliance leaders efforts to
38
resupply Israel during the Yom Kippur War.
Within the NATO context, the European allies are
primarily concerned about entrapment in that "U.S.
bellicosity might set off a severe insecurity spiral with
the Soviet Union, which could explode into crisis or
39
violence." More specifically, Europeans harbor the fear
of out-of-area entrapment — that is, being engulfed in a
superpower conflict ignited by an American overreaction to
Soviet advances in regions outside the traditional confines
of Europe. Therefore,
the alliance dilemma for the European allies is how
to escape or minimize these risks of entrapment without
seriously risking some form of partial U.S.
abandonment. The latter might consist of troop
withdrawals, American downgrading of the priority of
European defense in favor of other areas such as the










As demonstrated later in this study, this is precisely the
dilemma the European allies found themselves locked into at
the outset of the Persian Gulf crisis.
Kenneth Waltz approaches the alliance security dilemma
from a slightly different perspective by positing that in an
alliance among equals, the defection of one member threatens
the security of the remaining members. But in alliances
among unequals, "the contributions of the lesser members are
41
at once wanted and of relatively small importance." In
other words:
Where the contributions of a number of parties are
highly important to all of them, each has strong
incentive both to persuade others to its views about
strategy and tactics and to make concessions when
persuasion fails. The unity of major partners is
likely to endure because they all understand how much
they depend on it.^ 2
According to Waltz, in both bipolar and multipolar
systems, alliance leaders attempt to extract maximum
contributions from their respective members. However, in a
multipolar world, nations will often pool their resources in
order to serve their interests. Furthermore, alliance
members of roughly equal stature who find themselves engaged
in cooperative endeavors must strive for a "common
denominator" of their policies. Within a multipolar system
41
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics





they always run the risk of finding the lowest common
denominator thereby ending up in the worst of all possible
43
situations.
On the other hand, Waltz contends that in a bipolar
system (NATO vs. Warsaw Pact), alliance leaders formulate
strategies and tactics according to their own national
interests. In other words, strategies can be devised that
offset the main antagonist with little reference to the need
to satisfy the interests of one's lesser allies. In short,
"alliance leaders are free to follow their own line, which
may of course reflect their bad as well as their good
44
judgment, their imaginary as well as their worthy ends."
In no case, of course, are alliance leaders totally free of
constraints — but the major constraints on the courses of
action available to an alliance leader normally occur as a
result of an action from the main adversary and not from
45
one's own allies.
In summary, it is safe to conclude that the alliance
security dilemma is more severe in a multipolar than in a bipolar












plausible realignment options." As Snyder confirms:
Conciliating the adversary, or weakening one's support
of the ally to guard against entrapment, are both
constrained by fears of abandonment. But attempts to
ensure against abandonment by supporting the ally and
avoiding accommodation with the opponent- increase the
risk of entrapment; hence the dilemma.
Likewise, the mutual fear of abandonment in a multipolar
system tends to promote convergence of policy which is
normally measured in terms of mutual support and firmness
toward an adversary. In the multipolar system, as Snyder
maintains, abandonment worries outweigh entrapment fears.
This is not the case in a bipolar system, such as NATO,
because the risks of total abandonment are low. In fact, in
such a system, the allies may adopt independent (and at
times contradictory) policies toward the adversary with
little if any fear that the partner will defect as a
consequence of those independent policies. Therefore the
tendency in a bipolar system is toward a divergence rather
than a convergence of policy. This condition is a direct
result of the nature of the bipolar structure of the system
— the alliance [NATO] cannot disintegrate or even change







This structural guarantee against disintegration
encourages unilateralism and inhibits compromise.
Policy conflict may not be resolved because the cost
of not resolving them does not include a risk to the
alliance itself. 8
Conversely, the structural instability of multipolar
alliances tend — because they could disintegrate — to




It should be remembered, however, that alliance
cohesion, regardless of the prevailing system, remains a
function of the coercive capabilities of the alliance leader
(or stronger bloc) to exact cooperative behavior from the
weaker members. If the weaker states choose to support the
alliance leader, they face possible "entrapment" in both the
positive and negative aspects of the alliance leaders
decisions. If they choose to withdraw support (or pursue
alternative policies — to defect) , they risk "abandonment"
50
by the alliance leader.
48




Kupchan, p. 324. For additional information on the
derivation of the alliance security dilemma, the reader is
referred to the following seminal studies on alliance
cohesion theory: John H. Herz , Political Realism and
Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951), pp. 3-16; Ole R. Holsti, et al . , Unity and
Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: Wiley
and Sons, 1973), especially Chapter 5, "National
Attributes, Bloc Structure and Intra-Alliance Conflict";




The collective action hypothesis proposes that the
willingness of the alliance leader to bear the heaviest
burden of the costs of collective security leads to alliance
cohesion. Conversely, a decline in the leader's willingness
or ability to carry the heaviest load should lead to
alliance discord. As the dominate alliance leader applies
pressure to the less powerful members to contribute more to
the collective good, the "smaller powers derive less benefit
from participation in the alliance and are less willing to
51
play a subordinate political role." This, in turn, leads
to noncooperative behavior. This proposition assumes that
weaker powers contribute less (over time) than their
proportionate share of the defense burden because they "free
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979), Chapter 8,
especially pp. 163-170; Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 62-76; George Liska,
Nations in Alliance : The Limits of Interdependence
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), Chapter
2, "The Cohesion of Alliances"; for information on the
concept of "defection" in alliances see: Robert Axelrod,
Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970), pp. 66-70;
Anatol Rapaport and Albert Chammah, Prisoner ' s Dilemma (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 33-50;
Robert Axelrod, "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's
Dilemma," The Journal of Conflict Resolution , September
1980, pp. 379-403; and James Tedeschi, Barry Schlenker and
Thomas Bonoma , Conflict , Power and Games (Chicago: Aldine,
1973), pp. 135-141. For additional information on the
concept of cooperation in alliance cohesion theory see:
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,






ride" on the alliance leader. However, this hypothesis
predicts that smaller powers should increase their share of
the burden when the share provided by the alliance leader
declines. In other words, they [smaller powers] will
increase their share of the burden when they are forced to
52
rely on their own defense resources.
While the basic argument for this hypothesis was first
formulated by Charles P. Kindleberger in his The World in
Depression 1929-1938 , the central thesis for this
proposition is drawn from Robert Keohane ' s general
proposition called "Hegemonic Stability Theory." Two major
tenets remain central to Keohane ' s theory: First,
that order in world politics is typically created by
a single dominant power. Since regimes constitute
elements of an international order, this implies that
the formation of international regimes normally depends
on hegemony. The other major tenet of the theory of
hegemonic stability is that the maintenance of order
requires continued hegemony. 53
This assertion implies that cooperation, defined as mutual
adjustment of state policies to one another, also depends on the
continuation of hegemony. Kindleberger, in perhaps the most
52
Ibid . , p. 326.
53
Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), p. 31. For an indepth analysis
and evaluation of the "hegemonic stability theory" see
Keohane ' s "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in
International Economic Regimes," in Ole Holsti et al
.
,
Changes in the International System (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1980), pp. 131-162.
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straightforward expression of this sentiment, flatly states
"that for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to
54
be a stabilizer, one stabilizer."
Keohane points out that the hegemon is generally more
willing to enter into agreements which require it to make
initial sacrifices in order to ensure future gains. The
hegemon willingly enters into such agreements only because
it expects to have a major stake in and control over the
behavior of its lesser partners in the long term. In other
words and simply put: the hegemon can make life quite
difficult for its lesser partners if they fail to live up to
55
their individual or collective obligations.
On the other hand, the smaller states know that the
hegemon is likely to enforce a broad set of rules and
responsibilities. These states may therefore be willing, as
Keohane contends, "to deal both with the hegemon — because,
to the rule-maintainer
,
precedents and reputation are so
important that cheating and double-crossing strategies are
costly — and with other countries, since these states may
56
be kept in line by the dominant power." Thus hegemony
54
Charles P. Kindleberger , The World in Depression
1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973),
p. 305.
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provides the alliance with standards for conduct,
information about other member's likely patterns of
behavior, and ways of providing incentives to states to
comply with the hegemon's rules. According to Keohane
,
these effects of hegemony are much easier to construct than
trying to create stability and cohesion through the
laborious process associated with multi-lateral
57
international regimes.
However, in a follow-on study to his original hegemonic
stability thesis, Keohane, in his After Hegemony:
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy ,
concludes that the crude theory is only partially valid.
His "first cut" at the problem pointed to the importance of
material power in achieving cooperation but it did not
provide a general causal explanation of the changes taking
place in the post-hegemonic international order of the
1970* s and 1980' s. Keohane points to the evolving role of
international regimes for clues in finding an explanation
for these changes in the international system:
Cooperation seems also to depend on expectations, on
transaction costs, and on uncertainty, all of which
can be affected by international regimes. Despite
the erosion of American hegemony, discord has not
triumphed over cooperation; instead, they coexist.
57
Ibid . , p. 181.
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In the final analysis, Keohane concedes that the
hegemonic stability theory, like realist theory, "provides a
useful, parsimonious basis on which to begin analysis" but
it does not provide an adequate explanation of the evolution
59
of the postwar international economic order.
Mancur Olson and Richard Zechauser have written perhaps
the seminal study on applying the concept of collective
action to alliance cohesion theory. In their article "An
Economic Theory of Alliances," they attempt to develop an
empirical model which explains the inner workings of
international organizations and then test that model against
the experience of some existing international institutions
— namely NATO.
Prior to conducting their analysis, however, the
authors deem it necessary to set the analytical stage by
asking whether or not the different-sized contributions of
different countries within an alliance can be explained in
terms of national interest. For example, why would it be in
the interest of some countries (like the United States) to
contribute a larger portion of their total resources to
group undertakings in other countries? And why do NATO
nations fail to provide the level of forces that they
themselves describe as appropriate and in their own national







these questions, while central to collective action theory,
cannot be answered without "developing a logical explanation
of how much a nation's acting in its national interest will
60
contribute to an international organization."
Thus any attempt to build a theory of alliance cohesion
must, as Mancur and Zechauser point out, begin with the
purposes or functions of these international organizations.
One function that all alliances must have is that of serving
the common interest of its member states:
In the case of NATO, the proclaimed purpose of the
alliance is to protect the member nations from aggression
by a common enemy. Deterring aggression against any one
of the members is supposed to be in the interest of all.
The analogy with a nation-state is obvious. Those
goods and services, such as defense, that the
government provides in the common interest of the
citizenry, are usually called "public goods." An
organization of states allied for defense similarly
produces a public good, only in this case the "public"
— the members of the organization — are states rather
than individuals.
Collective or public goods share common objectives and have
one or both of the following properties: First, if the common
objective is in fact achieved, then everyone who shares in
achieving this goal automatically benefits. In other words,
"non-purchasers" cannot be kept from consuming the good. And
60
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second, if the collective good is made available to the other
members of the alliance, then that good is made available to the
62
others at little or marginal cost.
It therefore follows that since the benefits of any action
taken by an individual group member to provide a public good goes
to all members, individual members, acting independently, do not
63
have an incentive to provide "optimal amounts of such goods."
The author's cite examples of states exacting taxes and labor
unions demanding compulsory membership as illustrative of this
phenomenon. That is, when the group interested in a particular
public good is large and the share that goes to any one
individual is small, the tendency is for the individual group
62
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September 1976, pp. 393-414; Joseph Oppenheimer, "Collective
Goods and Alliances: A Reassessment," The Journal of
Conflict Resolution , September 1979, pp. 387-407; and Todd
Sandler, Jon Cauley and John F. Forbes, "In Defense of a
Collective Goods Theory of Alliances," The Journal of
Conflict Resolution , September 1980, pp. 537-547; Wallace J.
Thies, "Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal, "The
Journal of Conflict Resolution , June 1987, pp. 298-332;
Amnon Rapoport and Gary Bronstein, "Public Good Problems in
Competition Between Equal and Unequal Groups," The Journal
of Conflict Resolution , September 1989; Mark A. Boyer,
"Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System," The
Journal of Conflict Resolution , December 1989, pp. 700-727.
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member not to voluntarily purchase a share of the good. Olson
and Zechauser sum up their thesis by stating the following
proposition:
When — as in any organization representing a
limited number of nation-states — the membership of an
organization is relatively small, the individual
members may have an incentive to make significant
sacrifices to obtain the collective good, but they will
tend to provide only suboptimal amounts of this good.
There will also be a tendency for the "larger" members
— those that place a higher absolute value on the
public good — to bear a disproportionate share of the
burden. °
In summary, the collective action hypothesis
presupposes that it is in the national interest of the
alliance leader to provide the larger share of the public
good and that the smaller members of the alliance are
willing to cooperate as long as they continue to benefit
from the alliance leader's determination and ability to
65
provide the public good of collective security. While
Keohane ' s hegemonic stability theory deals with economic
regimes, the central tenet of his thesis posits that a
decline in the dominant power's ability and willingness to
provide the public good (security in the case of NATO)
should precipitate a rise in intra-alliance tension and
discord. As the dominant power places additional pressure
on the smaller states to contribute more to the collective
64





good, the smaller states begin to derive a smaller portion
of the overall benefit from membership in the alliance and
therefore are "less willing to play a subordinate political
66
role."
However, if cooperation is measured in terms of the
economic contribution of the smaller states to the overall
output of defense related goods, then, as Kupchan points
out, the collective action hypothesis suggests the opposite
prediction:
Small powers should increase their level of
contribution to defense capability when the level
provided by the dominant power declines. There should
be a negative correlation between the contribution of
the latter and that of the former. The hypothesis is
based on the assumption that smaller powers
consistently contribute less than their proportionate
share of the collective good (security) produced by the
alliance because they "free ride" on the dominant
power."'
In other words, the smaller powers have little incentive
to make additional contributions (like raising defense
expenditures) because the dominant power or hegemon makes
provisions for their defense requirements. For the alliance
leader, the strategic pay-offs of this relationship outweigh
the economic costs. However, when the alliance leader
decides, for political or economic reasons, to decrease its
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to "pick-up the slack." When the smaller powers are forced
to rely on their own resources as a result of such action by




The domestic politics hypothesis asserts that allies
cooperate when tangible public support is present or when
the political leadership (in democratic societies) perceives
there is an "electoral advantage in tightening alliance
69
relations or raising defense spending." Conversely,
alliances are less cohesive when public support is lacking
or when domestic political (or economic) constraints
preclude a stronger commitment to a more equitable sharing
of the defense burden.
The relevant literature on the impact domestic politics
has on alliance cohesion includes a fairly large number of
propositions suggesting alliance policies reflect domestic
needs. In fact, K.J. Holsti suggests that a nation's
70
alliance strategies are closely linked to domestic needs.






K.J. Holsti, International Politics
:
A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 110
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which national attributes or domestic politics play a vital
role in the formation of alliance policies: the stability of
the top leadership, the socialization of political elites,
and certain characteristics of open and closed polities.
Holsti is careful to point out, however, that these are
limited areas bordering on speculative and illustrative
rather than comprehensive and exact. But they do provide a
71
firm foundation upon which to begin analysis.
The literature dealing with the stability of the top
leadership, by implication, also deals with the stability of
the domestic regime itself. These propositions suggest that
a leadership group faced with internal domestic turmoil may
actually court allies in the hope of securing external
support for a collapsing domestic regime. In this respect,
George Liska posits that the greater the internal
difficulties within a non-aligned state, the greater the
incentive to move beyond non-alignment to militant
72
neutralism. Ole Holsti asserts that domestic instability
is the national attribute most often associated with
73
alliance disintegration. Liska expands this proposition
by asserting that the most straightforward cause of alliance
71
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disintegration is domestic instability producing radical
74
change in the governing elite.
The literature (and propositions) on alliance cohesion
often focus on the political attributes of the alliance
leader and hold that cohesion depends upon stable leadership
75
within the alliance leader's nation. Changes in national
leadership may result in a re-evaluation of alliance goals,
strategy, and tactics. Indeed, Holsti and company flatly
assert that "the more regime instability experienced by one
or more members of the alliance, the more the alliance will
76
experience problems of performance." Since domestic
politics cannot be divorced from foreign policy, as Holsti
contends, it therefore stands to reason that regime
77
stability will have an impact on alliance performance.










Ole Holsti, et al., p. 55.
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For example, Jacob and Teune assert that governmental
ineffectiveness associated with unstable leadership may in
fact provide added incentives for seeking larger "units of
community." For more information on this process see:
Phillip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process:
Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political
191

To demonstrate, dramatically, the effect socialization
of political elites has on alliance cohesion, Holsti and
company examine the alliance experiences of French and
Chinese leaders — namely Mao and DeGaulle. Suffice it to
say, and for the purposes of this brief survey, both leaders
were intensely nationalistic and were "convinced that their
vision of history gave them exceptional insight into the
79
features of the politically relevant future," Like
statesman in other countries who have "successfully"
challenged their alliance leaders (for example, Tito in
Yugoslavia), Mao and DeGaulle, as Holsti points out, owed
their positions to national, domestic, and personal factors
80
rather than to the intervention of their allies.
Holsti and company also link the nature of the
political system — pluralistic or authoritarian — to
differences in alliance policy. Since this analysis deals
with NATO's cooperative efforts to address Persian Gulf
security, this portion of the survey focuses only on the
aspects of the open polity inherent in pluralistic systems.
The hypothesis developed by Holsti is stated and framed in
Community," in Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds.,
The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott Co. , 1964)
.
79
Ole Holsti, et al., p. 152.
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terms of the identifiable link to the nature of a
pluralistic system:
Nonconforming alliance policies of an open polity tend
to remain confined to a few issue-areas; that is, there
is little tendency for disputes to spill over into all
issue-areas
.
In other words, this proposition is derived from the
perspective that foreign policy elites, in a pluralistic
system, operate within a decision-making process marked by
significant constraints against abrupt and complete changes
in policy:
These include multiple internal and external channels
of communication, relative freedom for divergent
interests to make political demands, and a limited
ability of top leaders to mobilize all politically




More recent literature on the domestic politics
component in alliance theory tend to focus on the specific
role public opinion plays in the development of viable
national security policies within an alliance framework. As






Ibid . For additional information on these broad
domestic politics propositions see: Ole Holsti ' s Unity and
Disintegration in International Alliances , pp. 10-14, 31,
54-56, 60-84, 151-165 and Annex C for specific propositions
on the impact of domestic politics on alliances; George
Liska's Nations in Alliance , especially Chapter 3, "The
Efficacy of Alliances"; and for an indepth analysis of the
effect elitism has on alliances see: Amitai Etzioni's
Political Unification , pp. 45-47, 68-71, and for specific
propositions see pp. 94-96.
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requires not only the capability to organize and to maintain
the military prerequisites for deterrence and defense, but
83
also a degree of social acceptance of these measures."
Moreover, and with specific reference to NATO, today's
increasingly interdependent world creates a situation in
which domestic political factors are becoming more and more
intertwined with external policies:
The transmission of information and the conduct of
intra-allied debate over policy is less and less
confined to diplomatic channels and communication among
top political leaders. The speed with which
information is available to all Western publics
simultaneously creates new and more direct interactions
between the different political cultures existing in
alliance member states. 4
Concerning the degree of domestic consensus within each
alliance member, various researchers and theorists point out
the need to distinguish the level of agreement between
governmental elites and public opinion and the level of
agreement within the public. Several analysts have
concluded that, despite the many crises of cohesion
plagueing the Alliance, the elite-public consensus on
security issues remains quite strong. In fact, a clear
83
Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds . , The Public and
Atlantic Defense (Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985) , p. 1
84
Ibid . . p. 387.
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division between European public opinion and the governing
85
elites occurs only on the nuclear weapons issue.
However, less onerous domestic divisions do take place.
These cleavages within the European domestic political arena
are normally, as demonstrated later in this study, split
down party lines and, in some instances, compounded by
generational divisions. Based on Europe's historical
tradition of ideological differences on security matters,
most analysts would conclude that this phenomenon is neither
86
new nor even surprising. Likewise, the so-called
simplistic concepts of neutralism and pacifism as well as
"single-factor" theories such as generational change do not,
according to many analysts, provide sufficient explanations
for the pattern of domestic divisions within NATO on
87
security matters.
Researchers have found that it is the very complexity of the
divisions themselves that complicate policy coordination within
the Alliance. They contend that public opinion profiles vary in
two specific ways:
85
William Domke , Richard Eichenberg, and Catherine Kelleher,
"Consensus Lost? Domestic Politics and the 'Crisis' in NATO,"





. , p. 405.
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First, opinions are not uniform across countries. In
some there are deep divisions on security issues while
in others these are less severe. Second, the nature
of opinion cleavages varies; in all the countries,
there is evidence of partisan cleavage, but in some it
is complicated by generational differences.
Coordination of policy is further compounded by the
differences in political institutions and changing domestic
conditions (social and economic) that tend to influence
public opinion. For example, the rate of economic growth
within a specific Alliance country has a direct relationship
to the general consensus against raising defense budgets at
the expense of social programs: strong economies tend to
break down this consensus and defense spending increases;
weak economies, on the other hand, tend to solidify this
consensus and a greater share of scarce resources are then
89
allocated for social rather than defense related programs.
Given this background, it is safe to conclude that the
degree of commitment to an alliance depends upon the
90




Ibid . , p. 406. For European governments, as Domke et
al. point out, the best outlook would be the avoidance of
these tradeoffs through rates of economic growth strong
enough to allow relatively modest increases in defense
outlays without impacting adversely on social programs.
Most European governments during the 1970' s actually
increased defense spending (in real terms) without incurring
the wrath of the electorate at the ballot box.
90
Michael D. Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics ,
Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Denver:
Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, 1982), p. 76.
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"the military, economic and political postures in an
alliance are constrained to a greater or lesser degree by
91
the internal requirements of each particular member."
This proposition reflects the need, particularly on behalf
of the Alliance leader, to be intimately familiar and up-to-
date on the status of an ally's domestic political parties,
their political leaders and the coalition politics they are
involved in so that overall alliance policy can be better
coordinated. The affect which electoral politics, governing
elite perceptions, public opinion, and regional
collaboration and conflict each may have on alliance
cohesion should be factored into a comprehensive approach to
92
coordinating alliance policy and strategy.
In summary, and for the purposes of this study, the
domestic politics hypothesis maintains that allies cooperate
when tangible public support is present or when the
political elites perceive there is an electoral gain to be
made in shoring-up intra-alliance relations or even
increasing defense expenditures. Likewise, alliances are
less cohesive when public support is lacking or when










more equitable sharing of the defense burden.
Summary
The preceding summary of the relevant alliance cohesion
literature and theory provides the foundation upon which the
analysis in the following chapter is based. An overview of
the findings in the preceding approach to alliance cohesion
theory by no means rules out the formulation of an alternate
93
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set of propositions by which to analyze allied cooperation
in the Persian Gulf nor does it lay claim to the validity of
one set of hypotheses over another. Indeed, in their
comprehensive empirical study, Holsti and company examined
over 130 alliances formed during the span of more than a
century and found that the evidence for these propositions
is, at best, mixed.
For example, one of the researcher's major findings was
the stark contrast in the number of correlations of
independent variables between the nature and performance of
the alliances formed during the period between the end of
the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of World War II in 1939
and the post-war bipolar alliance system. The independent
variables selected by the researcher's -- ideology,
political stability (and instability) , geographical
dispersion, size, goals, and international conflict —
remain among the most prominent in the alliance cohesion
94
literature. However, as Holsti and company have
demonstrated, the most striking factor in their analysis was
the consistency of low correlations of these variables with
the nature and performance of the alliance systems examined
prior to 1939 and the relatively high correlation between
95








their data supports the general proposition that the
structure of the international system has a dramatic impact
on and influence over the nature and performance of the
prevailing alliance system.
It is from this perspective, the structure of the
international system, that the alliance cohesion
propositions outlined in the preceding summary will be
applied to the case study. Moreover, these hypotheses are
designed primarily to serve as an analytical framework
within which to organize the research data, frame the proper
research questions, and systematically analyze and evaluate
the research problem. Given this background and framework,
it is now possible to apply these four applicable hypotheses
to the case study to determine why a political agreement and
its subsequent transformation into an operational agreement




ENDS VERSUS MEANS: ALLIED COOPERATION ANALYSIS
With their internal relations Great Britain . . .
would have been foolish to interfere. All that she
took upon herself was to secure the maritime peace of
the Gulf . . . that object has been secured. Trade
is prosecuted in these waters with an immunity and
security which, under any other regime would have
been impossible . . . hundreds of thousands of human
beings are secured by the British Protectorate of the
Persian Gulf . . . were it either withdrawn or
destroyed both sea and shores would relapse into . .
anarchical chaos.
G.N. Curzon, 1892
It remains our intention to withdraw British forces
from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971.
British Ministry of Defence, 1968
. . . there have been over 200 confirmed attacks
against merchant ships . . . most vessels have no




"Naturally," the eminent British naval historian James
Cable recently wrote, "it is tempting to say that Curzon was
right, to sketch the course of events — First a trickle,
1
G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London:
Longmans Green & Co, 1892), Vol. II, pp. 451 & 464;
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1970 (London: HMSO) Cmnd
4290, p. 4; and Adrian Swire, "Merchant Shipping and the
Gulf War" in Naval Forces No. HI/1987, Vol. VIII as quoted
in James Cable, "Outside Navies in the Gulf," International
Relations , May 1988, p. 228.
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then a torrent — which bore out, in less than a decade, the
warning he had uttered eighty years earlier." The change
that Curzon predicted, however, has been much more complex
and violent than he expected. The killing fields found
along the Iran-Iraq border, eerily reminiscent of the trench
fighting of World War I, have revealed the deaths of over a
million people and the use of lethal and exotic weaponry
such as mustard and nerve gas and ballistic missiles.
Nor could Curzon have foreseen the level at which this
violence would spill over into the trecherous and restricted
waters of the Persian Gulf. From indiscriminate small boat
attacks to the use of Exocet missiles, the tanker war became
just as vicious as the war on land. Ironically, Curzon'
s
latter-day prediction regarding a relapse into anarchical
chaos and Adrian Swire's recent observation regarding the
lack of naval protection for merchant ships, provides
pundits from both sides of the issue with enough
ammunition to buttress an argument either for or against the
establishment of some form of multi-national naval
protection for merchant ships plying the war-torn waters of
the Gulf.
Regardless of one's position on the causes of the
violence in the once peaceful waters of the Gulf and the
subsequent requirement for naval protection, the fact
remains that a political agreement and its transformation
into an operational agreement did emerge under the auspices
202

of the Western European Union. The question remains why and
how did such an agreement emerge? This portion of the
analysis will focus on this question by examining the
factors that determine intra-alliance cooperative and
noncooperative behavior. Moreover, this examination centers
on the allies ' specif ic efforts to address Persian Gulf
security issues as they pertained to the U.S. decision to
reflag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers.
Organization
This chapter is organized on a topical basis. The
first section briefly outlines the evolution of NATO policy
toward Southwest Asia and identifies examples of both
cooperative and noncooperative behavior. The second section
reviews the four central hypotheses that seek to explain
intra-alliance behavior outlined in the previous chapter.
These hypotheses are derived from both systemic and domestic
models of international politics. As previously noted,
Kupchan categorizes these hypotheses as follows:
The external threat hypothesis suggests that
alliance cohesion rises and falls with the external
threats to collective security. The alliance security
dilemma hypothesis proposes that cohesion is a function
of the coercive potential of the alliance leader and
its ability to exact cooperative behavior from its
weaker partners. The collective action hypothesis
suggests that alliance behavior is fundamentally a
public goods problem. The domestic politics hypothesis
asserts that alliance behavior is determined primarily






The third section tests these hypotheses against the
ref lagging case study to determine which one (or
combinations thereof) best explains the behavior that
eventually led to allied cooperation in the Persian Gulf.
In the final section, some general conclusions are drawn
regarding the sources of alliance cohesion and the
forecasting capability of these alliance cooperation
propositions. Admittedly, the theoretical scope of this
study is limited, primarily due to the concentration on one
case study. However, the purpose of this study is simply to
attempt to formulate causal statements pertaining to the
sources of cooperative and noncooperative behavior within
the confines of the Persian Gulf case study. The following
analysis suggests that the ultimate political and
operational agreement reached by the alliance members was
the direct result of altered threat perceptions coupled with
the application of coercive pressure by the alliance
leader. The study clearly delineates elements of the
external threat and alliance security dilemma hypotheses
merging together to effect a shift in the sovereign yet
collective European position.
The Evolution of NATO ' S Southwest Asia Policy
The March 1987 decisions by the United States to reflag
11 Kuwaiti tankers and the follow-on request for allied
cooperation in augmenting U.S. naval forces in the Gulf,




of-area problem. Article Six of the North Atlantic
Treaty restricts the Organization to the defense of
territories of the member states in Europe and North
America, and the seas and islands north if the Tropic of
4
Cancer. While many alliance members have maintained (at
times extensive) interests "out-of-area, " rarely has there
been a mechanism by which these interests could be
integrated into a comprehensive, permanent, and
5
collaborative military framework. This is a direct result
of differences in overseas interests of individual alliance
members. For example, containment of the Soviet military
threat has always been the primordial and galvanizing
interest of all the alliance members. However, in out-of-
area matters, the nature, scale and threshold of interests
varies with each member. The United States, by virtue of
3
For a detailed historical background on the NATO out
of area debate see: Charles A. Kupchan. The Persian Gulf
and the West - The Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen &
Unwin, 1987; specifically Chapters 7 and 8).
4
As Kupchan points out, the purpose of Article Six was
not to preclude combined operations outside the confines of
the formal treaty area but rather "to ensure that an attack
on colonial territories not be automatically considered as
an attack on the alliance as such." For further information
see: Theodore Achilles, "U.S. Role in Negotiations That Led
to the Atlantic Alliance." NATO Review 5, October 1983,
p. 17.
5
Simon Davis and Bruce George, "Europe, The United
States, The Gulf War, and NATO's Enduring Out of Area
Problem," in Robert Reed and Roger Weissinger-Baylon , eds .
,
Out of Area Crises and The Atlantic Alliance , (Menlo Park,
CA: Center for Strategic Decision Research, 1989), p. 70.
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its superpower status, is more concerned with geostrategic
issues requiring political and military influence in many-
regions of the world. Immediate post-war containment of the
Soviet threat was pursued through military assistance and
economic development programs which tended to replace
European influence or accelerate the withdrawal of
that influence from post-colonial regions like Southeast
Asia and the Middle East. This decline of British power in
the Middle East and Africa and the collapse of French
colonialism in Southeast Asia and North Africa "witnessed a
corresponding growth in American development and assistance
6
schemes with the successor regimes" . In short,
The intention was to erect a pro-Western set of
durable alternatives to the forces of radical Third
World nationalism which, in the fifties and sixties,
seemed increasingly sympathetic to Soviet and Chinese
auspices. This would involve building states along the
lines of prevailing "development" economics, with large
scale transfers of military training and material that
would soothe the political difficulties arising from
subsequent social and demographic change.
European out-of-area interests, on the other hand,
reflected a less systematic approach and clearly
demonstrated the unique national priorities of the European
NATO members particularly when removed from the "immediate
8











Britain have long maintained their own interests outside the
traditional confines of NATO. French out-of-area policy was
highlighted by concerted efforts to maintain an independent
(of NATO) position in relation to French national interests.
With the humiliating failures in Indochina, Suez, and
Algeria, a firm and selective stance on out-of-area issues
was deemed as vital to General deGaulle's adherence to a
policy of strict political independence. This policy
ultimately manifested itself in France's withdrawal from
NATO's integrated command structure in 1966, an attempt to
secure spheres of influence in the post-colonial regimes
through trade and defense programs, and in a sophisticated
arms sales and diplomatic policy in areas such as the Middle
9
East.
Similarly, Britain's main concern was to manage
adroitly its own colonial withdrawal while maintaining
"residual political and economic interests through the
10
looser Commonwealth federation." However, this policy
came at a time when the United States, particularly in the
early 1960 's, was attempting to balance the demands of a
strategic nuclear build-up with the need to counter the
Soviet Union's (read Kruschev's) well-published support
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Consequently, gaining the support of the NATO allies with
"parallel interests" out-of-area became a highly desirable
policy objective of the United States. Unfortunately,
British effectiveness in out-of-area concerns was steadily
reduced as a result of an economic and financial crisis at
home. In 1970, Britain reiterated that "it remains our
intention to withdraw British forces from the Persian Gulf
11
by the end of 1971."
This reduced European military contribution to out-of-
area interests coincided with the emergence of Iran as the
"flagship" of the new "twin pillars" strategy of the United
States. However, it should be noted that while the 1967
Harmel Report had called for greater coordination between
the allies on out-of-area issues, in reality the report
merely reflected a growing European concern over the adverse
effect the redeployment of American troops to Vietnam was
having on European security. As the United States entered
the post-Vietnam era, the Nixon Doctrine was seen as a means
to
. . . shift emphasis to the use of indigenous manpower
resources, armed and trained from Washington, in order
to provide an interlocking series of regional
arrangements capable of ensuring the overall
"containment" of non-Western influence. In this way,
the final withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf in
1971 was not seen as a vital issue. Instead, the U.S.
placed emphasis on its emergent alliance with the Shah
11
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1970. (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd 4290), p. 4.
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of Iran as the impending debacle in Vietnam would lead
to a reorientation of American security considerations
in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Iran was cast
as the major of the "twin pillars" of Western security
in the region - the other being Saudi Arabia - with
the Shah's regime subsequently receiving 19 billion
dollars in U.S. arms between ^972 and 1978 as the
flagship of the new strategy.
The collapse of the Iranian "pillar" in 1979
exacerbated the problems encountered by the United States
in the post-Vietnam era of relative economic decline and
political insecurities in balancing global security
interests with steadily decreasing means. The concomitant
economic rise of Europe and Japan was accomplished outside
of the "geo-strategic paradigm" established by the United
States at the beginning of the Cold War. As some analysts
have concluded, "this left a gap in Washington's ability
to assume a credible leadership of the Western world, with
its military power no longer able to guarantee an exclusive
or even decisive influence in important areas of world
13
policy." An early manifestation of this gap was the
inter-allied disagreements during the 1973 October War.
In the aftermath of the oil price revolution of
the early 1970s and the concomitant shift in the world
economy toward a more independent system, many European
nations established trade, finance, and development links to
12





nations in regions like the Middle East: "such areas (Middle
East) are certainly not linked to the geo-strategic concerns
which dominated much Western thinking on regional politics
14
and economic development in the fifties and sixties."
After the 1973 October War, it became quite clear that
any debate between alliance members over Persian Gulf policy
would take place in a highly politicized context. It was
also readily apparent that peripheral security
considerations would not be critical issues shaping NATO
policy. In fact,
. . . a precedent of sorts had emerged for dealing
with regional security problems: individual states
undertaking operations in the periphery could expect
at least some political support from their allies, yet
collective NATO participation in such ventures went far
beyond the expected norms of alliance behavior. 5
Throughout the early 1980' s, the out-of-area debate
16
rose to the top of the NATO agenda. The debate was
generated primarily by the U.S. reaction to the Iranian
Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This
U.S. reaction manifested itself in the form of the Carter
Doctrine (and Reagan Corollary) , the rapid deployment force















The Europeans agreed to address out-of-area issues at the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and defense Planning Committee
(DPC) levels. Several NATO communiques and reports
reflected a clear consensus of American and European
17
willingness to cooperate on out-of-area problems.
Negotiations at the DPC and NAC levels eventually produced a
framework for addressing security arrangements in Southwest
Asia. These arrangements were formalized at the Bonn
Summit in 1982 where the Allies developed a formula for
responding to conflict in the Southwest Asian region, a
formula which has served as the basis for NATO's out-of-area
policy since 1982. The formula is based on consultation,
facilitation, and compensation:
The allies agreed to consult on out-of-area
deployments and the Europeans agreed both to
facilitate the transport of U.S. troops and to
compensate for the diversion of U.S. assets.
NATO's international staff produced a report in 1984
which studied the impact a diversion of U.S. assets to
Southwest Asia would have on NATO's defensive capability.
17
For example, see: North Atlantic Assembly, Political
Committee, "Interim Report of the Sub-Committee on Out of
Area Security Challenges to the Alliance" (Brussels:
November 1984)
, p. 5; North Atlantic Assembly, "Interim
Report — Study of the Implications on NATO of the U.S.
Strategic Concept for South-West Asia" (Brussels: November
1984), p. 7; NATO DPC Final Communique (May 1980),
Paragraphs 5 and 6; NATO NAC Final Communique (December





The report recommended specific compensation measures to
19
be implemented by the European members. However,
despite this apparent cooperation at the political level,
the Europeans up until 1987 had yet to take the necessary
measures to compensate for any potential diversion of
20
U.S. assets to Southwest Asia at the operational level.
Given this background, how then can we understand the
initial American failure to elicit European support for the
reflagging operation? Moreover, how can we explain the
gradual shift of position by the Europeans to one of (tacit)
support for U.S. policy under the auspices of the Western
European Union (WEU) ? In short, why did a political
agreement and its subsequent transformation into an
operational agreement emerge? The answers to these
questions can be found by an analysis of the four hypotheses
19
North Atlantic Assembly, "Study on the Implications
for NATO of the U.S. Strategic Concept for South-West Asia
— Interim Report," (Brussels: November 1984), p. 7.
20
It should be noted that despite this poor
implementation record, significant allied cooperation did in
fact take place as evidenced by the movement away from
previously implaccable positions and in the specific wording
of cooperation contained in the reports and communiques.
Additionally, the compensation and facilitation issues were
placed on the agendas of European and American defense
planning programs. For example see: U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on Armed Services, NATO: An Alliance of Shared
Values — Report of the Delegation to NATO Countries - 1982
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1982), pp. 70-71; and
U.K. House of Commons, Second Report from the Defence
Committee — Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), p. 62.
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explaining alliance cooperation and then applying them to
the case study.
Causal Statements
Prior to refining the four propositions regarding
intra-alliance behavior, a method of measuring cooperation
and discord within the context of NATO should be
established. As previously noted, cooperative behavior
can be measured along three dimensions:
First, allies can engage in joint operations or
offer explicit military assistance to each other. Put
bluntly, they can undertake coordinated actions.
Second, cooperation can take the form of compromise on
policy issues, which is then reflected in official
statements and documents. Third, cooperative behavior
can be measured by economic contributions to collective
defense capability. Allies cooperate when they reach
some mutually acceptable and reasonable agreement about
sharing the defense burden. 2 1
Likewise, to confirm or validate one of these four
hypotheses requires the formulation of a series of causal
statements that explain cooperative or noncooperative
behavior as it pertains to the Gulf case study. With the
help of Kupchan's framework, the following causal







1. Alliance members' common concern about the increasing
threats to western interests in the Gulf led to
increasing cooperation and support of the U.S.
reflagging policy. ( External threat hypothesis)
2. The United States induced cohesion through intra-
alliance negotiating by threatening to impose sanctions
against the West Europeans for their noncooperation
.
The United States was able to make the costs of
noncooperation (potential abandonment) outweigh the
costs of cooperation (potential entrapment) . ( Alliance
security dilemma hypothesis)
3. A cooperative agreement on the reflagging policy
emerged because the United States maintained (or
increased) its ability (and willingness) to provide
the "public good" produced by NATO, and the West
European allies benefited accordingly. If U.S.
provision of the "public good" declined, then decreasing
cooperation would result. ( Collective action
hypothesis)
4. Cooperation on the reflagging policy emerged because
of domestic political pressure. U.S. and European
legislative bodies and the public opted to support the
policy. ( Domestic politics hypothesis)
Explaining Noncooperation
1. The European allies failed to support the reflagging
policy because they did not perceive the external
threat to their interests serious enough to warrant
direct participation. ( External threat hypothesis)
2. The European allies refused to support the policy
because U.S. pressure was not strong enough to force
European assistance. The costs associated with U.S.
retaliation for European unwillingness did not
outweigh the costs of supporting the policy. ( Alliance
security dilemma hypothesis)
3. The European allies failed to assist the United States




4. The European allies failed to assist the United States
because they lacked the domestic political and economic
support at home. ( Domestic politics hypothesis)
Noncooperative Behavior Analysis
Having defined the four applicable hypotheses and
formulated a series of causal statements, it is now possible
to apply this theoretical framework to the case study to
determine why a political agreement and its subsequent
transformation into an operational agreement emerged. The
noncooperative aspects of alliance behavior are examined
first in order to lay the foundation for explaining the
gradual shift in position by the Europeans to one of (tacit)
support for U.S. policy.
The External Threat
To confirm this hypothesis, it is necessary to prove
that the emergence of U.S. -allied cooperation in the Gulf
resulted from a growing common concern over the
vulnerability of Western interests (primarily access to oil)
in the Gulf. As Kupchan points out, to avoid "circularity"
it is important to establish an independent measure of
threat when testing this hypothesis. This can be achieved
by consulting official policy statements and documents
regarding threat assessment and then by examining events and
their impact on a changing strategic environment in the
Gulf. According to Kupchan, the best way to test this
hypothesis is to proceed along two lines of argument.
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First, an assessment should be made of whether the allies
perceived a deteriorating security situation in the Gulf
between the 7 March, 1987, U.S. decision to reflag and the
first indication of European support expressed at the 20
August, 1987, WEU meeting at The Hague. Second, a
determination should be made of whether the allies perceived
the threat as serious enough throughout this period to
warrant cooperation. If proven, then it can be proposed
that this cooperation came about gradually after the U.S.
reflagging decision was made primarily because it took time
for the perception of threat and suggested responses to
22
"coalesce" into a "common" policy.
Between March of 1987 and the June, 1987, summit of the
seven major industrialized nations in Venice, The United
States' attempt to elicit European support fell on deaf
ears. For example, France, in spite of the 13 July attack
on the French container ship Ville d 'Avers , the 17 July
break in diplomatic relations with Iran over the Gorji
23
affair , and the June deployment of French troops in




Wahid Gorji, a suspected Iranian terrorist, had taken
diplomatic refuge inside the Iranian Embassy in Paris. An
"official" driver and translator for the Embassy, Gorji had
been previously apprehended by French authorities for
concealing high explosives inside his suitcase. The ensuing
diplomatic embroglio led to the severing of diplomatic
relations between Iran and France on 17 July.
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Aozou Strip from Libya, continued to cling to its "sovereign"
national position regarding the U.S. ref lagging operation.
The French position was clearly delineated by a terse
statement made by the French ambassador to Kuwait:
"France's stand is not to provide protection for tankers
24
entering the Gulf, whether they are French or non-French."
Similarly, French Defense Minister Andre Giraud, commenting
in an interview with the left-wing daily Liberation ,
carefully avoided any reference to the reflagging operation
and announced that France had decided to "adjust" its naval
presence in the Gulf by sending the corvette George Leygues
to the Gulf to augment its three escorts already on patrol
25
in the region. Noting that France had opted for the
"pragmatic approach" to the problem, the Defense Ministry
went to great lengths to differentiate between "escorting"
and "accompanying" ships: "escorting" was described as a
military defensive position, whereas "accompanying" civilian
ships was portrayed as a "form of assistance that could have
26
a technical or medical aspect." Giraud made it perfectly
24
Fatimah Mansur, "Interview with Ambassador to Kuwait
Marcel Laugel," Al-Anba , 20 July 1987, pp. 5, 22.
25
Jean Guisnel, "Interview with French Defense Minister
Andre Giraud," Liberation , 23 July 1987, p. 5. The French
Navy already had three ships in the Gulf: the supply tanker
La Marne and two escort vessels, the corvettes Victor
Schoelcher and the Protet .
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FBIS-WEU-87-141, 23 July 1987, p. II.
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clear however that the French government had no intention of
remaining passive (if attacked) and noted that it was hoped
the "pragmatic approach" would serve as a "general
deterrent" to potential hostile action against French
27
interests in the Gulf.
As with France, Great Britain continued to cling to its
"sovereign" national position regarding the reflagging
operation. British Defense Secretary George Younger praised
the Royal Navy's low-profile presence in the Gulf as the
correct way to ensure the safety of British tankers.
According to Younger, Britain's Armilla Patrol — a force of
one destroyer and two frigates — was the "correct, non-
provocative, low-profile way of protecting British
28




Britain had maintained the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf
since October of 1980. In the beginning, the patrol was to
remain in the Gulf of Oman and to provide a visible naval
presence to British merchant shipping entering the Gulf.
The mission was to encourage merchant shipping to continue
through the Strait of Hormuz "without giving any suggestion
that military intervention was planned." In November of
1986, the British Secretary of State for Defense announced
that in response to an intensified threat to merchant
shipping, the amount of time spent in Gulf waters would be
"increased as a response to local developments." The three
warships then in the Gulf were the type 22 Frigate
Broadsword , the type 42 destroyer Cardiff and Southampton ,
and the Royal Fleet Auxilliary Tidespring . For further
information on the Armilla Patrol composition and mission
see: "Joint Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of
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from the U.S. ref lagging operation, the British government
painstakingly brushed off Kuwaiti attempts to gain
protection from the Royal Navy by stating emphatically that
reflagging is a commercial matter, and not one for
29
governments. This position touched-off an in-house
political debate highlighted by the Labour Party's taunts of
"rent-a-f lag" and editorial comments calling for the
government to "distinguish between re-flagging and re-
registration" in the interests of political clarity at home
and the safety of the British Forces presently in the
30
Gulf.
West Germany continued to stand behind the
constitutional limitations on the use of its military
outside the confines of the NATO area. As early as May of
1987, both the Defense and Foreign Ministries, citing the
Basic Law, adamantly rejected any use of the Federal Navy in
31
safe-guarding the sea lanes inside the Persian Gulf. In
Transportation in reply to questions put by the Committee"
in U.K. House of Commons, Third Special Report from the
Defence Committee, The Protection of British Merchant
Shipping in the Persian Gulf
,
(London: HMSO, 13 May 1987)
.
29
Jonathan Smith, "Younger on Navy's 'Low-Profile'
Presence in Gulf," London Press Association , 21 July 1987.
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p. 12.
31
"Action of Federal Navy In Gulf Rejected,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine , 29 May 1987, p. 3.
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June, further clarification was provided by Peter Kurt
Wuezbach (CDU) parliamentary state secretary in the Defense
Ministry this time citing the division of tasks within NATO:
We are performing our tasks here very thoroughly
along the intra-German border in the Baltic, in
the North Sea, right up to the North Atlantic.
Other states must act in the Gulf.
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher added
unequivocally that under the provisions of their
constitutional law, West Germany had no intention of sending
naval forces to the Persian Gulf to participate in the
reflagging operations under the pretext of helping to
33
establish stability in the region.
Several smaller European nations (Belgium, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Norway and Italy) moved to protect their own
national (mostly economic) interests by maintaining warm
diplomatic ties to Iran. In Italy, the headlines in the
Rome dailies made it patently clear where the government
stood on the reflagging issue: "Rome refuses even to talk
34
about Italian ships in the Gulf." Foreign Minister Giulio
Andreotti, taking a more diplomatic position, clearly
32
"Government Rejects U.S. Demand on Gulf Presence,"





Vincenzo Nigro, "Rome Refuses Even to Talk About




articulated the Italian government's position: "If there is
a problem with navigation in the Persian Gulf it is better
35
that it be dealt with by the United Nations."
Interestingly, Andreotti cited another reason for not
getting militarily involved in the Gulf — in the aftermath
of the break in diplomatic relations between France and Iran
over the Gorji affair, Italy had agreed to represent Paris*
interests in Teheran. Andreotti added the fact of the
Italian flag flying over the French Embassy in the
Iranian capital as one more reason "for adopting a stance
36
which will keep the doors open for negotiations...."
In summary, there is little evidence to suggest that
the European allies perceived a serious threat to their
interests in the Gulf. France and Great Britain continued
to cling to their "sovereign" national positions. West
Germany continued to stand behind the constitutional
limitations on the use of its military outside the confines
of the NATO area, and several smaller European nations
(Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Italy) moved to
protect their own national interests by maintaining warm
diplomatic ties to Iran. Additionally, the announcement of
the U.N. Resolution 598 on 20 July, 1987 shifted the focus
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deteriorating Gulf situation. These differing national
interests did not provide for a collaborative framework
within which to address the growing Gulf security problem.
In fact, when the first U.S. convoys set sail at the end of
July, they did so without direct allied support. This lack
of allied support has been attributed to the failure of the
United States to consult with the allies during the
formulation of the initial reflagging policy and the simple
fact that less than one percent of Gulf oil shipping had
been disrupted. In short, the Europeans failed to support
the reflagging policy at this point in time because they did
not perceive the external threat to their interests serious
enough to warrant direct participation (causal statement
1 for noncooperation)
.
The Alliance Security Dilemma
To verify this hypothesis, it is necessary to show that
the Europeans cooperated because they were forced to do so
by the United States. In other words, the United States
made the costs associated with noncooperation outweigh the
costs of cooperation resulting in the Europeans moving to
38
find a balance between entrapment and abandonment.
37





When the reflagged tanker Bridqeton struck an Iranian
mine during the first convoy operation in July, a serious
operational flaw in U.S. Naval capabilities was exposed — a
lack of adequate in-theatre mine countermeasures (MCM)
capability. Since the European navies have large numbers of
MCM vessels for their NATO mission of countering the Soviet
mine threat, the United States increased calls for some form
of assistance in the MCM area. These calls for assistance
were linked to the perennial "burden sharing" arguments
within and between the Executive and Legislative
branches of the U.S. government. The only course of action
available to the United States was to attempt, through
"persuasive diplomacy," to push the Europeans into "measures
39
beyond their collective obligations." The means chosen
for this task consisted of a series of informal requests
circulated around the European capitals by then Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger while the respective U.S.
Embassies sought additional assistance through diplomatic
channels. These efforts culminated in a meeting of the NAC
and DPC at NATO headquarters in which Weinberger restated
his request for support. Each of these efforts was met with
"cautious rebuff".
The U.S. response was to play-down the rebuffs and
focus on a bilateral effort to gain support. Upon the
conclusion of a two-day DPC meeting (25-27 May) , Secretary
39
Davis and George, p. 77.
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Weinberger noted that he had discusssed with NATO defense
ministries the "desirability of cooperative efforts" to
ensure free passage in the Gulf, but that the United States
did not make specific requests for assistance (emphasis
40
added) . The following day, Charles Redman, in a State
Department news briefing, apparently confirmed that the
United States had not asked the NATO alliance for assistance
in improving security in the Gulf:
The first point to be made is that we didn't ask
NATO as an organization to take action in the Gulf....
the Persian Gulf is not within NATO's defined
geographic area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the
alliance recognizes that events outside its treaty
area can affect the security interests of its members.
And in that respect, NATO is on record as urging
support for those alliance members which have the
capability of protecting Western interests outside
the treaty area. ^
The spokesman added that the United States is
"consulting bilaterally with individual NATO allies as well
as with other allies around the world concerning possible
courses of action with respect to the present situation in
42
the Gulf." Emphasizing the non-organizational nature of
40
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the U.S. request for assistance, the spokesman concluded his
briefing by pointing out that "as an alliance, we have not
43
asked for anything."
At a press conference following the DPC meeting,
Weinberger was asked what kind of contribution NATO members
(individually) could make to ensure safe passage in the
Gulf. Weinberger's response illustrates the delicate and
sensitive position the United States government found itself
in resulting from the lack of prior allied consultation on
the reflagging:
I think other nations can help in a number of
ways. They can help with additional naval units. They
could help with cooperative work in connection with air
cover. They can assist in providing some of the infra-
structure and some of the basic resources involved —
there are a number of ways. It can be done
individually. It can be done by individual nations,
growing out of bilateral discussions; possibly but not
all that likely, that the alliance as a whole might do
something.
The U.S. bilateral attempt at "persuasive diplomacy"
ran into strong yet diplomatic opposition. The Netherland's
made it quite clear that any MCM ships it might send to the
Gulf would only be available under U.N. auspices. The
government did indicate, however, that it was willing to








decided to grant U.S. requests for MCM assistance.
Editorial comments in Dutch newspaper reflected the
Netherland's cautious yet diplomatic handling of the U.S.
request by characterizing Foreign Minister Van den Broek '
s
conditional promises to the United States as having
"prevented the Netherland's Navy from becoming involved
in the conflict in the Persian Gulf, while, on the other
hand, the United States has no need to feel that it has
46
been left in the lurch."
Italy continued to cling to the primacy of U.N.
resolution 598 as the basis for its policy. Foreign
Minister Andreotti advised patience over the Gulf situation
and pointed out that "the problem is being examined by the
47
United Nations." A reply to Secretary Weinberger's
request for mine-sweepers, (which had been delivered to the
Italian Defense Minister by U.S. Ambassador Rabb) was
formulated at a one hour meeting held at the Chigi Palace
between the president of the council of ministers Goria,
Vice President Amato, Foreign Minister Andreotti and Defense
Minister Zanone. The reply illustrated the growing gravity
45
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of the Persian Gulf situation, mentioned the possibility of
sending Italian minesweepers to the Gulf, stressed Italian
concern for freedom of navigation, and once again called for
coordinated action through the U.N. . According to press
reports, the Italian reply stipulated that "the
participation of Italian minesweepers in the Persian Gulf
operations is not opportune under the present, or possible
future, circumstances. Italy's commitment... is to a




Once again, West Germany continued its objection on
legal (constitutional) grounds:
. . . the Federal Government's position is clear. It
has been defined by the Federal Chancellor. We will
not send warships to the Gulf. Currently, it is being
considered to what degree we can relieve the Americans
by a temporary operation of the Federal Navy within
the Alliance - be it the Atlantic or in the
Mediterranean. That will be discussed by the
Alliance . *
In a specific reference to the U.S. request for
minesweeping assistance, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner
stated that Secretary Weinberger "respects" the fact that
the Federal Republic cannot assist the United States in the
Gulf due to constitutional constraints. He diplomatically
48
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revealed that the U.S. Defense Secretary had "applied no




France continued to refuse support of the U.S. position
having played no role in the formulation of the original
reflagging policy and continued to cling to its "sovereign"
national position. It should be noted, however, that this
independent position manifested itself in the French
Government's decision to place a Fleet Air Arm Force on
alert as tension between Paris and Teheran intensified
in the wake of the severing of diplomatic relations over
the Gorji affair. The Air Arm Force included the
carrier Clemenceau and two guided missile frigates, Le
Suf fren and Le Duquesne . As Defense Minister Giraud
explained:
This is not intended as a threat. The fact is
merely that France, which has an aircraft carrier,
finds itself in a potential situation to use it to
protect its maritime traffic. Nothing more. x
Interestingly, the Defense Minister stressed that
French warships currently in the Gulf were not "escorting"
France's merchant shipping in the Gulf but merely
50
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"accompanying" them. In a specific response to the U.S.
request for minesweepers, Giraud pointed out that he had
informed the United States that France simply would not send
53
minesweepers to the Gulf.
The British also expressed reservations on military
grounds claiming they did not have the assets to provide air
cover for an expansion of Royal Navy MCM assets let alone
the assets of the Gulf Armilla Patrol already on station
inside the Gulf. The request for British assistance was
delivered to British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe by
U.S. Ambassador Charles Price. The Foreign office indicated
that the request would be given "the most serious
54
consideration." The following day, however, Britain
officially rejected the United States' request:
The decision is in line with Mrs. Thatcher's
insistence that Britain must maintain a low-profile
non-provocative presence in the area. But it is also
a serious blow to American hopes of help from European
allies — Holland and .West Germany have also turned
down similar requests.
52
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However, the Foreign Office kept the door to future
assistance slightly ajar by indicating that "we have
explained our position to the Americans and will continue to
remain in close touch with them. If circumstances were to
56
change our attitude to this matter might change."
In summary, the Netherlands made it clear that any MCM
ships it might send to the Gulf would only be available
under U.N. auspices while Italy continued to cling to the
primacy of U.N. Resolution 598 as the basis for its policy.
Likewise, West Germany continued its objection on legal
(Constitutional) grounds and France refused to support
the U.S. position having played no role in the
formulation of the original ref lagging policy. The
British also expressed reservations on military grounds
claiming it did not have the assets to provide air
cover for an expansion of Royal Navy MCM assets let
alone the assets of the Gulf Armilla Patrol already on
station in the Gulf. Even after an early August tour
of the NATO capitals by Deputy Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci, the European allies continued to rebuff
57
U.S. calls for assistance. Simply put, the Europeans
refused to support the ref lagging policy because U.S.
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European cooperation. In other words, the costs
associated with U.S. retaliation did not outweigh the




To verify this hypothesis, it is necessary to
find evidence that allied cooperation resulted from
U.S. willingness to assume the major portion of the
burden associated with the ref lagging mission in the Gulf.
However, it should be noted that there is no universally
accepted formula for determining each alliance members' so-
called "fair share" of the collective defense burden.
National contributions to this defense burden come in many
shapes and sizes all requiring different methods of
analysis. For example, quantifiable measures are normally
broken down into indicators of ability to contribute to the
collective defense effort such as Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) share, population share, and per capita GDP share and
indicators of actual contributions such as defense
expenditures, active defense manpower shares, and naval
59
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non-quantifiable categories of indicators measuring the
ability of a nation to contribute to the collective defense
effort: "this assessment involves highly subjective
judgments because benefits received are not easy to
60
quantify." In other words,
Since one of the major benefits of participating
in a collective defense effort is successful deterrence
of conflict and freedom from foreign domination, some
would argue that the larger a nation's population (or
the larger its GDP) , the more that nation has to lose
if the alliance defense effort is not successful.
By that line of reasoning, many of the indicators
of economic condition and strength would reflect
benefits received. Others would argue, however,
that successful deterrence and freedom frc-m domination
are intangibles best left unquantif ied.
Similarly, the selective use of statistics can distort
the central points of the burden-sharing issue. One recent
study has concluded that:
In the absence of any index for the burden or for
what constitutes a "fair share' distribution, there is
a constant temptation to use handy measures without
careful consideration of their limitations. Caution is
needed in evaluating ad hoc yardsticks and selective
data sometimes used to measure the distribution of the
alliance's fiscal burden. In our view, no one standard
is adequate to convey burden-sharing in the alliance.
Each measure has its limitations and an accurate
picture can only be obtained by examining a variety of
measures . ° 2
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In short, some of the more important factors in measuring
the burden simply do not lend themselves to
63
quantification.
However, as Kupchan points out with respect to the
Persian Gulf, out-of-area considerations have a direct
impact on the provision of two specific "public goods"
within the confines of the alliance: First, deterrence and
64
defense in Europe and second, access to Persian Gulf oil.
Therefore, the dedication of U.S. military assets to the
Gulf mission theoretically increases provision of the second
good (Gulf oil) and decreases provision of the first public
good (security in Europe) . If this hypothesis is
theoretically valid, then tension between the United States
and its European allies would increase as the U.S.
contributions of the first public good declined. In other
words, "a declining contribution decreases cooperation
because smaller powers derive fewer benefits and are less
65
willing to play a politically submissive role."
This line of reasoning certainly explains the initial
noncooperative behavior of the European allies: they failed
63
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to assist the United States because they were "free riding"
(Causal Statement No. 3 for Noncooperation) . On the surface
the collective action proposition appears valid as the
concept of "free riding" could explain the initial European
noncooperative response. The United States, in the initial
formulation of the policy, apparently decided to "go it
alone" in the Gulf. Therefore, the Europeans had little
incentive to respond to U.S. calls for assistance, but
much incentive to encourage the United States through
political support to continue its unilateral effort to
66
provide protection for Gulf shipping. However, in the
aftermath of the Bridgeton incident, and with the formal
request for allied MCM assistance, the United States
indicated it was no longer willing or ready to "go it
alone." In requesting allied assistance, the United States
implied, however slightly, that ships and aircraft normally
available for duty within a NATO context were now needed in
the Persian Gulf.
However, if the Europeans were in fact "free riding,"
then, according to the collective action hypothesis, as the
U.S. contribution to their conventional defense decreased
they in turn should have compensated by a corresponding
increase to the collective good. Prior to the 20 August WEU








allied cooperation were evident, no such increase in the
European share of the collective defense burden took place
neither in terms of compensation for the diversion of U.S.
military assets to the Gulf nor in the facilitation of the
movement of U.S. forces to the Gulf. As demonstrated later
in this study, the shift by the alliance to a cooperative
position can best be explained through a line of reasoning
associated with a series of events which actually support
the security dilemma proposition more than the collective
action proposition.
Domestic Politics
To prove this hypothesis, it is necessary to find
evidence that domestic political pressure caused both the
United States and the European allies to cooperate on the
67
ref lagging issue. Without question, congressional and to
some extent public opinion, forced the Reagan administration
to reassess the policy in terms of allied cooperation. Due
to Europe's greater dependence on Persian Gulf oil, U.S.
public and congressional sentiment strongly favored a more
equitable European share of the defense burden in the Gulf.
Numerous congressional hearings throughout the first half
of 1987 reflected a sometimes intense effort to pressure
the administration into seeking allied assistance for the
reflagging operation. For example, April of 1987
67
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congressional testimony demonstrated an increased effort to
enlist the support of the GCC states, particularly Saudi
68
Arabia, in the protection of Kuwait shipping.
Furthermore, and in the aftermath of the USS Stark tragedy
on 17 May, the Senate passed a resolution on 29 May
requiring a full report from the administration on U.S. Gulf
policy as an amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations
Bill which was necessary for the financing of the U.S.
69
Navy's operations in the Gulf. This in turn led to
intense administration lobbying both at home and overseas to
gain support for the reflagging policy.
The domestic political squabble over the policy reached
new heights in late spring and early summer as renewed
congressional debate over the efficacy of the policy
resulted in legislation calling for a 90-day delay in
70
implementing the ref lagging plan. Congressional
frustration over the lack of sufficient allied support could
68
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Developments in
the Middle East, April 1987
.
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print.
Off., 21 April 1987), p. 34.
69
The response to this legislation came in the form of
a U.S. Department of Defense Report on Security Arrangements
in the Gulf (The Weinberger Report)
.
70
See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Froeign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.
Developments in the Middle East , July 1987 , (Washington:
U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 28 July 1987).
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be clearly seen in a series of pointed supplemental
questions submitted by the House Subcommittee on Europe and
the Middle East to the State Department regarding the
specific contributions of Britain, France, the Netherlands,
71
Italy, Belgium, West Germany and Japan. On the surface
then, there is ample evidence to suggest that congressional
and to some extent public opinion, forced the Reagan
Administration to raise the issue of allied support for the
Gulf operation at the NATO NAC and DPC levels as well as
through State Department diplomatic channels in the
respective European capitals.
This hypothesis, however, holds up less well in terms
of the European position. It should first be noted that
gauging European public opinion, particularly on matters of
71
For detailed information on these questions and
responses see Appendix I of U.S. Congress, House, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle
East, Developments in the Middle East, September 1987 ,
(Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 15 September 1987),
pp. 65-69. It should also be noted that these congressional
events apparently served as the catalyst for reviving the
burden-sharing issue within the alliance. For example, the
U.S. Senate's FY-89 military spending bill contains an
extensive burden-sharing proposal that required a review of
U.S. strategic interests and the appointment of a
presidential envoy to negotiate the issue with the allies.
Likewise, the House Armed Services Committee established a
"Defense Burden-Sharing Panel" (chaired by Representative
Patricia Schroeder) which issued a highly critical report on
the allies' contributions to the common defense. For
further information see: North Atlantic Assembly, Report on
the Subcommittee on Defence Cooperation on Burden- Sharing in
the Alliance
, p. 1; and Report on the Defense Burden- Sharing
Panel of the Committee on Armed Services , U.S. Congress,
House (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., August 1988).
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intra-allied national security, can, at times, be best
categorized as an inexact science. Opinions are not uniform
across nations and in some cases there are deep divisions on
security issues while in other domestic areas the divisions
are less severe. As a recent study concluded:
The implications of this diversity seems
clear. To the extent that NATO governments must
depend on domestic consensus to implement
policies, the pace of harmonization and even the
ability to harmonize will be complicated by the
diversity of opinions within member states.
Further complications will arise because of
differences in the political institutions and
domestic conditions that mediate domestic opinion.
For example, although it is clear that there is a
general consensus against increasing defense
budgets at the cost of social programs, the impact
of this constraint in different countries will
depend on rates of economic growth.
Throughout the first six months of 1987, European
public and parliamentary opinion reflected a cautious and
reserved position regarding the U.S. ref lagging policy.
This general European public concern manifested itself in
fears over escalation of regional conflicts to an East-West
confrontation as well as an appearance of a resurgence of
73
Western colonialism. A more specific concern can be
established by an examination of British and Italian
72
William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg and Catherine
M. Kelleher, "Consensus Lost? Domestic Politics and the
"Crisis" in NATO," World Politics , Vol. 39, No. 3, April
1987, p. 405.
73
Davis and George, p. 338. For a complete list of the
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internal differences of opinion over the reflagging
policy as (relatively) representative of the broader
European concern. British domestic politics reflected a
predictable split down party lines: the Conservatives
praised the low-profile non-provocative policy of the
Thatcher government while the Labour Party warned that
America's reflagging of Kuwaiti ships was a "high risk and
potentially very dangerous policy" that could result in a
74
"shooting war." Amid taunts of "rent-a-f lag, " Labour
frontbenchers called for U.S. -Soviet cooperation for
solving the problem in the Gulf:
. . . There is the general political problem
of being drawn into a shooting war in the
Gulf and the fact that we seem to be
following along behind a very dangerous
American policy. One has to question the
sense of that policy. It would be far better
if the United States and the Soviet Union were
to get together and solve this problem rather
than the United States and Britain trying to
go it alone.
Perhaps the most colorful European domestic political
debate over the U.S. reflagging policy took place within
Italy's five-party coalition government. The debate
enlivened the traditional quiet summer political scene in
the Italian capital: Foreign Minister Andreotti, a Christian
74
Jonathan Smith, "Younger on Navy's 'Low-Profile'
Presence in Gulf," London Press Association , 21 July 1987.
75
Chris Moncrief, "Howe, Younger, Davies Comment on
Gulf Crisis," London: Press Association , 21 July 1987.
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Democrat, joined ranks in early August with what has been
described as "strange bed-fellows" — the Communist Party
and the extreme left wing Demorazia Proletaria — all of
them publically stating their opposition to any form of
76
unilateral Italian naval support in the Gulf. Ironically,
Andreotti suddenly found himself aligned against the other
four parties which made up the governing coalition —
Socialists, Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans — as
well as members of his own party. Those favoring Italian
support of the reflagging policy centered around liberal
Defense Minister Zanone and the rest of his party as well as
the Republicans and the right-wing Italian Social
77
Movement. Prime Minister Goria's claim of a "wide margin
of agreement" among coalition parties "that Italy would
continue to follow the line adopted up till now and favor a
United Nation's settlement of the problem" seemed far from
convincing at the height of the Italian political debate on
78
its Persian Gulf Policy.
76
"Debate Continues on Sending Navy to Gulf," Rome





Ibid . Ironically, at the height of the Italian
debate, a French weekly, L ' Evenement du Jeudi , reported that
several European arms producers, including Italy's Valsella
Company, had provided "millions" of land and sea mines to
Iran between 1981 and 1984. Allegations that the Italian
government had authorized these sales were adamantly denied
by the Foreign Ministry. For more information see:
242

In summary, the domestic politics proposition, by
itself, is insufficient to explain the initial
noncooperative behavior of the Alliance members. While a
case can certainly be made that the allies initially failed
to assist the United States because they lacked the domestic
political and economic support at home, other factors, such
as a divergence of interests and insufficient pressure by
the alliance leader, played a more substantive role in the
noncooperative behavior of the European allies.
Cooperative Behavior Analysis
Given this background on the search for an explanation
for the initial noncooperative behavior of the European
allies, how then can we understand the shift in the European
position to one of support (however tacit) of the U.S.
ref lagging policy? In other words, how did an emerging
consensus of immediate interests evolve into a cooperative
political and operational agreement? Having examined the
aspects of noncooperative behavior, an analysis of the
European shift to cooperative behavior however sovereign in
pretext can now be made through an application of the same
theoretical framework.
"Government Denies Sale of Mines to Iran," FBIS-WEU-87-157
,







A series of events beginning in mid-August of 1987 in
the Persian Gulf altered the external threat perception of
each ally and precipitated a gradual shift in the collective
European position. Added to this altered threat perception
were increased American efforts to secure European support
which were coupled to a shift in U.S. policy emphasis "to
guarantee the integrity of international freedom of
navigation ... as a matter of concern for all of the
79
Western States." The British position shifted after the
Texaco Caribbean tanker was mined in the Fujairah
international anchorage in the Gulf of Oman on 10 August.
The British announced that four additional Hunt-class
80
minesweepers would join the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf.
The announcement came after a ninety minute meeting at
Downing Street on 11 August involving the Prime Minister,
the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister of State
in the Foreign Office. The result of this meeting reflected
a clear consensus over the recent and disturbing discovery
of mines in what had previously been considered a safe area
— the Gulf of Oman — outside the declared war zone. The
Fujairah international anchorage, until now, had been
79
Davis and George, p. 77.
80
Chris Moncrief, "UK to Send Minesweepers, Support
Ship to Gulf," London Press Association , 11 August 1987.
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considered a safe haven for international shipping. As the
Defence Minister pointed out:
News of further mining in the Gulf area over
the past 48 hours shows that a new situation
has arisen there. There is an increased
danger from mines in the Armilla Patrol's
operational area. The government has therefore
decided to equip the Armilla Patrol with a
minesweeping capability to enable it to 81
continue to carry out its tasks effectively.
Noting that Britain was the only nation which had
conducted an extremely successful low-profile operation for
years and had successfully accompanied British ships in and
out of the Gulf, Younger added that the non-provocative
approach to the problem would continue. As a somewhat
cryptic harbinger of things to come, Younger clearly
indicated that the British government was beginning to move
in the direction of a more coordinated allied policy of
cooperation (within a traditionally sovereign context) by
stating: "We hope that nations with suitable assets will
feel able to contribute their assets to help their (emphasis
82
added) ships make use of the high seas."
On 11 August, France expressed a similar concern for
protecting shipping in international waters and announced
that increased measures to protect French shipping would be







anchorage, Defense Minister Giraud officially announced that
two minesweepers would be sent to the Gulf to augment French
naval forces already in the region:
. . . since yesterday evening mines have already
been found in the sea of Oman and consequently
we believe that security of the French ships
that are in that region cannot be well ensured,
completely ensured, unless these two mine-
sweepers are also sent. ^
Specifically, these ships were to augment the
Clemenceau battle group, which had sortied from Toulon in
late July in response to the deteriorating diplomatic
relations between France and Iran. At the time of the
French decision, the Clemenceau was enroute to the Indian
Ocean.
Italy's coalition government had been divided over the
Gulf security issue: the Foreign Ministry hoped to maintain
favorable relations with Iran while the Defense Ministry was
eager to promote Italian prestige as a rising influence in
NATO's southern flank and Middle East politics by offering
assistance in the form of a naval force for the Gulf
operation. The combined effect of the failure of U.N.
Resolution 598 to take hold and the Iranian attack on the
Italian merchant ship Jolly Robino (3 September) resulted in
the Andreotti Government, sending under Parliamentary
83
"Giraud Announces Two Minesweepers Moving to Gulf,"
Paris Domestic Service, FBIS-WEU-87-155
, p. II. The number
of French MCM ships were increased to a total of three by
the Defense Ministry on 14 August.
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pressure, an Italian naval force to the Gulf. Foreign Minister
Andreotti, still isolated within the majority of the cabinet
members who favored sending ships to the Gulf, reluctantly
84
endorsed the governments new policy. According to
Andreotti, Italy's decision to send a naval task force is
"in line with Italy's traditional foreign policy, serves to
protect shipping and is a clear warning to those who do not
85
intend to respect Italy's neutrality." In a pointed
reference to the Jolly Robino , Andreotti said that the
attack demonstrated the "immediate grave risks facing
86
Italian ships and determined the governments reaction."
Still clinging to the rapidly receding policy of U.N.
resolution of the crisis, Andreotti marked out Italy's
political objectives:
Our political policy follows a triple objective:
maintain contacts with the warring parties,
safeguard Western unity and reinforce the
efficiency of the United Rations through the
cohesion of its members.
84
Sandra Bonsanti, "Andreotti Isolated Within Majority:
Stormy Meeting at Chigi Palace," La Repubblica , 5 September
1987, p. 7.
85
"Andreotti Gives Gulf Decision," Rome ANSA, FBIS-WEU-







The West German government, sensing this shift in the
collective European position, agreed to transfer naval
forces to the Mediterranean to compensate for the absences
created by measures taken in the Gulf by France, Britain,
88
Italy, and the United States. However, the Federal
government made it abundantly clear that such assistance was
merely an "example of the Federal Republic's willingness to
89
offer help at short notice if asked by NATO partners.
Following the 20 August meeting of the WEU, both the
Dutch and Belgian governments began to shift their position
to one of tacit support for the growing European
minesweeping contribution to U.S. efforts in the Gulf. The
government of the Netherlands was the first of the Low
Countries to announce that it was prepared "in principle" to
send minesweepers to the Gulf. Foreign Minister Van den
Broeck qualified the announcement, however, by stipulating
90
that such support can only happen in a European context.
Important as this statement was, subsequent public
government statements and press reports focused on the
caution and conditionality contained in the Foreign
88
Davis and George, p. 77-79.
89




"Example," De Volkskrant , 21 August 1987, p. 3.
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Ministers statement. However, by 11 September, the Dutch
government finally reached the decision to send two
minesweepers to the Gulf. Enclosed in a letter to the
Secretary General of NATO from the Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands on the NAC was a note his
government presented to the Dutch Parliament giving the
rational for the decision:
The government's decision is based on the
conviction that the freedom of shipping in the
Gulf must be guaranteed in order to protect
Dutch interests and that any action should be
taken in conjunction with our European partners.
The government takes the view that the West
European countries have their own responsibility
in this respect. Accordingly, the government
attaches great value to the statement issued on
20 August by the member states of the Western
European Union to the effect that the vital
interests of Europe require that the freedom g^
of shipping in the Gulf be assured at all times.
Similarly, and after a three week hiatus in the wake of
the 20 August WEU meeting, Belgium announced on 15 September
that for purely defensive operations and while respecting
strict neutrality in the war, it would send two minesweepers
92
and a command ship to the Gulf. In a barrage of Belgian
91
Letter from J.G.N, de Hoop Scheffer, Ambassador and
Permanent Representative of the Netherlands on the North
Atlantic Council to the Right Honorable the Lord Carrington
Secretary General NATO on the Netherlands decision to send
minehunters to the Gulf, 11 September 1987.
92
In the weeks between the 20 August WEU meeting and
the Belgian decision to send minesweepers to the Gulf, the
Belgian Press, along party lines, speculated on the courses
of action available to the government. The following sample
headlines are representaitve of this speculation: "Under
249

television, radio, and written press interviews, Prime
Minister Martens, Foreign Minister Tindemans , and Defense
Minister de Donnea set about to explain and amplify the
government's decision. In essence, the decision was cast as
a means to protect Belgian rights and guarantee the freedom
of international waters. The announcements revealed that,
for the first time, the Belgians would form a squadron
together with the Dutch and would be afforded protection by
93
the British navy.
In summary, these series of events beginning in mid-
August of 1987 altered the external threat perception of
each ally and precipitated a gradual shift in the European
position. In short, the growing common concern among
alliance members about the increasing threats to Western
interests in the Gulf led to gradually increasing
cooperation and tacit support for the U.S. reflagging
operation (causal statement No. 1 for cooperation). Added
to this altered threat perception, as outlined in the
Study: A Belgian-Dutch Team for Removing the Gulf's Mines"
(independent Le Soir - circ. 220,000); "The Belgian Navy is
Ready for any Task" (conservative catholic La Libre Belgique
- circ. 90,000); "Belgians to Gulf? — Problems Mainly of
Financial and Logistic Nature" (conservative catholic Gazet
van Antwerpen (circ. 184,000); "Belgium Does not Want to
Plunge Itself Overhastily into Gulf" (socialist De Moraen -
circ. 43,000); "Belgium Examines 'Work Offer' to Remove
Mines of Persian Gulf" (liberal catholic De Standaard -
circ. 359,000) .
93
For a full text of the Belgian governments
declaration see: De Standaard , 15 September 1987, p. 2.
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following section, were increased American efforts to secure
European support which were coupled to a shift in U.S.
policy emphasis "to guarantee the integrity of international
freedom of navigation . . . as a matter of concern for all
94
of the Western states."
The Alliance Security Dilemma
To prove this hypothesis it is necessary to find
evidence that the allies ultimately cooperated because the
United States was able to make the costs of noncooperation
(potential abandonment) outweigh the costs of cooperation
(potential entrapment). Interestingly, elements of this
hypothesis begin to creep into the collective European
decision-making process in the form of a consultative forum
created by the WEU. On 20 August, Alfred Cahen, then
serving as Secretary General of the WEU, convened a group of
senior officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Defense of the member states of the WEU to consider the
consequences of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the
Gulf. Cahen acted in accordance with Article VIII,
Paragraph (3) of the modified Brussels Treaty and the
decision made in Rome in October of 1984 to hold
consultations in the event crises in other regions of the
94




world had an impact on European security. This was the
first time such a meeting on out-of-area security had taken
place under the post-war European security framework. As
the Secretary-General pointed out, "it is indeed the first
time European countries are acting together — under the
aegis of a European organization to which they belong -- on
problems which do not touch upon the immediate area of
defence but whose evolution may threaten their security in
96
the broadest sense."
The question remains, however, as to why the Europeans
chose to seek not only a consensus on cooperation at this
specific point in time, but also why they chose the
95
Western European Union, Thirty-Third Ordinary
Session, Communications From the Chairman- in-Of f ice of the
Council Concerning the Meetings of Senior Officials From the
Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence of WEU Member
States on the Situation in the Gulf Held in the Hague on
20th August and 15th September 1987 , Document No. 1109,
(Paris: WEU Assembly, December 1987), p. 33. See also:
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and
Collective Self-Defense signed at Brussels on March 17,
1948, as amended by the "Protocol Modifying and Completing
the Brussels Treaty" of October 23, 1954 (entered into force
May 6, 1955). Article VIII, paragraph (3) reads in
entirety:
3. At the request of any of the High Contracting
Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in
order to permit them to consult with regard to any
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to
economic stability.
96
Western Eruopean Union, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary
Session, Organization of European Security , Report, Document
No. 1138, (Paris: WEU Assembly, 9 May 1988), p. 7.
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framework of the WEU? There appear to be several reasons:
First, it became quite evident that any NATO action as such
in an area not covered by the provisions of the Atlantic
Treaty would be simply out of the question. As Davis and
George quite accurately point out:
Any attempt to provide a joint policy among
politically and geographically diverse members,
in a context unrelated to the binding anti-
Soviet anxiety, would be doomed to failure. An
alternative was to use the framework of the
Western European Union (WEU) for joint
consultations . . . Although largely eclipsed by
the emergence of the EEC and by the consolidation
of NATO itself, it would prove useful as a
consultative forum for its members: France, the
United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and the
Benelux States, leaving the integrity of the
Alliance intact.
Second, any European involvement in American action outside
the traditional confines of the NATO area inevitably causes
tension in the alliance — the U.S. bombing raid on Tripoli
in 1986 remains the most recent (and classic) example. The
third reason relates to the course of action the United
States and its European allies might take: Although in
agreement with the United States to defend freedom of
navigation in the Gulf it remains somewhat doubtful that




Davis and George, p. 78.
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Western European Union, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary
Session, Cooperation Between Europe and the United States
and Canada in Security Matters , Report, Document No. 1137,
(Paris: WEU Assembly, 9 May 1988), p. 22.
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The alliance security dilemma must also be analyzed
from the European perspective to understand the gradually
unfolding shift toward cooperation. The United States and
Europe, quite frankly, have the same interests in the Middle
East. A recent WEU report lists six mutual political
objectives all of which remain in the general interest of
the allies: first, to ensure freedom of navigation in the
Gulf; second, to prevent the development of local
imperialism; third, to counter international terrorism;
fourth, to ensure world oil supplies; fifth, to avoid wild
fluctuations in oil prices; and sixth, to work to restore
99
peace between Iran and Iraq.
While several European countries have specific
interests in the region, the dilemma occurs because not all
members necessarily share the United States' view on how to
take effective action. Therefore, it is not "possible for
them to adhere systematically and continually to the view
that there is just one Western interest and that the United
100
States alone is responsible for safeguarding it."
Timing and the impact of events play a significant role
in the formulation of policy and strategy. The
deteriorating situation in the Gulf in August of 1987







European consultations as well as an exchange of views
between alliance members. Assessing the problem though the
European filter reveals that these consultations were
required in order "to avoid unilateral measures being taken
that might disturb the mutual confidence needed for the
101
smooth running of the alliance in Europe itself." Hence,
the Europeans moved to find that delicate balance between
entrapment and abandonment. And therein lies the rub: for
the Europeans, there seemed little reason to bring the
United States (a world power) into opposition with Europe (a
regional power) over the increasingly divisive issue of Gulf
102
policy. Furthermore, it was clearly in the interest of
the European alliance members to seek "not necessarily new
institutions, but a dialogue with the United States on all
103
these questions within adequate frameworks."
The United States has long held uncertain expectations
regarding the public expression of European views on
security matters. The December 1987 unanimous WEU approval
of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement changed









helped the Reagan Administration to convince Congress that
the INF accords would not estrange Europe from the United
104
States thereby ensuring Congressional approval. The
Dutch government, in perhaps the best expression of this
subtle move to find a balance between abandonment and
entrapment, adopted a cooperative role on U.S. Gulf policy
based on the credibility of the alliance from Washington's
perspective
:
The prospect of increased conventional force
goals in the post-INF era brought with it the need
to establish favorable American participation in
the new division of labor. A demonstration that the
Europeans had a "reasonable" attitude to the broader
problems of "Western" security was felt as desirable.
This was compounded by financial difficulties in
Washington as the Administration needed to accommodate
the costs of the U.S. Naval operation in the Gulf
against the Congressional determination to reduce
federal expenditures on the Navy's operating budget
for the following financial year. 05
This Congressional pressure to secure assistance from the
NATO allies to offset these financial problems was best
expressed in a memorandum from then Secretary of the Navy
James Webb to Caspar Weinberger expressing the need for
nations benefiting from the U.S. ref lagging operations
to "start living up to their responsibilities, so we
104
Western European Union, Thirty-Fifth Ordinary
Session, Future of European Security , Report, Document No
1185, (Paris: WEU Assembly, 3 May 1989), p. 7.
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can downsize our presence."
In summary, the alliance security dilemma hypothesis,
standing alone, is insufficient to explain the gradual shift
to European cooperative behavior. However, elements of this
proposition are clearly evident in the collective decision-
making process which led to the formal WEU agreement. In
short, while the effect of a change in threat perception
played the predominate role in producing cooperative
behavior (external threat hypothesis), the United States, to
a lesser degree, was able, through stepped-up coercive
diplomacy, to make the threat of noncooperation (potential
abandonment) outweigh the costs of cooperation (potential
entrapment) (causal statement No. 2 for cooperation).
Collective Action
There is little evidence to support the collective
action hypothesis that cooperative behavior emerged because
the United States increased its ability (and willingness) to
provide the "public good" produced by NATO and that the
Europeans benefited accordingly. In fact, the overall U.S.
contribution to the public good was in a state of decline as
evidenced by the defense budget entering its fourth year of
steady reductions at the height of the Persian Gulf.
Additionally, the fact that the United States spends 6.7% of
106
For more information see: Defense News, Vol. 2, No
37, 14 September 1987.
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its GNP on defense while the European allies allocate an
average of 3.7% (and many have not fulfilled their 1984
undertaking to increase military expenditures by 3% per
annum) can at times "bring grist to the mill of those who
advocate reducing American expenditures on the defense of
107
Europe." Most theorists of international relations would
agree that a democratic country's ability to participate in
a policy of collective defense, let alone fighting a war,
depends, to a large extent, on the nature of its social
consensus. A sharp rise in economic constraints or a severe
lack of resources is liable to endanger that consensus.
Furthermore, development of tensions in the Persian
Gulf led the United States not only to consider sending
naval forces to the region, but also to consider the
possibility of deploying ground forces in the event of an
108
Iranian or Soviet thrust into the vital oil fields. The
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in mid-1988
carried with it the possibility of greater Soviet freedom of
action with respect to the Middle East. Faced with scarce
resources, the United States increased its emphasis on the
strategy of "discriminate deterrence" (with the concomitant
emphasis on the criticality and security of the Persian Gulf
107
Western European Union, Thirty-Fourth Ordinary
Session, Document No. 1137, p. 73.
108




region) to effectively meet its global commitments. This
renewed emphasis on discriminate deterrence raised the
perennial European fear regarding the permanency of American
forces stationed in Europe — a part of which in time of
crisis could be sent (on short notice) to the Persian Gulf
thereby "weakening the Western system in Europe just when
there was a threat to peace and necessitating the
110
redeployment of European contingents in NATO."
This renewed emphasis on discriminate deterrence,
declining defense expenditures, and the revival of
Congressional burden-sharing rhetoric can hardly be
interpreted as contributing to the "public good" of the
alliance. Theoretically, if the Europeans were in fact free
riding, then we would expect to see them compensate (in some
manner) for the decreasing U.S. contribution to European
111
conventional defense. Based on the available evidence,
no such rise in European defense spending occurred. It
might even be argued, that the European allies entered into
a tacit agreement to support the U.S. ref lagging policy
precisely because the U.S. contribution was perceived as
declining. In other words, the collective European
109
Discriminate Deterrence : Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy (Washington: U.S. Gov't.
Print. Off., 1988), pp. 13-22.
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objective was not to free ride on the alliance leader, but
rather to secure the trans-atlantic political link. In
summary, there remains little evidence to support the
collective action proposition that cooperative behavior
emerged because the alliance leader increased its
willingness and ability to provide the "public good"
produced by the alliance and that the Europeans benefited
accordingly.
Domestic Politics
To prove this hypothesis it is necessary to show that
cooperation on the reflagging policy emerged because of
domestic political pressure. In other words, European and
U.S. legislative bodies and their respective publics opted
to support the Reagan administration's policy. As with the
collective action hypothesis, there is little evidence to
support the proposition that cooperative behavior between
the United States and the European allies emerged due to
domestic political pressure from either side of the
Atlantic. American public opinion reflected little
support for a unilateral overseas venture while European
public opinion consistently "sought to preserve the
112
uniquely European credentials of the operation."
112
Davis and George, p. 79.
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According to public opinion polls, the American people
remained sharply divided over the Administration's
reflagging proposal with approval (47 percent) barely-
outweighing disapproval (40 percept) (see Table 14). As
expected, there was a clear political dimension to the
public's assessment of the reflagging proposal with
Republicans favoring the plan by a 2-to-l ratio and
Democrats opposing it by a 5-to-3 margin.
As mentioned above, there is, however, ample evidence
to suggest that Congressional and to some extent public
opinion, forced the Reagan administration to raise the issue
of allied support at the NATO NAC and DPC levels as well as
through State Department diplomatic channels in the
respective European capitals. Without question, U.S. public
and Congressional sentiment strongly favored a more
equitable European share of the defense burden in the Gulf
primarily due to Europe's greater dependence on Persian Gulf
oil. However, this Congressional and public pressure was
applied after the decision to reflag (on a unilateral
basis) had been made and was more in response to a perceived
lack of allied support in the initial stage of the operation
rather than in response to the original reflagging decision.
Once again, European parliamentary and public opinion
split down traditional party lines but more importantly
reflected the uniquely European aspects of the operation and



























































































































U) Ul U3 OJ O H.
























































































































o > C-. C-l
o C C c
rt TO M 3
O C ^ ft
a* 00







Ul j> c- .> 3



















































i-« i-h TJ ?o
O M i-t H
C *< O
TO < ?:
3" rt ft c
3* c





ft i-t ft H
I-t H- >
» n jo Z
H- 03 ft ;*

































































of the British, Dutch, and Belgian connection helps place
the uniquely European credentials of the cooperative effort
in perspective: for example, the Belgian parliamentary
hearings held on 17 September in the wake of the government's
decision to dispatch minesweepers revealed a division of the
opposition parties along regional and linguistic lines with
the strongest negative reaction coming from the Flemish
Socialist Party and the Flemish Nationalist Volksunie Party.
Spokesmen for the majority parties all stressed that sending
minesweepers to the Gulf was an opportunity to demonstrate
not only Belgian willingness to defend vital European
interests in the Gulf, but also an opportunity to take an
all important first step toward a new and uniquely European
defense policy — a clear reference to the role played by
the WEU in forging a cooperative agreement as well as an
equally clear attempt to politically distance the collective
113
European decision from U.S. policy.
Likewise, securing parliamentary approval in the
Netherlands hinged on providing protection for Dutch
minesweepers about to operate in a potentially hostile air
environment and in placating the public's desire to preserve
the European nature of the coordinated effort. On 11
September, a meeting took place in London at which the
coordination of British, Dutch and Belgian MCM duties were
113




formalized. As Davis and George correctly point out:
It [the meeting] proved vital to the securing
of Parliamentary approval in the Netherlands.
Not only did the Dutch MCM vessels require
guaranteed protection from the Royal Navy in
potentially hostile air environment, but public
opinion also sought to preserve the uniquely
"European" credentials of the operation.
Invoking the need to protect the integrity of
international shipping was more important than
explicitly talking of attempts to deflect
broader U.S. criticisms of NATO's overall
utility. 114
These public concerns, rather than any long-range commitment
to a revamping of European out-of-area military
responsibilities, provided the basis for a coalition of
Christian Democrats and Liberals to defeat the opposition
Labor Party thereby securing parliamentary approval on 11
September to send naval forces to the Gulf. This political
rationale also helped avoid Iranian accusations that the
"Europeans were simply obeying the call of their senior
115
ally."
In summary, there is little evidence to support the
domestic politics proposition that the European governments
supported the U.S. ref lagging policy because their
respective publics pressured them to do so. In fact, the
available evidence suggests that European domestic factors
favored sending naval forces to the Gulf not as an explicit
114





demonstration of support for the American policy, but rather
as a means of protecting individual national and to some
extent collective European interests.
Summary of Findings
The noncooperative behavior exhibited by the NATO
allies in the period between March and August of 1987 can
best be explained through an application of the
noncooperative aspects of the external threat and alliance
security dilemma hypotheses. The Europeans failed to
support the reflagging policy at this stage because they did
not perceive the external threat to their interests serious
enough to warrant direct participation. The absence of a
patent military threat to European interests — like the
enduring bond created by the military might of the Warsaw
Pact in Central Europe — precluded the creation of a
116
similar bond in the coordination of Persian Gulf policy.
Only in certain benign circumstances — like the Red Sea
mine-clearance operation in 1984 — could out-of-area
cooperation between the allies take place.
Furthermore, the nature of European interests in the
Gulf region precluded the establishment of a cooperative
military framework within which the Gulf security problem
could be addressed: for example, up until July of 1987, Iran
116
Ibid
. , p. 75
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had been France's largest supplier of oil and France was
Iraq '
s
principle trading partner and supplier of advanced
military equipment. The complexity of France's position was
further compounded by the so-called "Affaire Luchaire" in
which it was revealed that France had sold substantial
quantities of 155mm ammunition to Iran in exchange for
117
French hostages in Lebanon Given the complexity of these
interests, it does not take a lot of political
sophistication to understand why France was reluctant to
align itself with the policies of "outside powers" as the
Persian Gulf crisis unfolded in late spring and early summer
of 1987. As will be demonstrated later in this study, it
was not until the balance of French interests shifted away
from Iran in the wake of the Gorji affair that France




Likewise, the mission of Britain's Armilla Patrol had
been to "accompany British merchant vessels into the Gulf as
a measure of reassurance to U.K. maritime and insurance
119
interests." The U.K. naval commanders on the scene had,









regular Iranian Navy (as opposed to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Navy) who in turn permitted British
merchant ships to pass unscathed. Therefore,
In order to continue existing relations with the
littoral states unchanged, the Royal Navy vessels
avoided permanent basing arrangements in the
area, and were rotated on and off station from
home ports in the United Kingdom. Although this
would require nine ships — 18% of the Royal
Navy's surface combatant strength -- the policy
was seen in London as satisfactory. 12 ^
Finally, the allies failed to support the U.S.
ref lagging policy because, again at this juncture, U.S.
pressure in the form of "coercive diplomacy" was not yet
strong enough to force European compliance. The costs
associated with potential U.S. retaliation for European
unwillingness simply did not outweigh the costs of outwardly
supporting the policy. In short, the coercive means chosen
by the United States — informal State and Defense
Department requests — were of insufficient strength to make
the costs of noncooperation (potential abandonment) outweigh
the costs of cooperation (potential entrapment)
.
Conversely, the preceding analysis on cooperative
behavior clearly delineates elements of the external threat
and alliance security dilemma hypotheses merging to
120
Ibid . As Davis and George point out, Iran, due to
its almost total reliance on the Strait of Hormuz for its
oil exports, was actually undercutting international spot
market prices to attract customers to the war zone and
offering discount insurance rates to offset the effect of
Iraqi air attacks on its facilities.
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effect a shift in the sovereign yet collective European
position. While each European ally expressed independent
and sovereign reasons for contributing forces to the Gulf
operation, the combined effect of this shift in position
produced political cooperation resulting in operational
cooperation inside the Gulf.
As outlined above, a series of events beginning in mid-
August of 1987 in the Persian Gulf altered the external
threat perception of each ally and precipitated a gradual
shift in the collective European position. The British
position shifted after the Texaco Caribbean tanker was
mined in the Gulf of Oman. The following day, France
expressed a similar concern for protecting shipping in
international waters and announced that increased measures
to protect French shipping would be implemented. Similarly,
the combined effect of the failure of U.S. Resolution 598 to
take hold and the Iranian attack on the Italian merchant
ship Jolly Robino resulted in the Italian government, under
parliamentary pressure, to send an Italian naval force to
the Gulf. The West German government, sensing this shift in
position, agreed to transfer naval forces to the
Mediterranean to compensate for the absences created by
measures taken in the Gulf by its NATO allies.
The emerging consensus of immediate interests
manifested itself in a consultative forum created by the
WEU. While European naval support in the Gulf remained
268

essentially national in nature, they were conducted on the
basis of WEU political consultations. The growing common
concern among alliance members about the increasing threats
to Western interests led to gradually increasing cooperation
and tacit support for the U.S. ref lagging operation.
Finally, added to this altered threat perception were
increased American efforts to secure European support based
on a shift in U.S. policy emphasis to protecting freedom of
navigation as a matter of concern for all nations.
In the final analysis, the political and operational
agreement reached by the Alliance members was the direct
result of altered threat perceptions coupled with the
concomitant application of coercive pressure by the Alliance
leader. While the use of a single case study can neither
validate nor invalidate the applicability of these four
hypotheses to other Alliance issues, several general
conclusions regarding the cooperative and noncooperative
aspects of alliance behavior can be made: first, political
cooperation can be best explained by a combination of
balance-of-power (external threat) and systemic (alliance
security dilemma) models while economic cooperation is
121
"determined by second image or domestic considerations."
As George Liska points out (using economic terminology)
,






liabilities." Therefore, cooperative behavior exists
when alliance members are able to maintain a "favorable
123
balance of gains to liabilities for their members." In
other words:
Alignment becomes a rational policy when an
external force threatens the nation with greater
liabilities than those entailed by collaboration.
The primary collective benefit which an alliance
can provide its members is through the aggregation
of group resources in defense against the common
enemy. Thus, alliance members are more likely to
engage in collaborative behavior and exhibit
consensus with their allies on basic issues during
time of external threat than during periods of
relative detente.
Second, this analysis shows that strong leadership and
consultation are critical factors in producing alliance
cohesion. The alliance security dilemma hypothesis
"suggests that strong U.S. leadership enhances America's
ability to have credible threats of abandonment and
therefore increases the likelihood of cooperative
125
outcomes." Similarly, a lack of strong leadership or a
decline in the U.S. military contribution to the Alliance




^01e Holsti, et al., Unity and Disintegration in
International Alliances
,






of abandonment and increasing interdependence among the less
126
dominate members.
There remains little question that the NATO allies will
continue to share common interests and objectives in regions
of the world outside the traditional confines of the
Alliance. The recent events in the Persian Gulf have
indicated an increased willingness of the European allies to
take action outside the NATO area. However, as this
analysis clearly demonstrates, any future out-of-area
efforts will more than likely remain within a framework not
127
identified with the Alliance.
As mentioned previously, the implications for U.S.
policy of inserting forces and then debating the strategy
remain clear: the political failure to obtain even a token
commitment of assistance from U.S. allies prior to the
public endorsement of Kuwait's ref lagging request
illustrates another case in which the failure to think
through policy manifested itself. By framing the initial
protection of shipping plan in unilateral terms and then
pursuing diplomatic efforts to enlarge the commitment into a
multilateral operation by securing allied assistance the
United States forced a showdown with its allies over who had




Davis and George, p. 81.
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oil supplies. For the Europeans, the disruption of less
than 1% of the oil flow simply did not justify the dispatch
of scarce resources to the Gulf. It was not until several
European nations perceived the threat to their interests as
substantial that assistance was finally provided and the





Critical analysis is not just an evaluation of the
means actually employed, but of all possible
means -- which first have to be formulated,
that is, invented. One can, after all, not
condemn a method without being able to suggest
a better alternative.
von Clausewitz, On War , 1831
Regional Strategies : Problems and Perceptions
"Foreign policy," wrote Walter Lippmann in 1943,
"consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable
surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and
the nation's power." If the balance between ends and means
remains prudent, then the foreign policy will gain public
support and stand a good chance of success. However, if
commitments exceed the nation's power, then "insolvency"
results which foments deep domestic political divisions
thereby lessening the chance for achieving that often
elusive foreign policy "victory." This is precisely the
problem the United States faced in attempting to formulate
and conduct its Persian Gulf reflagging policy and strategy.
The ability effectively to manage the foreign policy and
strategy formulation process -- to see relationships between
ends and means, objectives and capabilities, aspirations and
interests, and short-term and long-term priorities -- will
1
von Clausewitz, p. 161
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remain the critical task facing the United States in any
future formulation and conduct of a Persian Gulf policy.
Moreover, if the tensions created by the Cold War continue
to recede in the months and years ahead, then this ability
effectively to manage the foreign policy and strategy
formulation process will become even more critical to the
protection of the nation's vital interests.
Why then, in the macro sense, has the United States
found it so difficult to articulate and then implement a
well-balanced and sound policy for the Gulf region? The
answer, guite frankly, lies in America's globalist
orientation: the extension of American power into the Gulf
(and all peripheral regions for that matter) is based upon a
perception of global U.S. -Soviet competition. In the most
recent manifestation of this phenomenon, Caspar Weinberger,
in his recently published memoir, Fighting For Peace
,
clearly illustrates this point with respect to the
reflagging operation by tersely pointing out that it was
"not in our interest for Soviet forces to move into an area
that was so vital to us . . . they would gain a tremendous
2
strategic advantage that I did not want them to have."
According to the former Secretary of Defense, the threat to
U.S. interests posed by the Soviets escorting Kuwaiti
2
Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace : Seven
Critical Years in the Pentagon
,






tankers was a major point in his calculus. Simply put,
containment has been the primordial and galvanizing concept
shaping not only U.S. global security policies but regional
3
security policies as well.
The United States, for obvious reasons, has based its
global national security policy, doctrine, force structure,
and contingency planning on the concept of containment.
However, as one analyst correctly points out, the
applicability of containment to the periphery assumes two
preconditions
:
First, the United States must be confronting either
Soviet forces or Soviet ideology. Second, the threat
to U.S. interests must take the form of a deterrable
event -- one that can be avoided by the threat to use
or the use of military force.
3
As Charles Kupchan demonstrates, shifts in U.S.
security policy toward the Middle East in general and the
Gulf region in particular have a direct relationship to the
perceived requirements of containment:
In the 1940' s and 1950* s, the Truman and Eisenhower
Doctrines were responses to the ideological challenges
posed by the Soviets. In the late 1960's and 1970 's,
the United States engaged in an arms sales race with
the Soviet Union to preserve the military superiority
of pro-Western states and to counter the Soviet
search for regional surrogates. Since 1979, brought
about by a shift in U.S. perceptions of the direct
Soviet threat to Southwest Asia, the central focus of
U.S. policy has been to deter a Soviet move into the
Gulf.
For additional information see, Charles A. Kupchan, The
Persian Gulf and the West : The Dilemmas of Security (Boston





As the United States has often (and painfully) found out,
many situations and events in the periphery simply do not
meet these two preconditions. For example, there are many
threats to U.S. economic, political and strategic interests
in the Gulf region which simply are not related to Soviet
ideology or even Soviet military power. Likewise, the
threat of U.S. intervention can not deter the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism or Arab nationalism nor can it
[intervention] prevent a coup or civil rebellion in the
5
region. This position, of course, does not discount the
need to confront the Soviet military or political threat to
the moderate Arab Gulf states. It merely points out the
need to reexamine the means by which to counter such a
threat. As Charles Kupchan quite clearly points out:
Reliance on containment has narrowed the scope
of America's vision; regional considerations have
been subsumed within concern about the Kremlin's
intentions. This has led to the formulation of a
security policy that rests on unreliable, if not
unsound, political foundations."
This global bias contained within U.S. regional
security policies has been shaped by both cognitive and
bureaucratic factors inherent to the American foreign policy
decision-making process. Cognitive factors, such as paying
selective attention to the external environment, distorting
5





incoming information, and failure to consider all available
options, played a significant role in arriving at the
7
decision to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers. As the majority of
decision making studies have shown:
Rather than seeking initiatives crafted for the crisis
at hand, decision-makers minimize uncertainty by
altering their perceptions of the crisis until it
appears to be more manageable within the context of a
fixed repertoire of options and beliefs."
These cognitive tendencies, as Robert Jervis contends, cause
decision-makers "to fit incoming information into pre-
existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be
there," as well as ignoring "information that does not fit,
twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not
9







Ibid . For a detailed analysis of these cognitive
processes, the reader is referred to the following seminal
studies: John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of
Decision : New Dimensions of Political Analysis , (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974), especially Chapter Four
on "Cognitive Processes"; Irving Janis and Leon Mann,




(New York: Free Press, 1977) ,
especially Part Two on "Hot Cognitive Processes"; Richard
Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War : The Nature of
International Crises
, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), especially Chapter Five on "Cognitive Closure
and Crisis Politics"; Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics , especially Chapter
Four on "Cognitive Consistency and the Interaction Between
Theory and Data"; For an indepth review of the pertinent
literature on the decision-making process, see: Pfaltzgraff
and Dougherty, Contending Theories of International
Relations
, Chapter Eleven on "Decision-Making Theories."
9
Jervis




By viewing the "spill-over" effect of the Iran-Iraq war
and its impact on Kuwaiti shipping in East-West terms, U.S.
decision-makers fit the reflagging contingency into a
national security apparatus designed to meet the challenge
of the more familiar and definable Soviet threat. In other
words, the prospect of U.S. -Soviet confrontation in the Gulf
was a more "definable and familiar threat, one that fit
neatly into the policy repertoire that has emerged to
10
implement containment."
Organizational structures and bureaucratic factors also
played a role in framing the reflagging policy in East-West
terms. In Fighting For Peace Weinberger, quite candidly,
laid out the interagency battle over reflagging as "DOD and
11
NSC for; State against." Moreover, he stated somewhat
10
Kupchan, p. 222. In the reflagging case, the primacy
of containment -- preventing the Soviet Union from filling
the proverbial "vacuum" in the Gulf -- and U.S. perceptions
regarding regional security led decision-makers to view the
crisis within an East-West framework. The spill-over from
the Iran-Iraq war and the possibility of Soviet support for
Kuwait produced fear and frustration within the political-
military decision-making arena in Washington, D.C. This in
turn led to cognitive failures that caused decision-makers
to pay selective attention to incoming information from the
Gulf and to zero in on the perennial Soviet threat. Kupchan
notes that this same process of cognitive bias explains why
decision-makers, during the 1979 Iran crisis "initially
perceived accurately the gravity of developments in Iran on
their own terms, but then began to concentrate on the
potential for Soviet manipulation or penetration well before





tersely that George Shultz "did not share my enthusiasm for
12
this mission." As Kupchan notes:
Generalists, who are concerned primarily with broader
East-West issues, dominate the NSC and the top echelon
of decision-making. The State Department, on the other
hand, contains many career regional experts concerned
mainly with studying and interpreting local dynamics
in the Middle East.
Similarly, the military has traditionally resisted the
formation of regionally deployable strike forces as they
[the strike forces] have a tendency to divert scarce
resources from the primary mission of deterring and if
necessary fighting the Soviets on a global basis. Again,
Weinberger, in his memoirs, provides tangible evidence for
this phenomenon:
Initially, the Navy was far from enthusiastic about
this operation, fearing that it would divert a large
number of its forces from existing, long-term
commitments; that it would be expensive, taking funds
from projects the Navy cherished: and that it might
result in some loss of life and ships.
The U.S. Navy's resistance to the Persian Gulf
operation also stemmed from both strategic and tactical
(ROE) considerations. From the strategic perspective,
former Secretary of the Navy James Webb, in an interview
with The Journal of Defense and Diplomacy
,
questioned the












American penchant for the "surgical" use of the military as
a means to achieve those goals. Invoking the lessons from
Vietnam, Webb, while in office, was gravely concerned over
the way in which the military force structure was growing
event by event in the Persian Gulf:
You're going to do a security patrol. You put a
helicopter squadron in. Then you're going to do
a security patrol to protect the helicopter.
Then the security patrol hits. Then you're going to
bring in an artillery unit to protect the security
patrol. Then the artillery battery gets hit. Then
you're going to put in fixed air. Etcetera, etcetera.
Pretty soon you've got this tremendous support
structure that has grown because of tactical events
without clear articulation of what you're doing.
Webb points out that while the United States did extremely
well militarily in Vietnam -- "If you don't believe it, go
to Hanoi and try to find someone my age" -- we failed to
work under an umbrella of clearly stated goals. Moreover,
Webb, in reference to the Persian Gulf operation, raises the
vital question of how U.S. military force should be used in
a non-declared war environment. His own response is
characteristically blunt:
My personal view is you should be very careful about
when you use military force. But when you use military
force you should use it in a massive way. 16
Ironically, while in office, Webb accused Weinberger of
violating his own prerequisites for combat (see Table 9).
15
"Interview with the former Secretary of the Navy
James H. Webb," The Journal of Defense and Diplomacy , Vol





Weinberger's response that we are "not now engaged in
'combat' r " provides clear evidence of the continuing
dysfunction within the crisis decision-making process over
17
the appropriate use of force. This seemingly bizarre
political debate over the precise definition of "combat"
reflects the legalistic approach American policymakers
traditionally take in attempting to resolve thorny
international political and diplomatic problems -- an
approach that often leaves the implementers of the policy in
various stages of disbelief. While low-intensity conflict
may indeed be at the low end of the spectrum of violence,
quibbling over what is or is not "combat" seems almost
surrealistic to the U.S. helicopter pilot taking hits in his
18




This legalistic approach to the role force plays in
achieving political objectives took an even more bizarre
twist when the question of awarding personal decorations and
campaign medals to U.S. personnel serving in the Gulf came
up. When asked by a U.S. Navy sailor if such awards would
be forthcoming, Weinberger responded that he thought they
would
:
But then I was stopped by the thought that bestowing
decorations might give some credence to the
Congressional voices arguing that this was a combat
zone. I was hardly eager to give ammunition to those
who wished to invoke the war powers resolution.
Ironically, both hazardous duty pay ("combat pay") and
decorations were ultimately authorized for those servicemen
and women serving in the Gulf. For more information see:





The U.S. Navy's resistance to the operation was also
apparent at the tactical level. Some naval commanders
flatly stated that "the rules of engagement were not to our
19
liking ..." Interestingly, in an insightful assessment
of Iran's decision to mine the Gulf in 1987, former
Commander of the U.S. Middle East Force, Rear Admiral Harold
Bernsen, concluded that Iran looked at the U.S. involvement
in Beirut and indecision in Washington and decided it "had
50-50 chance that the United States would leave as a
result ... By mining the Iranian's decided they would be
willing to be hit by carrier air . . . the carrier was no
20
longer a 100% deterrent." The Navy's veiled objection to
the policy of "measured" or "proportional" response at the
tactical level to the Iranian minelaying was fairly candid
and straightforward: the then Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Air Warfare, Vice Admiral Robert Dunn,
commented that "we [the Navy] don't believe in measured
response either . . . But we're responsive to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who's responsible to a
21
civilian government." In a further clarification of this
19
Vice Admiral John H. Fetterman, "Situation Report:
COMNAVAIRPAC, " Wings of Gold , Summer 1990.
20
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point, Vice Admiral Richard Dunleavy, then serving as
Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet, when asked why
the Navy does not believe in proportional response stated
tersely:
You lose. The longer answer is that we've had a sad
experience with [it] . . . certainly including Vietnam,
where the response was proportional to a fault, and the
fault ended up being losing the war. We don't want to
do that again. .
As with the Iran crisis eight years earlier, these
differing organizational perspectives complicated the
formulation of a balanced and coherent reflagging policy.
As the tanker war in the Gulf intensified and the dynamics
of the Iran-Iraq war began to shift in favor of Iran (all in
the spring and summer of 1987), so the domestic political
pressure for some form of U.S. response -- ranging from do
nothing to intervene — increased within the electorate.
This in turn led to a shift in the decision-making process
that favored generalist inputs from Defense and NSC rather
than accepting the advice of the regional experts in the
State Department. As Kupchan concludes based on U.S.
experiences with previous Middle Eastern crises, "it is
precisely during these periods of crisis that stress-induced
cognitive biases favoring focus on the Soviet threat would






rift with regional experts." Given Sadaam Hussein's
recent sabre-rattling boasts to destroy half of Israel with
ballistic missiles armed with chemical warheads,
his re-harboring of the Middle East's most notorious and
cut-throat terrorists, and his stunning 2 August, 1990
invasion of Kuwait, one can not help but ponder over the
regional expert's warnings regarding the long-term
ramifications of the 1987-88 U.S. decision to "tilt" toward
Iraq in its confrontation with Iran. In what will probably
remain a classic, however twisted and ruthless,
demonstration of coercive diplomacy, Hussein -- now labelled
the "crude enforcer" by the Western press -- sent a clear
and unambiguous signal to the world community of his
intention to solve the "Kuwaiti problem": "Iraqis will not
forget the saying that cutting necks is better than cutting
means of living ... God Almighty, be witness that we
have warned them!" Within days of this warning, Iraqi --
rather than Soviet or even Iranian -- tanks rolled into
Kuwait City making the perennial fear of Soviet or Iranian
domination of the world's richest oil producing region seem
like a cruel postscript to the American-Kuwaiti reflagging
operation.
In the aftermath of Iraq 's blitzkrieg invasion of oil-





has introduced us to the new realities of the Near East."
Realities which question whether or not the Carter Doctrine
and Reagan corollary remain applicable to the region.
Ironically, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf has
shifted decisively in favor of Iraq. Incredibly, since the
so-called moderate Arab Gulf states have chosen not to
adequately rearm, the long-term rearming of Iran -- the only
regional power with the requisite demographics and resources
-- may be the only viable way to reintroduce equilibrium
into the region. The political ramifications of restoring
the balance of power in this manner are, of course, mind-
boggling .
The failure to think through policy also manifested
itself in the way in which the United States framed the
initial protection of shipping plan in unilateral terms and
then pursued diplomatic efforts to enlarge the commitment
into a collective operation by pursuing allied assistance.
The oscillation between unilateral and collective approaches
to Gulf security is nothing new within the Atlantic
alliance. As former British Prime Minister Edward Heath
remarked on the occasion of the 1979-1980 Gulf crisis:
We [NATO] have to ensure that when we make a
strategic decision which is announced, like the
fact that the Gulf is a vital interest of the
Alliance, we have also got the resources to carry
285

through the necessary defence of the area if it is
to be required.
Given the inherent political and economic limitations within
the Alliance framework, it is not difficult to grasp the
fact that the European government's simply disagreed with
the United States regarding the gravity of the threat in the
Gulf and how best to confront it. In short, the political
implications of joint naval operations in the Gulf were not
properly factored into the formative stages of the U.S.
reflagging policy.
The gradual shift of the European position to that of
tacit support for the reflagging operation was a clear
manifestation of the perennial West European concern about
the danger of an American drift toward some form of
isolationism or even into a Western hemisphere form of
continentalism thereby leaving the Europeans to fend for
themselves. The revival of the WEU as first a consultative
forum on the out-of-area issue and then as a sort of
operational coordinating agency, served as the means by
which the West Europeans could respond to increasing U.S.




. , p. 195; for a detailed discussion of allied
cooperative efforts in Southwest Asia in the wake of the
1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly from the
British perspective, see: U.K. House of Commons,
Afghanistan : The Soviet Invasion and its Conseguences for
British Policy , Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs
Committee, 1980 (London: HMSO, 1980).
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Clearly, both the United States and its West European
allies shared common interests in providing for the security
of the Persian Gulf. Similarly, both were well aware of the
need for a cooperative approach to solving the dilemmas of
Persian Gulf security. Where each side diverged on the
issue, however, was in the realm of the means by which to
address Gulf security. The analogy to the previous
confrontation within the Alliance over the RDF is striking:
The problem was that each had a differing conception
of the benefits to be derived from a collective stance.
The United States wanted the autonomy of unilateral
action, but also sought the legitimacy and military
convenience (compensation, strategic access) associated
with alliance-wide cooperation. The Europeans desired
the global influence and added capability of a
collective stance, yet, within the context of an
alliance dominated by the United States, were unwilling
to sacrifice the political legitimacy and sovereignty
associated with a unilateral (or a European)
approach. 25
As the United States painfully found, the pursuit of shared
interests in the Persian Gulf between alliance members
became subsumed within the European context of individual
national interests. As previous plans to address Gulf
security within the Alliance framework have demonstrated, it
is precisely this tension between the "expectations of
cooperation and the reality of political limitations" that









The debate over the use of U.S. forces to protect U.S.
interests in the Persian Gulf is now legion. A veritable
cottage industry has sprung up providing masses of
literature on the structure, balance, capabilities and
limitations to the military force required in seeking
political ends in the Gulf region. While the debate over
U.S. world-wide operational commitments has been raging
since the end of World War II, it has recently been
refocused due to a change in the strategic context of the
debate
:
The world has become increasingly complex, and
there has been both a real and a relative decline
in U.S. capabilities to deal with those complexities.
Furthermore, there has been a dramatic increase in
Soviet ability to project power beyond Europe and a
growing ability by a number of Third World states to
use military and political power to challenge the
United States. This has reduced U.S. influence and
increased the need for flexibility and subtlety in
response.
According to some strategists, a cursory inspection of
U.S. involvement in the region can allow one to conclude
26
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that the formulation of U.S. policy has been mainly reactive
"in that events have driven the development of policy rather
than a systematic effort to develop policy in relation to
28
interests." Citing a policy that has fluctuated between
neglect and overreaction, they contend that policy for the
Gulf region has been the result of the Soviets failure to
withdraw from Iran at the end of the Second World War,
followed by the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, the fall of the
shah, and the latest "rude awakening," the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. Additionally,
adherence to the often-heard premise that U.S. interests
exceed capabilities when combined with the formulation of a
priority-based defense strategy, may preclude a major
29
unilateral military presence in the Persian Gulf.
Perhaps the most salient example of this force-strategy
mismatch can be seen in General Sir John Hackett's essay on
the military requirements for protecting Persian Gulf oil
supplies. In his essay, Hackett attempts to quantify the
requirements for protecting these supplies by defining the








In choosing an area of operations it would first
be necessary very clearly to specify the
requirement. This can be identified in four
degrees
:
- to supply U.S. needs alone;
- to supply U.S. needs plus those of Japan;
- to supply U.S. needs plus those of NATO
allies
;
- to supply U.S. needs plus those of NATO
allies and Japan.
Such operations could only be said to have succeeded if
they satisfied five requirements:
- to seize the vital oil installations virtually
intact
- to secure them for weeks, months and even years;
- to restore wrecked resources rapidly;
- to operate installations with little or no
co-operation from the owners;
- to guarantee the safe passage of petroleum
products from the area and supplies to it.30
Hackett also develops a test case for defense of the "Saudi
core area" by U.S. armed forces and points out that the
limitations imposed by distance, limited resources, lack of
local facilities, refueling and overflight rights, no
guarantee of access to the region, and the harshness of the
physical environment all combine to impose significant
obstacles to the development of a sound security policy let
alone the employment of military force. He concludes by
30
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noting, "it would be idle to pretend that there are not
31
truly formidable difficulties to be faced here."
What options then are available to U.S. policymakers in
sorting out this force-strategy mismatch? A comparison of
several of the proposed alternative strategies may be
helpful in placing the problem in its proper context. These
options include a return to the status quo, sharing the
defense burden with those countries with the heaviest
dependence on oil, or going it alone through a unilateral
military build-up.
Those in favor of a return to the status quo argue that
the main strategic interests of the United States do not lie
in the Persian Gulf but rather in Central Europe. They
point to the tremendous cost in sustaining naval forces
far from even forward bases, the small percentage of U.S.
oil originating in the Gulf, and the Soviet reluctance to
get bogged-down in another Afghanistan as "good reasons for
32
keeping U.S. involvement on the margin." Likewise,
proponents of this approach argue that our strong ties to
Israel are non-negotiable regardless of the problems this
relationship poses for the United States in obtaining
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any credible capability of Iran or Iraq to effectively block
the Strait of Hormuz to the free flow of oil. Critics
maintain that such a policy creates a situation of
continually reacting to crises, playing catch-up, deploying
large and costly force levels and then standing those forces




Sharing the defense burden in the Gulf with both our
NATO allies and regional friends would be an "excellent way
to show both friend and foe the degree of Western resolve in
34
maintaining an open Gulf." An allied contingency force,
similar to the NATO ACE Mobile Force (AMF) developed to
respond to crises on NATO's flanks, would tap its strength
from those NATO nations with the heaviest Persian Gulf
35
energy dependence. Membership in this force would include
Italian, French, British, German, and U.S. forces all with
appropriate air, naval, and ground components. To ensure
alliance solidarity, NATO would institutionalize a










security issues. While the combined forces of the GCC
states could not provide for their own defense against Iran
or Iraq, continued U.S. security assistance and joint U.S.-
GCC operations would also enhance regional security.
Likewise, some strategists call for NATO to assume more
of the burden in Europe and the Mediterranean and for Japan
to increase the size of its regional defense thereby freeing
37
the United States to increase its presence in the Gulf.
However, despite the unprecedented show of allied solidarity
in the recent mine sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf,
experts tend to agree that the Europeans were eager to
depict those operations only as a defense of free navigation
by countries outside the Iran-Iraq War. Both France and
Britain continue to proclaim they were acting individually
38
and not as a part of a U.S. sponsored joint force.
A unilateral military build-up in the Gulf region by
the United States would certainly provide a greater
deterrent to aggression and promote regional stability.
Some analysts have called for moving CENTCOM to Turkey and
formalizing U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean by
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Prior to the current crisis, the political inability to
station ground forces in the region would have required
a permanent build-up in naval forces in the Indian Ocean
which would not have drawn-down assets from the Pacific or
Atlantic fleets. These forces for use "under a scheme of
unilateral U.S. action, must be on-station, readily
available as a quick deterrent to conflict or, failing that,
39
to halt the deterioration of the military situation,"
Opponents argue there are simply not enough ships in the
fleet to support such a strategy. These opponents contend
that without a reduction in commitments elsewhere or a huge
increase in operating tempo of existing forces, there is
simply no way a unilateral military build-up can reach the
size required to effectively protect U.S. interests in the
region.
However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has forced the
moderate Gulf states to reassess the political feasibility
of stationing Western ground forces in the region. If, in
the aftermath of the current crisis, the political realites
on the ground remain favorable toward some form of continued
Western presence, then a substantial portion of the present
force structure should remain in theatre long enough for an
Arab regional security system to be put in place in order to






A recent study, compiled by William J. Olson, concluded
that one of the major problems that U.S. policy has had to
contend with in recent years is how to respond to a wide
variety of demands with diminishing resources:
The habit has been to try to continue to cover
all the bases, to torture the force structure
into all the contortions necessary to meet
every challenge or potential threat that fertile
imaginations can conceive.
While the myriad of strategy permutations continues to
expand, one irrefutable yet unsettling fact in the quest to
secure U.S. global interests remains clear: U.S. interests
now and arguably for the foreseeable future exceed U.S.
41
capabilities. Therefore, what U.S. Persian Gulf policy
needs is strategic definition based on a set of world-wide
defense priorities: a set of priorities that recognizes the
military and political realities which preclude a major
42
military defense effort in the Gulf. The 1980 decision
that in effect placed the Persian Gulf under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella failed adequately to address the question
of whether or not the United States, lacking sufficient
conventional forces, would resort to the use of nuclear









emphasis in the Persian Gulf should be on dealing with local
threats and challenges and at least a tacit recognition that
Third World problems are rapidly becoming a serious threat
to U.S. global interests. Once this recognition is
incorporated into the strategic thought-process, then the
concommitant shift away from seeing all regional




This can then be followed by the evolution of a policy
and strategy that would allow for a "more sophisticated
effort to deal bilaterally with area states on the basis of
common interests and problems, and to downplay our own
necessary but unshared [with the Third World] preoccupation
44
with the Soviets." The recent Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy recognized this current state
of affairs by noting that while conflicts in the Third World
are less threatening than a potential global war with the
Soviet Union, they can undermine the ability of the United
45
States to defend its most vital interests.
In the Persian Gulf this bilateral effort can best be
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that can respond to the most likely area of conflict —
conventional conflicts by regimes seeking regional
dominance. Without removing the tripwire (and thereby
avoiding the "Acheson Syndrome"), U.S. forces should be
organized to deal not only with threats to oil field and
pipeline security, coups, limited local conflicts, hostage
situations, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorist
operations but also conventional conflicts by regimes
46
seeking regional domination. The former would require a
mix of small, quick reaction forces composed of marine,
naval and air elements designed for "advisory missions that




The latter would require heavy forces capable of
sustaining combat ashore alone for a minimum of sixty days
or as long as it would take to augment the local security
system with a major joint (or allied) operation composed of
additional heavy forces. Recognizing that regional security
cannot be externally imposed or successfully concluded
without dedicated local support, efforts should be stepped
up to encourage the GCC states to increase their own





. , p. 216
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which, when requested, would be augmented by the
restructured U.S. forces in the region.
When one widens the focus of analysis from regional to
global issues, it becomes readily apparent that the above
mentioned problems in U.S. Persian Gulf policy contain
unsettling implications for overall U.S. national policy.
As the preceding paragraphs have outlined, a restructuring
of U.S. forces will have to take place in order to
effectively deal with the Persian Gulf problem. However,
before this restructuring takes place, several significant
yet fundamental changes in U.S. national policy will have to
occur. First, the extreme oscillations between Wilsonian
idealism and Bismarkian realpolitik ingrained in the
traditional formulation of U.S. national policy must, once
and for all, be reconciled. These oscillations have
produced a huge gap between policy and strategy and even
deeper divisions between forces and available resources.
Narrowing the gap in this force-strategy mismatch to an
acceptable level of risk in relation to our vital national
interests will require a recognition by policymakers that,
for the foreseeable future, the sum total of the United
State's global interests and commitments far exceed the
nation's capability to defend them all simultaneously.
And if, in the so-called post-Cold War era, the United
States continues to eliminate forces, then a concomitant
shift in policy to terminate commitments must also be made.
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Consequently, this geopolitical fact of life cries out
for the need to place priorities in line with capabilities
as well as the need to muster the political will and resolve
to defend these reordered interests with an appropriate and
potent force structure. This strategic redefinition must
include an assessment of which national interests are so
vital that we must be ready to resort to war if they are
threatened; and which interests are no longer vital and
their defense can be undertaken by others. Any effort to
redefine U.S. vital interests — those for which we are
willing to resort to war — will more than likely reveal
interests that remain essentially what they were when George
Kennan first defined them in 1947 as the vital (but
vulnerable) industrial centers of North America, Western
Europe, and Japan. Since the main threat to the United
States today comes from the strategic rocket forces of the
Soviet Union, and in the next century from the ballistic
missile forces of the Third World — nuclear and/or chemical
— then ballistic missile defense must be our highest
priority followed by the air, naval and ground forces
necessary to defend those reordered interests. It remains
incumbent upon policymakers to redefine these interests
prior to the outbreak of the next crisis or we will continue





Secondly, once these choices are made, then the
economic and strategic importance of the Persian Gulf must
be placed into perspective: Persian Gulf oil is not
something for which the United States should be prepared to
resort to war. Since the most formidable array of military
hardware ever assembled in history remains entrenched in the
Central European theatre, the Middle East in general and the
Persian Gulf in particular are not the places to defend the
West in the event of a global war. In the event of a global
crisis, the concept of sequential operations for dealing
with the Soviets in corresponding regional crises would be a
48
more prudent strategy to adopt. Without a clear and well-
defined Soviet military threat to the Gulf region, the
United States should not place excessive reliance on the use
of force to influence events in the region but rely instead
on political, economic, and military assistance programs to
49
accomplish that task. However, in the presence of a clear
and well-defined regional threat to the Gulf posed by local
regimes seeking regional hegemony, the United States must be
prepared to react quickly, decisively, and in cooperation
with a restructured regional security system to contain, and
if necessary, roll back the threat.
48





Thirdly, any attempt to reformulate a policy for
Southwest Asia must include strategies for improving and
strengthening the United States' strategic position in the
region. To accomplish this task the gap between American
globalism and regionalism must be narrowed. The military
strategy must be based on the political realities on the
ground in the Gulf region. This will require a recognition
on the part of U.S. policymakers that the regional problem
is a cognitive and perceptual one "deeply rooted in
America's approach to regional security in the postwar
50
era." A policy which is more sensitive to local political
considerations and to events that simply cannot be deterred
by U.S. military power as well as a policy less focused on
containment may be more effective in the long term. Perhaps
the simple yet insightful policy advice offered by one
regional expert on how to deal effectively with radical
political change in Southwest Asia provides the best
approach to dealing with the continually shifting political
and military dynamics seemingly inherent to the Gulf region:
"Accommodating revolutionary states or simply doing nothing ,
rather than isolating or threatening them, may well be a
51









Fourthly, steps should be taken to ameliorate and if
possible circumvent the deep rooted perceptual differences
between U.S. and West European approaches to the out-of-area
security issue. The consultative forum established by the
reactivation of the WEU remains a superb place to address
regional security concerns in a much less politically
charged environment. For the same reason, intra-alliance
discussions on out-of-area problems should be removed from
the NAC and DPC levels of NATO and placed under a separate
council. Such a move would allow policy and strategy
recommendations to be formulated and forwarded to the NAC
and DPC levels without the unattractive side attraction of
52
divisive (and often times public) political debate.
Likewise, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic
must recognize the fact that it will remain too politically
sensitive to implement regional security strategies within
the formal Alliance framework. Therefore, Alliance members
should be encouraged to cooperate on regional security
matters on a multilateral basis. In more conceptual terms,
multilateralism offers a sort of middle ground between
unilateralism and collectivism: "It provides the autonomy
and sovereignty associated with a unilateral approach
53
without sacrificing the benefits of cooperation."
52






Fifthly, threats to U.S. interests and strategies
designed to protect those interests must be clearly defined
and then explained to the American people. As mentioned at
the outset of this study, anyone who would take the first
step in a conflict without having considered the last step
should, as Clausewitz admonished, not be allowed into the
Councils of War. This responsibility clearly rests with the
Commander-in-Chief. President Reagan's assertion in May of
1987 that "I don't see the danger of war" clearly
demonstrates one of the central problems facing American
administrations in crisis situations: An unwillingness to
give the American people the all-too-of ten grim facts.
"Every time the President explains too little, warns too
54
little, and is too optimistic, he gets in trouble." Once
the President explains the threat, points out the dangers,
and systematically educates the American people as to the
available courses of action then, and only then, will the
public support necessary for successful employment of
military force be forthcoming.
Finally, perhaps the key to solving the force-strategy
mismatch dilemma with its corresponding spill-over into the
Persian Gulf, lies in an all out cooperative effort to
eradicate the seemingly inherent contradiction that exists
54
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between military and civilian thinking on when to use force
and how much force is appropriate. This "dysfunction" has
plagued the national security decision-making process for
decades and has been the cause of problems that run the
gamut from mere irritants to grave national security crises.
While war may indeed be too important to be left to the
generals (and admirals), the obverse of this dictum bears
investigation. As a recent study clearly points out, just
as military leaders have a responsibility to be in tune with
political, economic, and social issues, our civilian
leadership must also be aware of the intricacies of military
operations and, perhaps more importantly the limits of force
55
in seeking political objectives. Since the primacy of
policy in the use of force must remain absolute, then
civilian leaders must, as Clausewitz clearly points out, be
acutely aware that "policy knows the instrument it means to
use" and that "a certain grasp of military affairs is vital
56
for those in charge of general policy."
While this inherent contradiction by its very nature
will probably continue to plague the policy, strategy, and
decision-making process, it remains critically incumbent
upon both civilian and military leaders to forge an alliance
of understanding to ensure the link between military means
55
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and political objectives remains prudent, reasonable, and
well-thought-out. General Matthew B. Ridgeway's eloquent
expression that "the soldier is the statesman's junior




U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION 207 RELATING TO A RESOLUTION
OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE
May 6, 1987
Mr. McCONNELL (for himself, Mr. DELL, Mr. LUGAR , and Mr
BOSCHWITZ) submitted the following resolution which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
RESOLUTION
Relating to a resolution of the conflict
between Iran and Iraq
Whereas, the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war
threatens the security and stability of all states in
the Persian Gulf;
Whereas, stability in the Gulf and the flow of oil is
critical to world trade and the economic health of the West;
Whereas, the conflict between Iran and Iraq threatens
U.S. strategic and political interests in the region;
Whereas, the conflict threatens international
commercial shipping interests and activities;
Whereas, the Iran-Iraq war has continued seven years
with more than 1,000,000 casualties;
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It is resolved by the Senate That the Senate,
(1) Supports an immediate cease-fire; and
(2) Supports the total, unconditional withdrawal of
of both Iran and Iraq to internationally recognized
boundaries; and
(3) Endorses the peaceful resolution of this conflict
under the auspices of the United Nations or other
international organization or party; and
(4) Encourages all governments to refrain from
providing military assistance to either party refusing to
participate in negotiations leading to a peaceful resolution
of the war; and
(5) Urges strict observance of international
humanitarian law by both sides and recommends a U.S.
contribution to the U.S. International Committee for the Red
Cross Special Appeal for Prisoners of War; and
(6) Recognizes that stability and security in the
Persian Gulf will only be achieved if Iran and Iraq are at
peace and agree not to interfere in the affairs of other




U.S. CONGRESS JOINT RESOLUTION 295 TO CALL FOR THE
REMOVAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
FROM THE PERSIAN GULF
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 28, 1987
Mr. GONZALEZ introduced the following joint resolution;
which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
JOINT RESOLUTION
To call for the removal of the United States Armed Forces
from the Persian Gulf
Whereas Iraq and Iran have been in a state of war for
more than six years and have attacked more than 300 tankers,
freighters and other vessels of foreign nations in the
Persian Gulf during that period of hostilities;
Whereas, United States naval vessels equipped for
combat have been introduced into the Persian Gulf;
Whereas on May 17, 1987 the United States frigate USS
Stark was attacked in the Persian Gulf by an Iraqi warplane,
resulting in the death of 37 U.S. crewmen;
Whereas the United States has promised to protect ships
of friendly and nonbelligerent nations in the Persian Gulf;
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Whereas the United States has agreed to sail Kuwaiti
oil tankers in the Persian Gulf under the American flag;
"and I might say by way of parenthesis that Kuwait is an
ally of Iraq," and
Whereas Iranian officials have stated that Iran will
continue to attack shipping in the Persian Gulf, whether or
not such ships and under the United States flag; Now
therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled , That
the Congress hereby determines that the requirements of
sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution have
become operative. Hence, the President of the United States
is hereby directed to remove United States Armed Forces from
the Persian Gulf within sixty days after the enactment of





U.S. CONGRESS HOUSE RESOLUTION 194 URGING THE PRESIDENT TO
SEEK A MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING NON-BELLIGERENT
SHIPPING IN THE PERSIAN GULF
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 11, 1987
Mr. DOWNEY of New York (for himself, Mr. STUDDS , and Mr.
LEACH of Iowa) submitted the following resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
RESOLUTION
Urging the President to seek a meeting of the United Nations
Security Council for the purpose of protecting
nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf.
Resolved , That (a) the House of Representatives urges
the President to seek --
(1) a meeting of the United Nations Security Council
for the purpose of establishing a United Nations
peacekeeping naval force for the purpose of protecting
nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf, and
(2) an immediate end to the Iran-Iraq war.
310

(b) The House of Representatives also urges the members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and all
members of the United Nations Security Council to
support the establishment of such a naval force as
an effective instrument in bringing greater





UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 598
of 20 July 1987
The Security Council
,
Reaffirming its resolution 582 (1986),
Deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a cease-
fire, the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human
life and material destruction.
Deploring the initiation and continuation of the
conflict
,
Deploring also the bombing of purely civilian
population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian
aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law
and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the
use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the
1925 Geneva Protocol,
Deeply concerned that further escalation and widening
of the conflict may take place,
Determined to bring to an end all military actions
between Iran and Iraq,
Convinced that a comprehensive, just, honourable and
durable settlement should be achieved between Iran and Iraq.
Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, and in particular the obligation of all Member
States to settle their international disputes by peaceful
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means in such a manner that international peace and security
and justice are not endangered,
Determining that there exists a breach of the peace as
regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq,
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter,
1. Demands that, as a first step towards a negotiated
settlement, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq observe an
immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on
land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the
internationally recognized boundaries without delay;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a team
of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise
the cease-fire and withdrawal and further requests the
Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in
consultation with the Parties and to submit a report thereon
to the Security Council;
3. Urges that prisoners-of -war be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention
of 12 August 1949;
4. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to co-operate with the
Secretary-General in implementing this resolution and in
mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and
honourable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all
outstanding issues, in accordance with the principles
contained in the Charter of the United Nations;
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5. Calls upon all other States to exercise the utmost
restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to
further escalation and widening of the conflict, and thus to
facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to explore, in
consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting
an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the
conflict and to report to the Council as soon as possible;
7. Recognizes the magnitude of the damage inflicted
during the conflict and the need for reconstruction efforts,
with appropriate international assistance, once the conflict
is ended and, in this regard, requests the Secretary-General
to assign a team of experts to study the question of
reconstruction and to report to the Council;
8. Further requests the Secretary-General to examine,
in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other States of
the region, measures to enhance the security and stability
of the region;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council
informed on the implementation of this resolution;
10. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider
further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution.





NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 139
ON
THE PERSIAN GULF
(Presented by the Political Committee)
The Assembly,
Deploring continuing attacks on innocent shipping and loss
of life in the Persian Gulf;
Convinced that the interests of neither Iraq nor Iran, the
other Gulf States, or the international community at large,
are served by prolongation of this dangerous and destructive
conflict
;
Concerned about the potential for further escalation of
violence
Stressing the vital security interests of all nations in
assuring the uninterrupted flow of oil;
Firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the high
seas and the right of innocent passage;
Welcoming the efforts of the United Nations and others to
achieve a peaceful resolution of the war, including the
efforts of United Nations Secretary-General Xavier Perez de
Cuellar
;
Acknowledging the national efforts of Belgium, Britain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States in
deploying naval units to protect shipping and their
political efforts to exert a stabilizing influence;
315

Noting the consultations between member states of the
Western European Union regarding security in the Gulf, and
the variety of approaches taken by member states toward the
question of foreign naval deployments in the Gulf;
Urges member governments and parliaments of the North
Atlantic Alliance:
1. to support a continuation of the role of the United
Nations in seeking a peaceful resolution of the
conflict
;
2. to exert all efforts to press for an immediate ceasefire
and early termination of the war;
3. to stand ready to apply enforcement actions; including
an embargo on all arms exports, in furtherance of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an
immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, withdrawal of all
Iraqi and Iranian forces to internationally recognized
boundaries without delay, and the establishment of a
framework for peace, and
4. to assist in the self-defence and security efforts of
Gulf nations.





NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION 3 7
ON
NATO AND PUBLIC OPINION
(Presented by the Civilian Affairs Committee)
The Assembly,
Recalling its Recommendations 83 of 1984, 85 of 1985 and 86
of 1986;
Appreciating the progress made in arms control and
disarmament negotiations, particularly the recent agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the
double-zero option, together with the release of a few
prisoners of conscience by the USSR and certain of its
allies, and hoping that this is the harbinger of substantial
advances
;
Noting that public opinion in member countries of the
Alliance considers the likelihood of a world conflict to be
receding, and that the image of a Soviet expansionist policy
is tending to fade, in particular as, result of the
effective public relations campaign mounted by its new
leaders
;
Desiring that this favourable development should not bring
about a decline of interest in and support for defence




Concerned by the effect on public opinion of the measures
and counter-measures taken by the governments and
parliaments in order to improve their respective positions
in international economic competition, and emphasizing that
the effects of "outbidding" in this area can only be
injurious to Atlantic solidarity in all its forms,
particularly where reflected in new restrictive and
protectionist legislation; and recalling the crucial role of
parliaments in this respect;
Convinced that the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power
station was instrumental in accelerating the misgivings
harboured by Western public opinion concerning the strategy
of flexible response;
Aware that the state and trends of public opinion in the
sixteen Alliance countries regarding the issues of
international security and national defence are not known
with sufficient precision;
Acknowledging that the major responsibility for information
on such matters lies with the elected governments of the
member countries; but
Emphasizing the importance of a technical public information
organ at the common disposal of the sixteen member countries
of the Atlantic Alliance;
URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
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1. to launch a programme of public information on the policy
and strategic options of the Atlantic Alliance, in
particular for the voters of all the political parties;
2. to emphasize to public opinion in their respective
countries, the contribution to peace, to the
effectiveness of national defence and to the moderation
of military expenditure, of the international solidarity
through the Atlantic Alliance;
URGES the parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
1. to authorize special budget appropriations for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation to commission an opinion
survey to discover the state and trends of public opinion
concerning defence and international security in the
sixteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
2. to set up a parliamentary consultative structure,
utilising the experience of the North Atlantic Assembly,
to contribute to the prevention, or at least the
resolution, of misunderstandings in the transatlantic
relationship;
RECOMMENDS that the North Atlantic Council:
1. appreciably increase -- within the NATO civil budget --
funds allocated for information activities, whether the
civil budget as a whole is increased or not;
2. commission an opinion survey to take stock of the state
and trends of public opinion regarding international
security and national defence in the sixteen member
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countries of the Atlantic Alliance, both generally
and among significant subgroups such as women, young
people, ethnic minorities, etc., the questionnaires for
which could be prepared jointly by the international
secretariats of NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly;
URGES the national delegations to the North Atlantic
Assembly to request their national parliaments to authorize
the budget appropriations necessary to conduct such a poll.






Letter dated 31st August 1987 from Mr. H. van den Broek,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
to Mr. Charles Goerens , President of the Assembly of Western
European Union on the situation in the Gulf.
The Hague, 31st August 1987
Dear President,
In view of the interest often expressed by the Assembly
in the implications that crises occurring in other regions
may have for Europe and bearing in mind our discussion in
The Hague on 7th July 1987, I wish to inform you personally
as follows.
On 20th August, the presidency convened a group of
senior officials from the ministries for foreign affairs and
defence of the member states of WEU to consider the
situation in the Gulf. The presidency acted in accordance
with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the
decision taken in Rome in October 1984 to hold consultations
whenever necessary on the implications for Europe of crises
in other regions of the world. To my knowledge, this is the
first time such a meeting has been held. We agreed to




For your information and that of the Assembly, I
enclose the guidelines for the press agreed upon at the
close of the meeting on 20th August.
Yours sincerely,
signed: Hans van den Broek
Press guidelines for the presidency
1. At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs
Western European Union, high officials from the ministries
for foreign affairs and defence of the member states met in
The Hague on 20th August 1987 to consider the different
aspects of the situation in the Gulf area in the context of
the current efforts of the United Nations to bring an end to
the Iraq-Iran conflict. This meeting was held pursuant to
Article VIII of the WEU treaty and, more recently, to the
decision taken by ministers in Rome in October 1984 to
consider whenever appropriate the implications for Europe of
crises in other regions of the world.
2. We had a thorough and useful exchange that contributed
to a harmonisation of views. It was agreed to continue this
process of concertation
.
3. It was stressed that Security Council Resolution 598
should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the
conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end. Member countries
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of WEU will continue to support all efforts aimed at
achieving this. In this context they reiterated their
support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
4. Europe's vital interests require that the freedom of
navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times. The member
states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that
principle
.
5. Participants took note of the measures already
undertaken or envisaged by individual member countries.
They agreed to continue to consult each other and exchange
information in order to further develop their co-operation.
Meeting of 15th September 1987 on the situation in the Gulf
Press guidelines for the presidency
At the invitation of the Netherlands, which chairs the
Western European Union, and pursuant to the decision they
took at their meeting of 20th August 1987 to continue to
consult each other and exchange information in order to
further develop their co-operation, high officials of the
ministries for foreign affairs and defence of the member
states met in The Hague on 15th September 1987.
They had a thorough exchange of views on recent
developments in the Gulf and the efforts being undertaken by
the United Nations to bring to an end the conflict between
Iraq and Iran. They again stressed that Security Council
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Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith. They
will continue to support the efforts of the Secretary-
General and of the Security Council.
They underlined the importance they attach to the
principle of freedom of navigation. They noted the
decisions taken by some member countries since the last
meeting to commit naval forces to the Gulf region.
Participants reiterated their decision to continue the
process of concertation . It was agreed that representatives
of the member countries of WEU will continue to meet to
exchange information and to discuss related issues.
Meeting of 14th October 1987 on the situation in the Gulf
Press guidelines
High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs
and defence of the member states of WEU met in The Hague on
14th October 1987 to pursue their consultation on matters
pertaining to the situation in the Gulf area.
They noted that the navies of five member countries
will be active in the region. They discussed how to improve
their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the
practical/technical level, fully respecting the national
character of their respective activities.




WEU PRESS GUIDELINES FOR THE PRESIDENCY
WEU meeting on the Gulf of 15th February 1988:
Press guidelines for the Presidency
High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs
and defence of the member states of the Western European
Union met on 15th February 1988 at The Hague. They again
underlined the need to maintain solidarity.
They reviewed developments in the Gulf region since
their last meeting on 7th December 1987, and reaffirmed
their intention to further deepen their consultation
process, and to consider possibilities for rationalisation,
fully respecting the national character of their respective
missions
.
They reviewed the activities of the naval points of
contact for intensifying co-ordination in mine counter-
measure activities between WEU member nations in the Gulf.
The next meeting of the naval points of contact will be
held in Paris.
WEU meeting on the Gulf of 11th May 1988:
Press guidelines for the Presidency
Following the statement adopted by the Ministerial
Council of the Western European Union at its meeting of 19th
April 1988 in The Hague, high officials from the ministries
of foreign affairs and defence of member states met on 11th
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May 1988 at The Hague to discuss recent developments in the
Gulf.
They reiterated the importance of maintaining the
freedom of navigation and safety of shipping in the Gulf.
They noted that the WEU members which maintain a naval
presence in the Gulf provide, in accordance with long-
standing time-honoured maritime traditions, assistance to
shipping in distress, in application of established
international rules.
They expressed appreciation for all measures which
could contribute to achieving those aims and they noted with
great interest the recent statement of the United States
Government in this respect.
They will continue their diplomatic efforts,
particularly within the EPC framework, to support all
endeavours towards the full and early implementation of
Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only
framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by
the Iraq-Iran conflict.
Statement on recent events in the Gulf
(19th April 1988)
The member states of WEU expressed their grave concern
at the recent increase in hostilities in the Gulf following




They stress the necessity of respecting the principle
of free navigation. Several member states contribute to the
safeguard of this right by their maritime presence in the
Gulf. The member states reaffirm the importance of such a
contribution to the maintenance of freedom of navigation.
They urgently call for an immediate end to all mining
and other hostile activities against shipping in
international waters, taking into account that such
activities can call for measures for self defence.
They will continue their diplomatic efforts,
particularly within the EPC framework, to support all
endeavours towards the full and early implementation of
Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only






from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs
(August-September 1988)
Dear President, London, 12th October 1988
In my letter of 26th July 1988, I had the honour to
review — for you and the members of the parliamentary
Assembly of WEU — the main activities of the
intergovernmental organs of WEU during the period June-July
1988.
You will find below a summary of these activities in
August and September.
Like the previous one, this letter has been drafted and
issued by me under my own responsibility.
While the summer recess naturally slowed down WEU '
s
activities in August, it did not prevent it from following
current events closely and reacting whenever necessary.
Thus, sustained attention was paid to developments in
the war between Iran and Iraq and their impact on the
situation in the Gulf and representatives of the seven
member states met in London on 3rd August -- on the
initiative of the British presidency -- to review the first
real progress recorded in the search for a peaceful solution
to the war and to draw the possible consequences for the
presence in the region of warships from five of our member
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states which are helping to ensure respect for freedom of
navigation there.
On that occasion, they welcomed Iran's decision to
accept Security Council Resolution 598. They expressed the
hope that this would lead to the early, full implementation
of the resolution under the aegis of the United Nations
Secretariat-General
.
They also studied the possible implications of this
decision for the role of their naval forces in the Gulf.
They expressed satisfaction at the solidarity that has been
a characteristic of their activities in the Gulf. They
agreed to follow developments, to keep each other informed
and to meet again when necessary to consult each other in
the same spirit of solidarity, with the aim of continuing to
act in a concerted and coherent manner.
With the same concern for a concerted and coherent
approach, member states continued their consultations in
September
.
There has been a continuous response to this joint
political reflection in the form of technical co-ordination
ensured, on the spot, between fleet commanders and, in the
admiralties, between naval experts who met periodically.
All these procedures allowed actions by five member




It is important to specify that the two member states
not present in the Gulf continued to show their WEU
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